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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the regulation of the Nigerian life insurance industry during the 
1960-1988 period. The role and nature of regulatory policy, the extent of industry 
compliance with regulatory rules, and the degree to which policy formulation is 
subject to industry influence are examined. The changes in life industry structure, 
behaviour and performance are also examined in relation to the regulatory 
developments over the period. In this context, the effects of protectionist and other 
regulatory policies implemented in the industry are examined within the political 
economical framework of Nigeria. Three types of analytical methods are employed in 
the study; the historical method, the descriptive survey method and the empirical 
method. 
Chapter one contains an introduction to the thesis and in chapters two and three, the 
literature on the theory of regulation, the characteristics of developing country 
insurance markets and the arguments in favour of and against the implementation of 
protectionist policy in these markets are reviewed. Chapter four places the study in 
context by briefly examining the political economy of Nigeria. This discussion forms 
the basis for the analysis of regulation and regulatory developments in chapter five. 
Chapter six contains the descriptive and empirical analyses of the impact of policy on 
market structure, behaviour and perrormance. In the last chapter conclusions are made 
and policy recommendations presented. 
Although the stated objectives of regulation are a concern with the consumer and 
national economic interest, the results of the analyses lead to the conclusions that, 
among other things, (1) the development, implementation and supervision of policy 
has been impeded by an underresourced and understaffed regulatory agency (2) the 
implementation of protectionist policies in the Nigerian life market has not been 
successful in terms of the stated policy objectives (3) the consumer interest is in fact 
not being adequately protected and (4) the lack of cooperation between life offices 
has contributed to the industry's inability to influence regulatory policy in it's favour. 
It is recommended, among other things, that (1) the Government should withdraw 
from intensive participation in the life market and should channel it's resources 
towards maintaining an effective regulatory mechanism and (2) the implementation of 
protectionist policies in the market should be made with respect to the prevailing 
socio-economic and political conditions for maximum effectiveness. 
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Chapter 1 
Research Background 
1.1 The Motivation For the Study 
A cursory review of the literature and environment of the life insurance industry in 
Nigeria gives rise to the preliminary conclusion that despite the phenomenal growth 
of the economy in the past, the industry is struggling for existence. Nigeria has a 
population of approximately 100 million people and it is estimated! that only a little 
over one million life assurance policies have been issued to date. In percentage terms 
it has been suggested that less than 5% (Kiladejo 1987,p.101) of the total population 
own one form of life insurance policy or other. The figure may even be considerably 
lower when policy surrenders and lapses as well as ownership of multiple policies are 
taken into consideration. In addition, most (77.3%)2 of the life insurance underwritten 
in the country is in the form of group life rather than individual life business. 
This figure is quite low in comparison with countries like the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America where about 76%3 and 83%4 respectively of the 
population own life policies. In 1986, Switzerland, the USA and Japan had the highest 
per capita expenditure on insurance at a time when the gap in total insurance business 
between the industrial and developing countries had increased substantially. 5 
The market for insurance in Africa is very small, representing 1.3% of world-wide 
premiums in 1981. In 1981, Nigeria's share of world-wide insurance premiums was 
0.17%, a very low figure compared with the US (46%) and the UK (6.52%). It 
however ranked 27th out of a total of 55 developed and developing countries 
1. Figure obtained from the Nigerian Insurance Year Book 1987 Edition. 
2. Figure derived from the Nigeria Insurance Digest 1989. 
3. Figure obtained from Insurance Facts and Figures. British Insurance Association. Various Editions. 
4. Figure obtained from the Life Insurance Fact Book. Institute of Life Insurance. New York. 
5. Sigm;!. Swiss Re No.5/May 1988. 
2 
examined, and indeed appeared to be the largest African insurance market. 6 In terms 
of premiums as a percentage of GNP, and premiums per capita, the country ranked 
34th out of 49 (1.61 %), and 47th out of 54 countries respectively. The lowest 
premiums per capita were recorded in life insurance business (Nabolz 1986,pp.36-
45).7 The growth of the life market in real terms was put at less than 5% in 1985.8 
The situation does not appear to be improving. By 1986, Nigeria's share of world 
premiums had dropped. It was estimated at 0.02%, while the country ranked 56 out of 
61 countries (6th out of at least 11 African countries) in terms of total business. Its 
position stood at 49 out of 61 developed and developing countries (4th out of at least 
11 African countries) for life insurance business with a world share of 0.01%. 
Premiums per capita stood at 0.5% for life and 1.4% for non-life business, with 
Nigeria having the least premium per capita in all the African countries for life 
insurance business.9 
1.2 The Significance of the Study 
The low consumption levels of life insurance in Nigeria and the slow growth of the 
market are of economic and social importance for a number of reasons. Life insurance 
has a significant role to play in national development. Apart from its provision of 
protection for individuals in society, it can facilitate economic development by 
contributing to social stability, reducing the financial burden on the state, and serving 
as a source of development funds by mobilising domestic savings. 10 It's primary role 
is to alleviate anxiety and worry by enabling future provision to be made for 
retirement, old age or the death of the breadwinner in families. In addition to this, life 
insurance also has attendant social benefits. It encourages thrift and provision for old 
age/retirement and protects the individual family against the consequences of 
premature death, so that in the long run, the potential financial burden on the 
government and society, that would have arisen without it is reduced (Evans 1981; 
6. With the exception of South Africa. 
7. In 1985 UNCT AD launched the first statistical survey into the operations of insurers and reinsurers in 
developing markets the results of which were published in 1987 in UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/220 "Statistical 
Survey on Insurance and Reinsurance Operations in Developing Countries." 
8. Figure from Sigma. Swiss Re No.5lMay 1877. 
9. Figures from Sigm!!. Swiss Re No.5lMay 1988. The premiums per capita in Sigma were calculated on the basis 
of premiums as a percentage of GDP whereas the 1981 figures were based on GNP figures. This may account 
for some of the differential, but does not alter the basic argument. 
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Franklin and Woodhead 1980; Mehr and Cammack 1976). This occurs because life 
insurance encourages the savings habit among individual policyholders and as such 
facilitates the growth of a vibrant economy. 
This is illustrated by the fact that countries like Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Malaysia, which have strong life insurance industries, have experienced 
tremendous growth in national savings and domestic investment rates which have 
averaged over 20% of GDP in each country. The role of financial intermediation 
played by life insurers is particularly important in the context of developing 
economies since life insurance has been proven to be an effective mobilizer of funds 
which can be channelled into national development activities (Greenberg 1986,pp.28-
32). 
The gross premium generated from the numerous relatively small premium 
contributions of the policyholders as a result of the life offices activities are mobilised 
and subsequently channelled into various sectors of the economy such as government 
and private securities and the granting of loans and mortgages. This intermediation is 
made possible because a high proportion of life funds (unlike the case with general 
insurance business) is available for long term investment as a result of the long term 
nature of life office liabilities. Thus government and other institutional borrowers can 
obtain financial resources for capital development more efficiently than if they had to 
go around borrowing numerous small sums for their capital requirements. 
In the past, insurance practice in developing countries was patterned after the model 
of the former colonial powers who had colonised various territories. As a result, the 
insurance markets were open and there was limited regulation of the activities of the 
insurers operating in these markets. Western insurance practice was an alien activity 
in these countries in terms of economic structure and social organization and as such 
did not take into consideration the socio-economic situation of these countries. It was 
recognised (after the independence of these countries) that they might not experience 
the benefits of the institution of insurance mechanism if the insurance system did not 
take into consideration their socio-economic needs. Since the past and present 
experience of developing country insurers bears little resemblance to that of Western 
insurers, it was considered that the application of the Western principles and practice 
to the third world markets would not encourage their economic growth and 
development (Ripolli 1974,p.75, EI-Hassan 1981,p.43). Thus efforts were made to 
redress this issue mostly in the form of policy recommendations by the United 
10. See UNCT AD TDIBIC.3/177. 1982. "The Promotion of Life Insurance in Developing Countries". 
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Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD) secretariat in Geneva. 
These recommendations were adopted as resolutions and their thrust was mainly on 
"the need to establish, encourage or consolidate national insurance institutions"ll 
(Ripolli 1974,p.82). This, among other things, involved placing limitations on the 
operation of insurers. Thus developing country markets increasingly began to adopt 
restrictive measures and became" ... more restrictive in outlook" (Carter and Dickinson 
1978,p.3). 
As a result of the UNCT AD recommendations, in many less developed countries, the 
investment policies of life offices are integrated with economic policies that are 
implemented to stimulate the development of the economy. However the successful 
use of the institution of insurance for facilitating economic development appears to be 
dependant upon the extent of regulatory control involved. Under the regulatory 
model, the implementation of these policies is a function of; 
(1) the nature and quality of the regulations in force, 
(2) the ability of the regulatory agency to enforce the regulatory provisions, and 
(3) the extent to which the industry complies with the regulations (EI-Hassan, 
1981,p.47). 
In the developing economIes, it has been recognised that the support of the 
government in the promotion of life insurance is essential. Life insurance can achieve 
importance if there is an environment conducive to its growth and the attitudes and 
policies adopted by a government in respect of the role of life insurance and it's 
promotion in the country can be crucial to its success. 12 Thus in many developing 
economies the role of government in the insurance industry has been mainly 
interventionist, and this has resulted in various effects on the insurance industries 
concerned.13 The interventionist measures are mainly in the form of protectionist 
measures imposed on domestic insurance markets and are generally geared towards; 
(1) the protection of the domestic, that is, local market from foreign competition 
11. This is discussed in some more detail in chapter 3. 
12. See UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/177 "The Promotion of Life Insurance in Developing Countries." 
13. This aspect is fully discussed in chapter 3. 
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(2) the protection of consumer interests or 
(3) a combination of the preceding (Skipper 1987,p.65). 
UNCT AD has made policy recommendations with regard to the issue of 
protectionism in developing country insurance markets, and these recommendations 
have resulted in UNCT AD as being seen to be sympathetic to the developing country 
interests (Skipper, 1987,p.61). Nigeria in recent years has, to a large extent, 
implemented several of UNCT AD's recommendations in respect of protectionist 
measures related to; 
(1) the limitation of the activities of foreign insurers in the local market (e.g by the 
use of domestication14 policies) and 
(2) the limitation of the operational activities of all insurers in the local market (e.g 
restrictions on the purchase of foreign reinsurance services by direct insurers). 
Various justifications for the implementation of these policy measures have been 
given, viz, the protection of the consumers interest, and the development of a sound 
local insurance industry and solid local investment. 15 However, the success or 
otherwise of the implementation of specific policy measures geared toward the 
attainment of strong national markets has been called into question 16 with the 
developed country markets repeatedly calling for the liberalisation of trade in 
insurance services and the privatisation of insurance markets in the developing 
countries)7 The reasons advanced for this is that many developing country markets 
are inefficient, undercapitalised and lack the essential expertise and infrastructure to 
operate domestication policies successfully. 
In the light of these and related issues, this study exammes the development of 
regulatory policies in the Nigerian life insurance industry during the period from 
1960-1988. The objective is to determine the manner in which government policy in 
the field of insurance has influenced industry structure, conduct and performance 
14. The words "domestication" and "localisation" are used interchangeably. 
15. See Skipper (1987.pp.71-81) for a discussion on the rationales for protectionism in insurance. 
16. A full discussion is provided in chapter 3. 
17. See UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/229 "Insurance in Developing Countries: Review of Developments in 1986-1988." 
6 
during the period. The focus of the analysis is on the post-independent period (from 
1960 onwards) although the historical development of the industry will be examined 
within the context of the study. This is because statistics in relation to insurance 
industry activities are available only from the 1960's. The year 1988 has been selected 
because industry data beyond that period are unavailable as at the time of writing. 
Some broad characteristics of the Nigerian economy are examined so as to describe 
the general environment surrounding the insurance market during this period. Thus 
life insurance market structure, behaviour and performance are discussed in the 
context of the regulatory environment and the socio-political environment. 
1.3 The Statement of The Subgoals 
A number of subgoals have been generated which are pursuant to the analysis. 
(1) The first subgoal is to examine the role and nature of regulatory policies in the 
Nigerian Life insurance Industry during the period from 1960-1988. This 
includes an appraisal of the objectives, nature, content and scope of regulatory 
policy during the period, as well as the capacity of the regulatory agency, in this 
instance the Insurance Department, to regulate the industry. The extent of 
industry compliance with regulatory provisions is also examined, as well as the 
degree or extent to which policy formulation is subject to industry influence. 
(2) The second subgoal is to examme the shifts/changes in industry structure, 
conduct and performance in relation to regulatory developments over the 
relevant period. 
(3) The third subgoal is to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory policies in 
terms of their stated objectives over the relevant period. This is intended to lead 
to prescriptive recommendations as to the proper focus of future legislative 
action in the field of life insurance in the country. 
1.4 The Delimitations 
The analysis at hand suffers from a number of constraints. Although the regulatory 
authorities compile some data with respect to the insurance market, this data is 
checkered and incomplete. This is by no means peculiar to the Nigerian market. The 
problem of the lack of administrative data and the poor quality of available data is 
7 
Figure lA 
A Structural Representation of the Research Problem 
The purpose of this study lS: 
Subgoal One 
Subgoal Two 
Subgoal Three 
Adapted from Leedy 1989 
to examlne the objectives, nature, 
content and scope of regulatory 
policy between 1960-1988 
to determine the capacity of the 
Insurance Department to regulate 
and the extent of industry 
compliance with regulatory rules 
to determine the extent to 
which policy formulation lS 
subject to industry influence 
to examlne the shifts In industry 
structure conduct and performance 
In relation to regulatory 
developments 
to evaluate the effectiveness of 
regulatory policies over 
the period 
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characteristic of developing countries (see Casley and Lury 1987 ,pp.1-14). It has been 
stated that politics, rather than statistics drives public policy decision making and as 
such the incentive to gather adequate and reliable statistics is low and so; 
"In many developing countries, despite nominal affmnations of 
interest, traditional administrators do not really believe in the value 
of...data in formulating and implementing public policy. The demand 
for quality data may thus be 10w ... Politics is more often the order of 
the day than statistics (B ulmer 1982,pp.3-7)." 
This appears to be true in the case of the Nigerian insurance market. First, in the early 
years, there were no legislative requirements as regards the establishment and 
maintenance of records by the insurance companies operating in the market. This was 
at the time when the market was dominated by foreign insurers, who it can be said did 
not care whether such records were kept in Nigeria since their activities were 
supervised by their parent companies abroad. 
Second, even after legislative measures imposed requirements for the maintenance of 
records, this was done in a haphazard manner. Where the blame arises for this state of 
affairs is not quite clear. The insurance companies blame the supervisory authorities, 
and the authorities accuse the companies of not submitting records in accordance with 
regulatory requirements. 
Third, even where the records are submitted in accordance with the legal requirement, 
the lack of skilled staff and computing facilities in the Insurance department preclude 
a competent compilation of comprehensive and accurate insurance company data. 
However, in addition to the Insurance Department there are four other sources of 
insurance statistics which have been employed in this study. They are: 
(1) The annual publications of the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation, that is, The 
Nigeria Reinsurance Year Book, 
(2) The Nigeria Insurance Digest, a publication of the Nigeria Insurance 
Association, 
(3) The Annual Abstract of Statistics, published by the Federal Office of Statistics, 
and 
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(4) The Central Bank Economic and Financial Review published by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria. 
The limitations related to the use of all of the above data sources is that some of the 
statistical data is inconsistent across the different government offices that compile 
them. For example, the statistics on premium income for the same years differ 
according to the data source. This is mainly because of the manner in which statistics 
relating to insurance activities are reported to the various bodies. The Nigerian 
Insurance Year Book, for example, compiles data based on returns made by insurers 
to both the Insurance Department and the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation. The 
Nigeria Insurance Digest statistics are based on returns submitted by members of the 
Nigeria Insurance Association. I8 However, while these other bodies provide a good 
source of macro (consolidated) data in respect of industry operations, micro, that is 
individual company data on most aspects of insurance company operations are to be 
found in the Insurance Department. 
The study is limited to the analysis of the activities of direct life specialist and 
composite offices in Nigeria. 
1.5 The Data And The Treatment of The Data 
The data used for this study are of three kinds, historical data, and survey data of a 
descriptive and analytical nature. 
These data fall into two categories, primary and secondary data. The primary data 
utilised are the written records and accounts of past happenings and events such as the 
various legislative instruments and policy documents, as well as information obtained 
from official government and private sources (see section 1.4). The secondary data 
are Government and industry data bases on insurance company operations. Published 
studies and texts as well as unpublished studies and dissertations relevant to the 
subgoals have been employed for descriptive purposes. 
To ensure as much as is possible, within the limitations specified above, the 
authenticity and validity of the evidence and data used, the sources of such 
18. The NiGeria Insurance Digest published its maiden issue in 1985. in response to the urgent need for a 
comprehensive database for insurance activities in the country. 
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infonnation are official. In this regard "official" is not limited to Nigeria and the 
sources include the sources enumerated in section 1.4 above. 
1.6 The Research Methodology 
Three types of analytical methods are employed in the study; the historical method, 
the survey method and the statistical method. 
The historical method is concerned with the analysis of documentary sources, and the 
object is 
" ... to provide a means through which the researcher may deal with 
problems that arise from events that happened in times past and to 
interpret what might otherwise be considered merely as the happening 
of blind fortune (Leedy 1989,p.125)." 
Consequently, this method is appropriate to the analysis of subgoal one, that is, the 
historical development of the life insurance regulation in the context of the political 
and socio-economic environment. 
The survey method is a tool that can be used to generate infonnation from people 
(respondents) who can supply information for use in examining the research problem. 
Surveys may be descriptive or analytical as the case may be. Descriptive surveys 
provide results which may be used to generate ideas and hypotheses which can 
subsequently be tested using statistical analysis (Allan 1991,p.179). The experience 
survey in particular, 
"attempts to tap the knowledge of those familiar with the general 
subject being investigated (Churchill 1988,p.82)." 
The analytical survey method can be used to obtain quantitative data which can be 
tested statistically (Leedy 1989,p.89). The descriptive survey and analytic survey 
methods are applied to the analysis of subgoals two and three, and some of the 
infonnation obtained is tested statistically as appropriate. 19 
19. Methodology in relation to the analysis of statistical data is discussed extensively in chapter 6. 
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During the period from May 1991 to July 1991, an experience20 survey was 
conducted. Interviews were held with some insurance industry executives who were 
familiar with some of the issues relevant to the study. The economies of the research 
process necessitated a limitation of the number of executives approached. Ten 
insurance companies operating within the commercial centre of Lagos were 
approached. After repeated effort, seven companies (six direct21 companies and one 
national reinsurance company) responded positively. Access to the insurance 
companies presented some problems. This is not unusual in the Nigerian situation. 
For example, in an earlier study22 of the Nigerian insurance market, there was a 
marked reluctance on the part of company executives to give personal interviews. 
Questionnaires sent out to insurance companies were not returned. However, 
fortunately for the researcher, he was appointed to serve on a Government 
investigating committee into the industry. Consequently the companies were 
compelled to complete and return the questionnaires. For this study, former students 
and friends were used as a means of gaining access to key personnel in the insurance 
companies selected. 
A convenience sample, rather than a random sample, was used as the basis for the 
selection of the companies. This was because (1) certain criteria were used as a basis 
for the selection of companies and (2) the use of a convenience sample reduced to 
some extent the problem of access to the companies. 
The basis for the selection of the companies was as follows: 
(1) All the companies had been operating in the market for at least ten years at the 
time the interviews were held. 
(2) Companies with different ownership structures were selected. Out of the seven 
respondent companies, three were national, that is, under government 
ownership and control. Another three had a minimum of 40% foreign equity 
and one was an indigenous (domestic) company. 
20. The experience survey is alternatively referred to a "key informant" survey. or qualitative interview. See Jones 
(1991,pp.203-214). 
21. Direct insurance companies mainly underwrite direct insurance business from the insurance market and may 
accept reinsurance business from other insurers. Reinsurance companies specialise in underwriting reinsurance 
business only. and as such accept business from insurers and reinsurers only. 
22. See Falegan 1991.pp.31-32. 
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(3) Companies with different underwriting portfolios were selected. One23 was a 
specialist company, underwriting life insurance business only, while the other 
six24 were composites. 
The last two selection criteria were employed in an attempt to incorporate respondents 
who might have differing points of view with respect to some of the issues raised 
during the discussions. None of the companies approached was prepared to release 
individual company data relevant to the study. Eight senior personnel in seven of 
these companies were interviewed.25 All the industry executives interviewed had 
spent a minimum of ten years practicing in the life insurance market. 
Although a standardised26 interview schedule was used as a guide-line, the interviews 
were informal. The interview format was semi-structured in the sense that although 
the questions in the schedule were standardised for ease of comparability of 
responses, the questions were open-ended rather than closed since the purpose of the 
interviews was mainly to solicit facts and opinions about the issues with which the 
study is concerned. Thus, a semi-structured informal interview process would best 
facilitate candid responses and also generate hitherto unknown information relevant to 
the study. All of the insurance company interviews were recorded on tape to 
encourage a free flow discussion. Although no pilot interviews were conducted 
because of time and financial resource constraints, because the interviews were semi-
structured, this allowed for the possibility to explore any interesting issues which 
might be raised. The respondents were asked for permission to record the interviews 
on tape, and in all except one, agreed. In three cases, because of background noise, 
written notes were taken in addition to the tape recordings as a back-up. Respondents 
were asked about their views on regulation of the insurance industry in general and 
the life insurance industry in particular, market structure and conduct as well as their 
ability to comply with regulatory requirements, among other things.27 
23. The African Alliance Insurance Co. 
24. The American International Insurance Co.; Crusader Insurance Co.; Financial Insurance Co.; Great Nigeria 
Insurance Co.; NICON; The Nigerian Reinsurance Co. 
25. See section 5.2.2.7. 
26. The respondents were asked the same questions using the same words and the questions were asked in the 
same order. For literature on interview techniques see. among others. Sellitz. Wrightsman and Cook 
(1976.pp.294-320). Churchill 1988. Allan 1991 and Jones 1991. 
27. See appendix B for interview schedule used in insurance company interviews. 
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Two regulatory officials from the Insurance Department were also interviewed. A 
separate interview schedule was employed in the manner described above. However, 
the discussions at the Department were not recorded on audio tapes, because the 
respondents objected. Since the personnel interviewed were bound under the Official 
Secrets Act, one of them, Mr. X, apparently concerned that he might have released 
"sensitive" information requested anonymity.28 This reluctance to speak had been 
anticipated, and in an attempt to overcome this, issues that might be considered 
sensitive were not broached until well into the interview after a few "tame" questions 
had been asked and rapport and trust established. The structure of the Insurance 
Department, personnel issues and the development of public policy in Insurance, 
among other things, formed the basis of the discussions.29 
1.7 The Thesis Structure 
The study is divided into seven chapters. The literature on the theory of the regulation 
of markets in general and financial markets in particular is examined in chapter two. 
In chapter three, the characteristics of developing country insurance markets is 
examined and the arguments in favour and against the implementation of protectionist 
policies in these markets will be discussed. Chapters two and three form the 
conceptual basis for the study. In chapter four the political economy of Nigeria is 
examined briefly in order lay a foundation for the discussion of regulatory sources, 
their intent and content, as well as development within the context of Nigeria's socio-
economic and political environment, which is undertaken in chapter five. The results 
of the descriptive and empirical analysis relevant to the study are presented and 
discussed in chapter six, while in the concluding chapter, the results are summarised 
and discussed in the light of the prevailing regulatory theories and arguments. In 
chapter seven policy recommendations are made based on the conclusions drawn 
from the results of the analysis. 
28. Mr X was unwilling to cooperate unless he was given the assurance that the information was to be used for 
purposes of research only. He in fact made the statement that " .. .if this (that is the information given) gets out, 
I will deny everything." 
29. See appendix C for interview schedule. 
15 
Chapter 2 
Regulation and Insurance 
Introduction 
In this section the concept of regulation is examined and a review of the various 
economic and political views as to the purposes of regulation in general and insurance 
regulation in particular is undertaken. The purpose is to lay a conceptual foundation 
for the study of insurance regulation in the Nigerian life insurance industry. 
2.1 The Concept of Regulation 
Regulation may be viewed as the process of subjecting an activity to some form of 
control. There are three aspects of the regulatory process. First, the generation or 
development of rules to serve as a code of conduct or behaviour. This is the nominal 
aspect of regulation. In addition to this, regulation also involves the monitoring or 
policing of behaviour. This is because regulation is meaningless unless there can be 
put in place a means of ensuring compliance with the rules that have been generated 
by monitoring the behaviour of those whose activities are subject to regulation. Then 
there is what can be referred to as the punitive aspect of regulation which is 
concerned with the punishment of non-compliance with the rules which invariably 
leads to the imposition of sanctions by the regulatory body. 
For example, the laws of a country may be set by parliament, the function of the 
police is to ensure compliance with the laws, and punishment for infringement is 
imposed by the judiciary. In the context of insurance business, rules are generated by 
the appropriate governing body, compliance is ensured by the relevant supervisory 
authority which has been given the charge of insurance business and infringement of 
the rules may be dealt with by the supervisory authority and/or the courts. 
Economists have long been concerned with the economic effects of regulation and a 
number of hypotheses regarding these effects have developed over the years. 
Traditionally, The Consumer Protection Hypothesis has been utilised to explain the 
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purpose of government intervention in markets. As it's name suggests, the basic thrust 
of the hypothesis is that the purpose of governmental intervention in markets is to 
protect the public welfare. The Producer Protection Hypothesis has been offered as an 
alternative explanation. It purports that the "purpose in fact" of government 
intervention is to protect the interests of certain groups (the producers) in the 
regulated industry. Posner (1971) used the phrase "purpose in fact" to 
"distinguish ... between the reasons ascribed to regulatory laws and decisions by the 
legislators and regulators themselves and the reasons, whether or not anywhere 
avowed, that provide a consistent explanation of the actual course and consequences 
of regulation. " 
The No-effect Hypothesis (Jordan 1972,p.153) and Taxation by Regulation (Posner 
1971) have also been advanced to explain the purpose of the economic regulation of 
industrial activities. Before the various hypotheses are examined, it is necessary to 
define what is meant by the word "regulation" in this context. 
2.1.1 The Definition of Regulation 
Regulation has been described as a process that involves "the use of governmental 
power to guide personal or organizational conduct" (Bernstein 1955,p.259). Although 
the exercise of regulatory powers is generally considered to be the prerogative of 
governmental bodies, it should be recognized that the performance of all regulatory 
activity is not necessarily restricted to government and various definitions of 
regulation take account of this fact. 
Consider, as an example, Mitnick's (1988) work in which he offered several of what 
he termed "definitional perspectives" of the regulatory process. He took a broad view 
of regulation as the "intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity, by an 
entity not directly party to or involved in that activity." This definition could 
encompass the efforts of say, a parent, controlling some of the activities in which his 
child is engaged. The definition is however restrictive because it would apparently not 
include the supervisory activities of, for example, the governing boards of 
professional organisations vis a vis the industrial activities of their members, under 
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the assumption that members of the board are also engaged (directly or indirectly), 1 in 
the activities being regulated. 
Additionally, it would apparently not include a situation in which the government as 
the entity carrying out the regulatory activity, (the regulator) is also directly engaged 
in the activity being regulated. For example, the evidence in various insurance 
markets shows that public (government) participation in the industry may, apart from 
regulation, take various forms such as partnership, competition, and exclusive agency. 
Thus there could be a situation in which the government forms partnerships with 
private indigenous and/or foreign firms or individuals. The government may also run 
fully state owned companies which operate in direct competition with other privately 
owned companies. This, we shall see further on, is the situation in the Nigerian 
insurance market. Thus, as Mitnick points out, his definition would not apply to 
situations in which there is no clear cut distinction between the regulator or regulatee. 
Mitnick's more restrictive definition of regulation as "the public2 administrative 
policing of a private activity with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest" 
excludes from the scope of the exercise of regulatory powers non-governmental 
institutions or entities. It also brings into focus the perceived purpose of regulatory 
activity-a concern with the effects of private activity on the public welfare. The nature 
or characteristics of both the regulatee and regulator defines the nature and sphere of 
regulatory activity, and this may differ from situation to situation. Mitnick 
(l980,p.14) expressed the various regulatory possibilities by defining what he called a 
"typology of regulation" in which he isolated four possibilities of regulation among 
public and private parties: 
(1) Traditional regulation (the public regulation of private activity) 
(2) Capture (the reverse of traditional regulation, that is private activity controlling 
the nature of public regulation) 
(3) Private self-regulation (the private regulation of private parties), and 
1. The nature of involvement would be indirect if, for example, a member of the board had fmancial interests in a 
particular finn. 
2. Emphasis mine. 
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(4) Government self-regulation (the public regulation of public parties). 
Insurance regulation may fall within the first three areas of activity and the broad 
scope of regulatory activity3 in this area covers some of the intra-organisational and 
inter-organisational activities of insurance firms within the industry. 
Private activity can be subject to various kinds of regulatory rules. Koch (1974,p.340) 
refers to the regulation of economic activity as the "comprehensive rules, instructions, 
procedures, and attention" that a regulatory agency imposes upon a particular 
industry. This definition is very broad and would include the regulation of all the 
significant economic variables associated with the firms' activities in a particular 
industry such as the regulation of products, prices, distribution and promotional 
arrangements. 
It should be appreciated that the process of regulation is a continuing one. Regulation 
should not be seen in terms of static acts of control by the regulatory authority, but 
rather as an on-going, dynamic process (Mitnick 1988,p.8). It is the product of a 
dynamic process with social, political and economic determinants (Van den Berghe 
1990,p.199), and it is virtually impossible to separate regulation from the general 
political and social setting in a society. Consequently a thorough knowledge of 
markets as well as their economic purpose and effects is essential to the development 
of an efficient system of regulation in which regulatory policy can be adapted to 
changes in the economic and socio-political environment (See Bernstein 1955,pp.252-
257, and also Veljanovski 1988,p.7). Others share this view of the need for dynamism 
in the regulatory process. For example, in 1968 the Superintendent of Insurance of 
New York commenting on the need to keep insurance regulation responsive to current 
public needs and current realities within the regulated industry, stated that 
"Regulation is the process of bringing current values of society to bear on current 
practices of an essential industry, and hence regulation must seek relevance rather 
than permanence" (Stewart 1969,p.32). 
3. For a detailed discussion on the scope of insurance regulation. see Hellner (l963),pp.494-543. 
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2.2 The Theory of Regulation 
Two theories have traditionally been advanced to explain the operation of the 
regulatory process. They are the consumer protection hypothesis (the public interest 
theory), which has its basis in economic theory, and the producer protection 
hypothesis which has been advocated by scholars in the field of economics and 
political science. Apart from these basic theories, over the years some scholars, 
dissatisfied with the traditional theories of regulation, have offered alternative 
theories by either modifying the traditional ones, or developing new theories. The 
various theories of the regulatory process are examined in the following section. 
2.2.1 The Consumer Protection Hypothesis 
The consumer protection hypothesis which, as the term implies, proposes that 
government regulation of industry is implemented to protect the interests of 
consumers, is the basis of what is referred to as the public interest theory. The 
question arises-who is the public and what is the "public interest"? 
The concept of a "business affected with the public interest" can be traced to the 17th 
century to Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale, the British jurist. At that time the phrase 
was not used in connection with commercial enterprises. It was not until 1876, when 
in Munn v. Illinois (94 U.S 113) the U.S Supreme Court stated the (state) 
governments right to regulate "properties ... with a public interest" that the phrase was 
applied to commercial enterprises (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.651; Greene 1977). In 
1961, in the seminal work "The Principles of Public Utility Rates" James C. 
Bonbright provided the basis for what came to be known as the public interest theory 
of regulation. He described the primary purpose of public utility regulation as the 
protection of consumers, defining a public utility as "any enterprise subject to 
regulation, including price regulation, of a type designed primarily to protect 
consumers," i.e "a business affected with a public interest." 
The extension of the public utility concept has led to a broader definition of a 
business affected with a public interest. The phrase is now used in a broad sense to 
describe any enterprise subject to special regulation (not necessarily a public utility) 
of a type designed primarily to protect consumers (Bonbright 1961,pp.3-7). The term 
"special regulation" implies that such an enterprise would be subject to certain 
constraints in its operations in the market as it would of necessity have to operate in 
Figure 2A 
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an environment more restrictive to its activities as compared with other businesses 
(Mehr and Cammack 1976,pp.651-652). 
The nature of the public interest may take different forms depending upon which 
group or groups of people are seen as constituting the public. Although in its original 
sense the public is taken to mean consumers (rather than taxpayers or producers), 
(Bonbright 1961,p.4), the public may in actual fact largely be classes of individuals 
such as individual shareholders, institutional investors, or employees. The 
development of public interest theory was in response to the need to analyse and 
justify regulation and government interference in the market economy. It starts from 
the hypothesis that the operations of the free market economy are inefficient, this 
inefficiency having led to a non-optimal allocation of resources. The failure of the 
market may be attributed to a number of factors such as; 
(1) the existence of a substantial amount of market power by a finn/firms, and 
(2) uncompetitive practices such as price-discrimination among other things.4 
The concept of public interest theory although broadly understood and applied, is 
largely unarticulated (Posner 1974,p.335). Its general application is however 
pervasive as can be seen from the fact that the professed purposes for governmental 
regulation of economic activity are based upon this concept. The reasons advanced 
for the governmental regulation of economic activity include, among other things; 
(1) the need for the regulation of natural monopolies or the elimination of 
unreasonable monopolies, 
(2) assuring fair competition, 
(3) the conservation and allocation of natural resources, 
(4) the promotion of an expanding economy and, 
(5) the protection of consumers and investors (Koch 1974, and Mehr and Cammack 
1976,p.650). 
4. For a discussion of the reasons why economic regulation may be imposed on an industry, see e.g Koch (1974) at 
pp.339-355. 
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2.2.1.1 Financial Markets and The Public Interest 
Financial markets in most countries are characterised by extensive regulation. Kay 
(1988,pp.35-42), identifies several reasons for this: 
(1) [the historical] political mistrust of the financial community by the public at 
large, 
(2) the macroeconomic significance of financial markets and their attractiveness to 
the operations of sophisticated criminals, 
(3) the what he terms "remarkable" vagueness of contracts, particularly insurance 
contracts, and 
(4) asymmetry of information.5 
Edwards (1982,p.82) argues that the one goal of overriding importance in the 
regulation of financial markets is "to maintain stability in financial markets and to 
guarantee that vicissitudes in economic activity do not undennine the economic 
health of nations and of the world economy". Thus other goals are of "lesser" 
importance since "a regulatory system that achieved these while failing to maintain 
financial and economic stability would clearly be a failure." Others, for example van 
den Berghe (1990,p.207) are also of the opinion that the stability of the financial 
sector is crucial to the equilibrium of the economy, since this sector is performing "a 
strategic buffer function". 
Financial regulation has several "potential" purposes such as the protection against 
systemic risk i.e "the risk that some sizeable part of the system as a whole may 
collapse " as well as the lofty aim of investor protection. The purpose of investor 
protection has been defined as that of providing "regulation which should be no 
greater than is necessary to protect reasonable people from being made fools of."6 The 
common purpose of all these defined purposes is the concern with the public welfare. 
5. Asymmetry of infonnation is discussed further on in the paper. 
6. Professor Ian Gower Cited in Veljanovski (1988) at p.7. 
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The theoretical foundation of the public interest theory is based in the economic 
theory of competitive markets. The assumptions of the theory are that, ceteris paribus, 
a perfectly competitive market will exhibit the following characteristics; 
(1) It will be atomistic in that there will be a large number of participants in terms 
of buyers and sellers, 
(2) Rational (profit maximising) econotnlc behaviour will be exhibited by all 
participants since each of them has perfect knowledge of the market, that is, 
complete and accurate information of all relevant and future conditions 
pertaining to prices, costs, and demand in the market, 
(3) Homogeneity of each sellers products and, 
(4) Non-existent or insignificant barriers to entry into the market (Koch 
1974,pp.15-25; Shepherd 1985). 
All these conditions are obviously not fulfilled in real life markets. The financial 
markets is a case in point. There is a lack of complete and accurate information in 
these markets. This exists in the form of (1) asymmetric information between the 
competitors in the market place and (2) an information gap between the individual 
investor and the financial institutions with which he is dealing. 
In insurance markets in particular, this means that most if not all the relevant 
information in terms of, for example, the "quality" of the insurance product relative to 
its price, that is needed to enable the policyholder to make the optimum, rational 
economic decision 7 is in the possession of the insurance company. In fact, in 
insurance markets, a double information gap exists because not only does the 
policyholder have insufficient information to make an informed decision, 
additionally, the insurer does not have perfect information about the nature of the 
individual risks presented by different policyholders (the risk exposure) with which he 
is dealing (Vanden Berghe 1990,p.203). For example although the insurer may be 
able to assess with some degree of accuracy the physical hazards associated with a 
given risk presented by the policyholder, it would be much more difficult to measure 
the degree of moral or morale hazard involved. 8 These and other special features of 
7. In order to make an informed. optimal decision. the policyholder should be able to make price/quality 
comparisons between the products of competing insurance firms as well as between the product choices 
available to him within a particular firm. 
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the insurance contract provide the explanation for its being classified as a business 
affected with a public interest (Mehr and Cammack 1976,pp.651-652). Thus, the 
existence of information asymmetry in financial markets in general "creates a 
potential requirement for regulation ... and ... lies behind the traditional regulatory 
posture in financial markets over the last century ... " (Kay 1988,p.37). 
2.2.2 The Producer Protection Hypothesis 
Although some empirical evidence has been advanced in support of the public interest 
theory (see, for example, Moore 1961; Edwards and Edwards 1974) this view of 
regulation is not universally accepted by all theorists and/or empiricists. Apart from 
the obvious difficulties entailed in detennining what constitutes the public interest9, 
since different people have differing views of what constitutes the public interest, it 
has been argued that two apparent assumptions of the theory namely, that markets 
will tend to operate very inefficiently if left alone, and that there is virtually no cost 
associated with government regulation are not justified by the available evidence. If 
the assumptions were correct, it would be expected that the incidence of government 
intervention in markets would be positively correlated with monopolistic market 
structures or the presence of external costs or benefits and regulation would be a 
costless procedure. Posner (1974,p.336) stated that the evidence from theoretical and 
empirical studies conducted by economists over a period of about fifteen years did not 
support the assumptions. The results demonstrated that "regulation is not positively 
correlated with the presence of external economies or diseconomies." 
Although some theorists agree that market imperfections do exist, they do not see the 
purpose of the regulatory process as the protection of consumer interests, but rather as 
a means by which powerful interests such as firms with a high percentage of market 
share in the regulated industry are protected as a result of what is referred to as 
"regulatory capture".10 It is considered that the naive belief in the ability of the 
8. In insurance terminology, a hazard is a condition that serves to increase the probability of a loss occurring as 
well as it's severity when it does occur. A physical hazard is an objective characteristic such as state of health 
of insured, or occupation a moral hazard is a subjective characteristic which has it's basis in the mental 
attitudes/disposition of the insured. Morale hazards are associated with carelessness or indifference on the 
insureds part (see Mehr and Cammack. (1976) at pp.23-24. and also Bickelhaupt (1979) at pp.7-9. 
9. See Bernstein (1955) at pp.154-163. Noll (1971) and Schumpeter (1950). in Early (1974) at p.I92. who stated 
that "There is. first. no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be 
made to agree [sic] on by the force of rational argument. This is due not primarily to the fact that some people 
may want things other than the common good but to the much more fundamental fact that to different 
individuals and groups the common good is bound to mean different things." 
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government to correct market failures based on the assumption that government in its 
regulatory role is "an independent and neutral factor, able to surpass all conflicts of 
interest and exclusively guided by the general "public interest" is unjustified and 
erroneous" (Van den Berghe 1990,p.209). This is because in the long run the regulator 
will tend to adopt views similar to that of the regulated industry. This is because both 
parties are employing "similar training, similar tasks, similar data, and similar 
techniques" and in time will establish their values by reference to each other (Stewart 
1969,p.34). 
The results of some of the work done in this area appear to be inconclusive. A number 
of studies of some regulated industries support the view that the "purpose in fact" of 
regulation is not the protection of consumer welfare. For example, Coase's (1959) 
study of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 11 , demonstrated that 
decisions taken by the FCC with respect to the licensing of broadcasting stations were 
not necessarily made in the public interest. Similarly, Hilton's (1966) study into the 
purpose, internal consistency and adequacy of the Interstate Commerce Act led to his 
observation that "The Act...[has] .... perpetuated the problem with which it was 
designed to deal", that is cartelization and collusion in the railroad industry. 
Huntington (1966) also studied the Interstate Commerce Commission and in his study 
demonstrated the way in which the ICC, in response to political demands and 
pressures from interest groups in the railroads, made regulatory decisions that 
favoured them and how the ICC gradually became dependent on the support of this 
segment of the transportation industry. Harris (1966) examined a specific case in 
which pressure groups tried to influence a regulatory agency by successfully opposing 
the election of a particular senator who they knew could not be subject to their 
political pressures and demands. 
Kitch, Issacsson and Kasper (1971) investigated the regulation of taxi cabs in Chicago 
and came to the conclusion that among other things, political pressure in the city had 
ensured a limitation on the number of licensed taxi-cabs operating in the city which 
was not in the welfare of the consumers. 
10. Discussed further on. 
11. The Federal Communications Commission is a regulatory agency charged with the supervision of the 
communications industry in the U.S.A. 
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On the other hand, there appears to be evidence that the regulation of an industry 
could sometimes produce mixed results, that is, the protection of both consumer 
welfare and the producer interest. Moore (1961) surveyed a number of regulated 
occupations and businesses in Chicago. His purpose was to determine whether 
licensing was carried out in the public interest or in order to confer monopoly power 
on regulated businesses and occupations. The results of the study were mixed. He 
found that restrictions on entry/registration which were the "least restrictive" and 
"least persistent" type of regulation appeared to be designed primarily in the public 
interest. On the other hand "non-price rationing regulations", (entry requirements that 
no expenditure of funds will satisfy) and the requirements of the self regulating 
occupations were the most restrictive and appeared to have been designed for the 
benefit of the practitioners in terms of preventing or reducing new entry into the 
professions. With regard to the licensing of occupations, his specific conclusions were 
that licensing raises the cost of entry into occupations because "Legislatures seem to 
license those occupations which it is most in the public interest to regulate and, in 
doing so, establish certain regulations which benefit practitioners." 
Regulatory capture, that is the process by which the regulatory agency is dominated 
by major or powerful interest groups, within the regulated industry, is discussed 
extensively in the political science and economic literature. In 1971, George Stigler in 
his "Theory of Economic Regulation" argued that regulation of industry was not 
directed towards the benefit of the public interest, but that" ... as a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for it's benefit". He 
believed that the economic regulation of industry should be based on the "rational 
theory of political behaviour" and proposed the hypothesis that politically effective 
industries or occupations would seek to control entry into their industries or 
occupations. His thesis was that the process of the economic regulation of markets 
could be modelled in terms of demand/supply considerations, with the regulated 
industry demanding regulation and the regulatory agency supplying the desired 
regulation at a price which is the political support of the regulated industry. Stigler12 
has come to be considered as the founder of what is variously known as "the interest 
group or capture theory", "the economic theory of regulation" (Posner 1974) or the 
"Stiglerian" (Ippolito 1979) view of regulation. 
Although Stigler'S theory provoked a lot of study into the economic regulation of 
industry, interest group theory had however been earlier discussed in the political 
12. In 1982, Stigler won the Nobel Prize for economics, "which specifically referred to his theory of economic 
regulation" (Meier 1988, p.l81). 
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science literature. 13 As far back as 1908, Arthur F. Bentley published his classical 
" ... more often cited than read work" The Process of Govemment14 which discussed 
the influence of interest groups over the process of administrative decision-making. 
This work was widely regarded as seminal, although it and the work of similar writers 
like Truman has been criticized as being seriously lacking in theory.15 Posner 
believed that the deficiency in their work stemmed from the fact that the "theories" 
did not explain the reason for the effective representation of some but not other 
interest groups in the political process, and additionally failed to specify the 
conditions under which interest groups succeeded or failed to obtain regulatory 
policies favourable to them. 
The political SCIence literature progressively began to emphasise the special 
importance of a particular interest group, the firms, usually the dominant firms, in the 
regulated industry, and attempts were made to explain the dynamics of the regulatory 
process on the basis of the theory of interest groups. Bernstein (1955,pp.250-259) 
stated that in the context of the American environment, regulation had been actively 
sought by groups that were concerned that the public be protected from business 
practices that were inimical to the public interest. He argued that however, although 
there are a few instances in which an industry will demand regulation, in many cases 
dominant interest groups within the industry will be hostile to any form of 
governmental interference and may oppose it. This is because the interest groups 
perceive the establishment of the regulatory agency or the enactment of legislation as 
the case may be, as not being in the (economic) interests of the industry. Once, 
however, the regulatory mechanism is in force, the affected interest groups will 
change tactics and fight for the maintenance of the status quo, seeking for ways of 
influencing the decision making processes of the regulatory agency in their favour. 
"Reformist rather than revolutionary in orientation," they change tactics and "attempt 
to make public policy the instrument of their aims" (Leiserson 1946,p.296). 
13. Meier ibid., notes that Stigler's theory was largely ignored by political scientists probably because they had 
similar theories and they considered that this theory was not radically different from their own theories (pp.21-
22). 
14. Cited in the introduction to Bentley's work by Odegard, (1967) at p.xiii. 
15. Posner (1974) at p.341 stated that " ... Bentley and Truman and their followers, ... have developed some evidence 
of interest groups in legislative and administrative processes, but unfortunately their work is almost entirely 
devoid of theory." 
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Economists also lent support to this view of the regulatory process. For example, 
Coase (1959,p.36) in his study of the FCC referred to " ... the extent to which pressure 
is brought to bear on the Commission by politicians and businessmen ... with a view to 
influencing it's decisions." As mentioned previously, the work of Hilton (1966) and 
Kitch et Al (1971) are also illustrative of the degree and nature of the pressure that 
can be exerted on regulatory agencies. The actual process by which the regulated 
industry "captures" the regulatory agency has been extensively treated in the political 
science literature. The interest groups engage in lobbying and similar political 
activities, the objective of which is to ensure that officials sympathetic to their 
interests, are employed in the relevant key positions in the regulatory agency (Truman 
1951,pp.450-453). This they consider as being essential to protecting their interests 
since it is very difficult for interest groups to influence decisions if they do not have 
access to administrative processes (Ziegler 1964,pp.285-287). The ability of the 
interest groups to influence the regulatory agency is heightened by the constraints 
within which the agency is operating. Generally speaking, the agency may be 
operating within the general guidelines contained in its enabling statute and is left to 
its own devices in seeking to determine the exact nature of regulatory goals that are in 
accordance with the public interest. 
Bernstein (1955,p.257) notes that regulatory agencies may experience difficulty in 
identifying and defining the exact nature of the public interest in a particular area of 
activity. An example is in the area of insurance pricing or ratemaking. In pricing 
insurance services, each policyholders fair share of losses and expenses is calculated. 
This involves the forecasting of probable claims from past losses and involves a lot of 
guesswork since the rates must be established before all the costs are known. There 
are certain principles that have to be complied with in order to scientifically calculate 
rates. These are, among others, 
(1) Adequacy of the rates, that is the rates should be sufficient to cover losses and 
expenses incurred 
(2) Equity in ratemaking which means that ideally all insureds should contribute to 
the insurance fund in proportion to their fair share of estimated losses and 
expenses, and 
(3) Non-excessive rates, that is rates charged should not be too high (Mehr and 
Cammack 1976,pp.600-603). 
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The regulatory agency has to determine in each area of activity specified above what 
is in the public interest. This is not always apparent because for example, the 
requirement for the adequacy of rates has to be balanced with that of ensuring that the 
rates are not "too adequate" that is, excessive. Mehr and Cammack (1976,p.602) have 
noted that regulatory authorities for political reasons are more concerned with 
correcting excessive rates rather than with inadequate rates. This is dangerous because 
inadequate rates may lead to insurer insolvency. At the same time it is virtually 
impossible to achieve perfect equity in ratemaking and so the insurer has to class 
similar risks together in order to attempt to achieve some form of equity. The question 
is, how is the exact nature of the public interest defined with consideration to these 
sometimes [conflicting] goals? The regulatory agency is thus subject to pressure from 
interest groups within the industry who want rates as high as possible and consumer 
groups who want the least possible rates. All this has to be done with regard to the 
scientific principles that the insurance pricing process should adhere to. Thus, 
although the 
" ... agencies must give their foremost loyalty to the public purpose 
entrusted to them ... they cannot forget that other social groups share in 
that purpose and have their own notions as to how it may be best 
achieved .... The wise administrator, therefore, keeps open the channels 
of information and advice between his agency and the private 
organizations concerned with its operation" (Leiserson 1946,p.296). 
Since the dominant interest groups are by definition powerful and generally more 
organised than the representatives of the public interest, then the agency through 
continuing interaction with these interest groups will tend to adopt their particular 
view of the public interest (Bernstein 1955,p.154-163). Apart from this, the regulatory 
agency operating within a hostile environment in the form of external opposition to its 
establishment and existence by the regulated industry, seeks to reduce the degree of 
opposition by aligning its policy goals with the desires of dominant interest groups in 
the industry (Ziegler 1964,p.275). 
Although the political science literature described how the regulated industry 
influenced the regulatory agency, the explanation of the behaviour of the regulators 
has been provided by economists. The explanation for this behaviour can be obtained 
from the recognition of the fact that regulators, like other human beings, are utility 
maximisers (Eckert 1973). They attempt to maximize some "objective function" in 
the decision making process (Noll 1971), and this objective function includes, among 
other things, the welfare of both the regulator and those that are affected by decisions 
taken by the regulatory agency. The welfare of the regulator includes his wealth, 
""k"";",~, .,,"'''; m,,,,,,,,,,,,,;: ,~~;""::.:~::;",,.:, ,....:.,:~~ert 1973,p.83). The different items that comprise 
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the objective function of the regulator are, in varying degrees, substitutable and given 
the constraints under which the regulator is operating he will attempt to select among 
the various regulatory policy choices available to him by considering what he sees as 
the costlbenefits associated with each policy alternative. The decision he makes will 
ultimately depend on the "cost-reward" structure under which he is operating (Eckert 
1973,pp.83-88).!6 The nature of the environment within which the agency is operating 
leads regulators to pursue what Noll refers to as "a high degree of invisibility" or 
alternatively "minimum Squawk" behaviour in order to reduce the hostility to which 
the agency may be subject (Hilton 1972,p.48). This involves to a large extent the 
pacification of the regulated industry (p.51). In any event, regulatory goals and 
policies are adjusted in line with the desires of the interest groups in the regulated 
industry.!7 This process inevitably leads to the exercise of "anticompetitive" 
behaviour and sub-optimal decision-making by the agency.18 Regulatory capture has 
occurred. 
Some writers like Bentley see the degree of influence over, or dominance of the 
regulatory agency as almost total, while others like Truman and Ziegler believe that 
this is not the case. Noll's view was that where several interest groups stand to gain or 
lose from the outcome of decisions taken by the regulatory agency in a specific issue, 
"the agency will tend to seek compromises among the competing .. .interests ... " (p.17). 
On the other hand, Ziegler's (1964,p.iv) explicated conflict model suggests that 
organised interest groups represent just a portion of the whole "matrix of pressures" to 
which the regulatory agency is subject, and " .. .it is a false realism which describes 
governmental decision makers as passive pawns pushed and shoved about according 
to the whims and fancies of "powerful" pressure groups."19 The degree of success an 
16. Eckert (1973) at pp.85-88 distinguishes between the behaviour of a bureaucratic agency and an independent 
regulatory commission. According to him these two regulatory systems are faced with different cost-reward 
structures and as such are expected in a given circumstance to make different policy decisions. 
17. Noll makes two exceptions to this: (a) where the political significance of the issue is such that the decision of 
the regulatory agency is subject to close scrutiny by the mass media, and (b) where a "special" interest group 
other than the regulated industry has a major interest in the decision made by the agency. 
18. Noll ibid at p.17. and also Hilton (1972). passim. Hilton was of the opinion that regulation served merely to 
misallocate resources and stated that "The incentives upon the commissioners [regulators] are to generate 
monopoly gain in one activity. either through administering a cartel or maintaining a monopoly. and then to 
dissipate it in uneconomic activity.".(cfPosner 1971). 
19. See also Truman (1951) at p.447. 
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interest group will experience in its attempts to influence the regulatory process will 
depend on, among other things, the social status of the members of the group. 20 
2.2.3 Alternative Hypotheses 
In addition to the consumer protection and producer protection hypotheses other 
views of the regulatory process are held. Stigler and Friedland's pioneering study into 
the measurement of the effects of regulation in the electric utilities industry has given 
rise to the "no-effect hypothesis". Stigler and Friedland (1962) studied the effects of 
regulation on the level of rates and returns in the industry and came to the conclusion 
that there were no significant regulatory effects in the market. Posner (1971) however 
considered that the no-effect hypothesis did not generally describe the effects of 
government regulation on markets. He illustrated his point with specific instances of 
regulated industries which had oligopolistic or competitive nonregulated market 
structures (the airline, railroad and freight motor carrier industries). In these cases 
government regulation has had an effect on the performance of the industries. 
Posner (1971) also proposed a thesis he referred to as "Taxation by Regulation." His 
argument was that "regulation is a method of public taxation and expenditure" and 
based on the study of some regulated industries he came to the conclusion that the 
consumer protection and producer protection views did not explain the prevalence of 
internal subsidies in many regulated markets. He defined the internal subsidy as 
" ... [t]he deliberate and continued provision of many services at lower rates and in 
larger quantities than would be offered in an unregulated competitive market , an 
unregulated monopolistic one." His public finance hypothesis, he believed, provided a 
"consistent explanation" of this and other features such as entry control among other 
things. 
The Stiglerian hypothesis as well as the work of other "interest group" or "capture" 
theorists have been analysed and criticised by some researchers. For example, 
although Posner (1974,p.336-349) posited that the theoretical and empirical evidence 
did not support the public interest viewpoint he concluded that, among other things, 
Stigler's theory in its [then] present form was "at best a list of criteria relevant to 
predicting whether an industry will receive favourable legislation ... [and was not]. .. a 
coherent theory yielding unambiguous and therefore testable hypotheses". He argued 
20. Bernstein (1955) and Ziegler (1964) at p. v. 
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that since there was inadequate empirical support for the theory, it had to be improved 
considerably before it could be accepted as an "adequate" theory of regulation. 
Peltzman's (1976) criticism of the Stiglerian theory was less severe. One of his 
arguments was that although Stigler's work provided a theoretical foundation for the 
producer protection view of the regulatory process, it needed to take into account the 
fact that" ... regulatory agencies will not exclusively serve a single economic interest" 
(p.2ll). He believed that regulators public policy decisions are shaped not only by the 
political processes involved in decision making, but also by the regulator'S utility 
function which is conditioned by the interplay of competing interest groups that will 
be affected by the regulator's decisions.21 The evidence from a study of the effects of 
price regulation in the automobile insurance industry lend support to this view 
(Ippolito 1979,p.87). 
Gormley (1986) also believed that there was little evidence to support the scenario of 
the capture theorists. In an attempt to develop a model that could be used to predict 
the composition and behaviour of the various actors in the regulatory process, as well 
as the regulatory pathologies22 that could be expected to emerge, he developed a 
categorisation of regulatory issue areas. This categorisation was dependent upon the 
levels of public salience and technical complexity23 of each issue area. He concluded 
that it was only issue areas that were considered to be low in salience and high in 
complexity (for example, transportation, commerce, finance, and more relevantly, 
insurance), that provided an environment conducive to policymaking by a "power 
elite". This elite he defined as bureaucrats, professionals and business groups with the 
latter being the dominant interest group. Since the levels of salience and complexity 
varied across regulatory issue areas, and this determined the nature of regulatory 
politics involved, generalizations could not be made as to the nature and degree of 
influence of the actors involved in policymaking without taking these factors into 
consideration. 
21. See also Noll (1971) at p.17 " ... when several special interest groups have a stake in a regulatory matter. the 
agency will seek compromises among the competing powerful special interests ... " 
22. The nature of the regulatory politics in tenns of the relative degree of influence of the various actors in the 
regulatory issue areas. Gormley (1985) at pp.615-617. 
23. Gormley defined a highly salient issue as one that affects a large number of people in a significant way. so that 
the scope of conflict is broad. and a highly complex issue as one that requires specialized knowledge and 
training beyond the scope of generalists and laypersons. 
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Meier (1988,pp.18-30) critically reviewed quantitative and case study literature in the 
area of both economics and political science and based on the findings in these 
studies, came to the conclusion that "[t]he regulated industry, ... ,must be viewed as 
having multidimensional interests" (p.29). 
His view was that since the various interest groups do not necessarily have the same 
policy goals and the policymakers are not passive actors in the regulatory process a 
"multi-interest" modeVtheory of regulatory policy could be applied to the regulatory 
process. This model, he believed, could be used as a basis for the analysis of, among 
other areas, insurance regulation. 
In Meier's model, four "key actors", VIZ industry groups, consumer groups, the 
regulatory agency, and political elites, influence regulatory policy to a degree 
determined by (in the case of the first three) their political resources. These political 
resources are for example, in the case of industry groups their size and wealth (p.29). 
The influence of political elites in the regulatory process he argued, was dependent 
upon their values as expressed by their policy goals. In Meier's framework, each set of 
actors in the political process will attempt to implement their respective policy goals 
within the resource constraints to which they are subject. Thus, the regulated industry 
will seek regulation that benefits it and oppose regulation that restricts it. 
The varIOUS regulatory hypotheses or models that have been discussed are all 
intuitively appealing. Taken separately, they do not adequately explain the behaviour 
of both the regulated industry and the regulatory agency because they cannot be 
applied to all regulatory scenarios. Taken together however, as in the case of Meier's 
multi-interest model, they appear to explain the dynamics of the legislative decision 
making process. 
Stigler's demand-supply theory of regulation, that the regulated industry demand 
regulation and the regulatory agency supplies it, in return for political favours, cannot 
be said to apply to all markets because it presupposes the existence of democratic 
decision making processes in government. The socio-political environment is taken as 
given, that is, a democratic system in which group dynamics can operate relatively 
freely. Coase (1959), Hilton (1966) and Kitch et Al (1971) also appear to make the 
same assumptions. It is assumed that draft bills are passed through the legislature so 
that politicians and other interested pressure groups can engage in lobbying and other 
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related activities to influence the legislative outcome. Truman's (1951) supposition 
that interest groups may attempt to place people who are sympathetic to their interests 
in key positions in the regulatory agency may be true in some, but not all situations. 
In many of the political systems to which these theories apply, the regulatory agency 
is usually an independent agency or system. Eckert distinguishes between the degrees 
of independence associated with the independent commission and the regulatory 
agency. Since the cost-reward structures the regulator is faced with in both systems 
differ, it is expected that under identical scenarios the decisions taken in both systems 
may differ. However, in a political environment that is autocratic and dictatorial, such 
as under military rule, it could be difficult to assess the extent to which various 
interest groups are able to influence the peculiar decision making processes in such an 
environment. In such situations, the regulatory agency is not an independent body and 
the decisions it makes are usually, if not always, subject to approval by what Meier 
would call the "political elites." The political elites in this case could be described as 
the key members of the ruling military junta and their "power groups", who may be 
defined as those so close to them as to be able to influence their decisions relating to 
specific public policy. Thus under such conditions, although the head of a regulatory 
agency is appointed, the degree or extent of his regulatory powers vis-a-vis the rule 
making process may not be as extensive as it appears to be. Since he is not operating 
independently, he will have to take directions from the political elites and this could 
significantly influence regulatory decisions. It is conceivable in such situations that 
the head of the agency might be coerced into implementing rules with which he is not 
in agreement. In such a situation, it may not be in the best interests of industry groups 
to attempt to influence the key employees in the regulatory agency. If key regulatory 
officials have very limited executive powers, then it would not make economic sense 
for interest groups to attempt to place someone of their choice in key positions. 
The implication for the various interest groups in the industry would be that they 
would have to determine, within their resource constraints, which one or which 
combination of the following groups; the head of the agency, members of regulatory 
committees, members of the ruling junta or other power groups, that it would be in 
their best interest to lobby. This could impose significant information costs (in terms 
of determining the groups that are most influential in the regulatory process) on 
interest groups. If the costs are excessive, the interest groups might decide that the 
effort was not worth the potential "benefits," which might not in any case (given the 
unpredictability of such a regulatory environment) be guaranteed to be in their 
interest. 
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In addition to this, even if the assumption is made, following Eckert (1973) and Noll 
(1971), that the regulator is a utility maximising individual, the maximisation of his 
welfare may not necessarily involve the pacification of the regulated industry by 
advocating regulation which will benefit them, as Eckert (1973) states. Instead the 
regulator may decide to playoff both sides, the regulator and the regulated, along the 
lines of the cost-reward structure posited by Eckert, open to him. The degree of 
success he achieves in so doing will be determined by his political ability because this 
involves his ability to satisfy his "bosses", who have appointed him and who are 
subject to dismissing him on whim or caprice if he does not come up with the 
goods,24 and his ability to satisfy the regulated industry. In such situations, the 
"minimum squawk" behaviour described by Hilton (1972), although it could involve 
the pacification of the industry (with for example promises to review and amend 
regulatory provisions not agreeable to the industry) does not necessarily lead to 
regulatory capture. 
Meier's model, not surprisingly (since it has it's basis in the various theories) appears 
to be the most comprehensive of the regulatory theories. It recognises the fact that 
there are various interests represented in the regulatory environment and that their 
objectives and degree of influence or power they possess depends on the nature of the 
environment in which they operate. As such it can be employed in explaining, and 
perhaps predicting, the nature of regulation with regard to the various actors involved 
in the regulatory process. Since it is not premised on the assumption of a democratic 
environment and an independent regulatory agency, it can be employed in the 
analysis of regulation in almost any kind of regulatory environment. 
2.3 Insurance Regulation 
2.3.1 Insurance and The Public Interest 
In his paper "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Enquiry into The 
Theory of Insurance Law," Kimball (1961) concluded that it was a difficult, if not 
impossible task to formulate a general theory of insurance regulation. His argument 
was that although common objectives of the regulatory process could be isolated, the 
"multiplicity of possible paths" to the accomplishment of these objectives "would 
seem to defy a definitive statement." He examined the pattern of evolution of 
24. That is. keeping the regulated industry quiet at minimum cost to the government 
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insurance regulation in the U.S and some European countries and observed that 
patterns of regulation had developed in specific response to "particular felt needs" in 
the system at the time, rather than as planned or anticipated policy action. In the U.S 
for example, a wave of regulatory reform followed after the scandal resulting from the 
New York Armstrong Committee hearings (Kimball 1961,p.477). Eight years later, 
Kimball (1969) considered his fears to have been justified. He commented on the lack 
of theory in the subject of insurance regulation. According to him, there was "no 
sense of a framework, of a carefully thought out basis for deciding what it is we want 
to do, no reflection upon the question where we are going, and why, no getting to the 
bottom of the subject." 
A survey of the available literature does appear to indicate that the field of insurance 
(unlike the fields of, for example, transportation, electric utilities, and even banking 
among others) has been neglected in the economic analysis of regulation.25 There 
have been various economic investigations into the industry, but these have been 
mostly into the analysis of the existence of economies of scale26 and concentration27 
in the life insurance industry. Recently, probably as a result of discussions on the 
deregulation of markets, however there seems to have been a generation of interest in 
the field of insurance regulation.28 The public interest aspect of financial markets has 
been specifically applied to the business of insurance and used as the main reason for 
the existence of the various forms of insurance regulation. The reasons are based on 
the "special" underlying characteristics of the insurance business which are supposed 
to distinguish it from most other forms of economic activity. This special nature of 
the insurance transaction can be found in the insurance literature that has been 
developing over the years. Bryan (1969 ,p.19)29 distinguished the concept of security 
as being of primary importance in the regulation of insurance activity, stating that "in 
every subject there is a fundamental proposition .. .in insurance ... that is that security is 
the one thing that is above all others." Wolfe (l972,p.165) as far back as 1906, spoke 
25. Early (1974) discusses the lack of relevant literature in the area of economics and political science at length at 
pp.4-8. See also Joskow (1973) at pp.375-376 and more recently. Meier (1988) at for example. pp. xv. 1 & 
167. 
26. See. for example. in the area of non-life insurance. Hensley (1958). and life insurance. Johnston and Murphy 
(1957). at pp 140-146. Houston and Simon (1970). Pritchett (1973). Colenutt (1977). Geehan 1977 & 1985. 
Kellner and Matthewson (1983). 
27. See Cummins et Al (1972). Colenutt 1975. Franklin and Woodhead (1980). 
28. For example Ippolito (1973). Joskow (1973). and more recently Finsinger (1985) & (1986). and Meier (1988). 
29. Bryan made these comments in 1914 at the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners in his capacity 
as Secretary of State of the United states. See Kimball and Denenberg 1969.p.17. 
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of the accumulations of a life insurance fund as a "sacred trust fund" and considered 
this to have been "one of the motives which lies at the very base of ... supervision." 
The special characteristics of the insurance service were identified as the future 
performance of the insurance transaction, its complexity, the unknown costs involved 
and the fact that it is a business subject to abuses (Greene 1977,p.552).30 The fact that 
insurance activities were characterized by the inversion of the exploitation cycle has 
also been delineated as a special feature of the business (Van den Berghe 1990,p.213). 
However the view has been held that many of these reasons (specifically, the large 
amounts of money involved, the duration of the contract, its complexity, and what has 
been referred to as the "quasi-trust" idea) did not justify the comprehensive control of 
the insurance markets in existence in the United States (Kimball 1969,pp.4-5). For 
example large amounts of money are involved in the oil industry which is not as 
extensively regulated as the insurance industry, and most insurance contracts except 
life contracts are of short duration. He went on to say that there are other transactions 
that could be considered as complex as the insurance transaction (for example the 
purchase of a house) and the insurance contract was not technically speaking, a 
"trust", but merely a debtor-creditor relationship. Others, to varying extents, agree 
with this.31 
Thus it appears that although researchers are basically agreed on the necessity for the 
existence of some form of insurance regulation, they are in disagreement as to the 
extent of regulation or the degree of control that is essential for the "efficiency" of 
insurance markets, in view of the fact that the regulatory system has costs associated 
with its operations. Identifying the costs is not an easy task, particularly as there are 
cost measurement problems (the lack of precise information on cost structures) as 
well as regulatory agency staff behavioural problems which are associated with their 
"intellectual and moral competence" (Kimball, 1969(c),p.1023). The controversy in 
British financial circles over the Financial Services Act (1986)32 is illustrative of the 
problems involved in this area. It has led to questions being raised as to the 
effectiveness of " ... the present cumbersome legalistic and costly approach ... " in 
providing investors with adequate protection (Veljanovski 1988,p.l0). Indeed the 
whole process of regulation has been criticised as at times being inefficient and 
ineffectual (Koch 1976,p.354). The most basic question to be asked and answered, 
30. See also Bickelhaupt (1979). p.l97-198. 
31. For example Vanden Berghe (1990) at p.207. 
32. See Seldon (1988) for both sides of the argument. 
39 
before a consideration of the effects of regulation on insurance markets specifically, is 
"Why are we regulating?" or "What is the ultimate purpose or objective of 
regulation?" 
2.3.2 The Purpose of Insurance Regulation 
Various writers have somewhat similar views of the purpose of insurance regulation. 
Kimball (1969,pp.5-9) suggested that objectives of regulation could be classified 
along the following lines: 
(1) The Internal objectives which he defined as those objectives that are directly 
related to the internal operations of the insurance business. These are; 
(a) maintaining the solidity of the enterprise, that is the "preservation and 
enhancement of the solvency" of the enterprise and, 
(b) ensuring fairness, equity and reasonableness [aequm et bonum] in the insurance 
market. 
Kimball (1961) examined the evolution of the principle he called aequum et bonum33 
in the Swedish regulatory system. He referred to it as a "congeries of objectives" 
which were too vague to be expressed precisely, but were present to some degree in 
most regulatory systems. Fairness is concerned with the treatment of the individual 
policyholder by the insurance company. For example, claims should be handled fairly 
and agents should not make misrepresentations to individual policyholders or induce 
them to replace existing contracts with new ones on the basis of false or incomplete 
infonnation (Kimball 1961,p.491). Equity refers to equity among the general body of 
policyholders and the principle involved is that insurers should treat their 
policyholders in a manner that is non-discriminatory. Simply put, policyholders 
should not be penalised unfairly by the tenns and coverage of their contracts. For 
example, policyholders should be classified for fair calculation of the premium so that 
each policyholder pays only for the cost of his own protection (Kimball 1961,p.495). 
Likewise a life insurance company must distribute dividends equitably among its 
participating policyholders (Mayerson 1965,p.55). Reasonableness requires that the 
general body of policyholders be treated reasonably. Policyholders should not be 
33. This concept comes from the Swedish term skalighet which had to do with reasonableness of the price paid for 
insurance and equity among policyholders (Kimball 1961). 
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overcharged and the terms of insurance coverage should not be ambiguous (Kimball 
1961,p.491). 
The requirements of fairness, equity and reasonableness sometimes conflict with and 
sometimes complement the requirement for solidity. 
(2) The External objectives which though not relevant to the successful operation 
of insurance business are important because of their public policy content. They 
may be; 
(a) political and/or 
(b) socio-economic 
Kimball (l961,pp.501-523) discussed the above in considerable detail. He described 
the political objectives of insurance regulation as democracy (egalitarian ideas in the 
social and political sphere) and liberty (that is the restraints on government 
interference with the insurance enterprise). Protectionism is the protection of the local 
insurance industry by placing localisation restrictions on its activities. Foreign 
insurers may be subject to restrictions on their activities which put them at a 
disadvantage in relation to domestic companies. This could be implemented on a local 
or international basis. The capital and licensing requirements may be more stringent 
and investment restrictions may prevent foreign insurers from investing in assets in 
their state or country of origin as the case may be. 
Within the social and economic objectives are the needs for (i) the socialization of 
risk, that is, the provision of insurance coverage compulsorily (as in compulsory 
motor insurance) or the extension of existing coverage (as in assigned risk plans) on 
social rather than economic grounds (Kimball 1969,p.7); (ii) freedom of access to the 
market and (iii) the socio-economic aspect of investment control. 
Other defined purposes of regulatory activity could conveniently fit into the above 
classification. For example, Mehr and Canunack (l976,p.650) have stated the 
underlying objective of insurance regulation to be the protection of the public from 
incompetent and fraudulent insurers, that is, aequm et bonum and apart from 
policyholder protection they also identify other objectives such as the assurance of 
fair competition, and the control of solvency supervision (solidity). Mayerson (1965) 
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reclassified Kimball's definition. He described the purpose of insurance regulation as 
being two-fold, solvency and equity, with equity encompassing the principles of 
reasonableness, impartiality and fairness. Franklin and Woodhead (1980,p.344), also 
referred to solidity as being the object of insurance regulation and supervision. 
Stewart (1969(a),p.24) proposed that the public purpose of insurance regulation was 
" ... trying to help people get the most insurance for their money" (aequm et bonum), 
and argued that government has the social responsibility to see to it that the regulated 
industry responds to the current needs of society (Stewart 1969(b),p.35). 
The various regulatory objectives detailed above are often in irreconcilable conflict 
For example the requirement for freedom of access to the market conflicts with the 
requirement for the solidity of the enterprise. The regulator is faced with the problem 
of determining the level of capital and other licensing requirements that should be 
applied to the market. Too high a level raises entry barriers and facilitates 
concentration in the industry, while the solidity of the enterprise is called into 
question if the requirements are not adequate. Thus the regulator is faced with the 
problem of balancing the needs for the various objectives (Kimball 1969, pp.9-10)). 
Comparatively speaking, little work appears to have been done in the specific area of 
insurance regulation. However the results of the available studies appear to lend 
support for the various political and economic views of the regulatory process 
discussed earlier on.34 One of the conclusions of Joskow's (1973) study of the 
property liability insurance industry in the U.S was that the employment of prior 
approval regulatory laws were not necessarily in the consumers best interests. On the 
other hand, Ippolito (1976) in his study of the effects of price regulation in the 
automobile insurance industry in the U.S specifically tested to see whether the results 
of his analysis of price levels and price dispersion among other factors would support 
the Stiglerian hypothesis. His conclusion was that the results generally contradicted 
the theory (pp.63-67), and that the regulator attempted to maximise his welfare by 
satisfying the demands of various groups (including consumer groups). 
Researchers in the field of financial regulation have nevertheless drawn attention to 
the fact that public interest theory is inadequate to explain the high levels of 
government interference in insurance. 
34. See sections 2.21 and 2.22. 
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For example, Van den Berghe (1990,p.207) examined the relevance of the public 
interest theory for all types of [European] regulation and government interference in 
insurance in the Belgian market in order to analyse the justification of the high level 
of government intervention in the industry. He stated that research had shown that 
although the application of the public interest character of the stability of the financial 
system to the area of insurance could provide an explanation for the high levels of 
government intervention in insurance markets, it did not justify all of the observed 
regulatory and supervisory measures in these markets. He posited that if, however, the 
special characteristics35 of the financial sector were taken into account a separate 
"financial" public interest theory could be developed and applied to the field of 
Insurance. 
2.3.3 The Multi-interest theory of Insurance Regulation 
Meier (1988) applied his multi-interest theory of regulation to the regulation of 
insurance in the U.S. He hypothesized that the various interests represented in the 
regulatory process would have policy goals which would be translated into policy 
measures. The resulting policy measures implemented in the industry would be 
dependent upon the resources of the actors in tenns of their political influence. Since 
the actors would be in favour of goals that would be beneficial to them, industry 
groups would support regulation that benefited the industry and oppose regulation that 
placed burdens on it. In the same vein, consumer groups would be in favour of lower 
prices and restrictive regulation, regulatory bureaucrats in favour of restrictive 
regulation and increased regulatory authority while political elites would support 
regulation that was consistent with their policy values (p.137). In this scenario, the 
resultant policy measures implemented in the industry would be dependent upon the 
resources of the actors in terms of their political influence. 
2.3.4 The Purpose of Insurance Regulation in Developing Countries 
The socio-economic aspect of insurance regulation has been of increasing importance 
over the years, especially with respect to its supervision in the developing countries. 
The prevailing sentiment is that regulation should work to ensure that insurance 
company activities are coordinated with the socio-economic aspirations of a nation. 
35. (1) the fact that stability of financial markets is of crucial importance to the equilibrium of the economy. and 
(2) the confidential and fiduciary nature of financial products. (See van den Berghe 1990. pp.207 -208). 
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In 1972, UNCfA036 published a report37 which provided an analysis of the [then] 
existing legislation and supervision of insurance activities in developing countries. 38 
The report among, other issues, examined the aims and objectives of insurance 
supervision in developing countries. The group of experts who produced it agreed 
that: 
(1) the supervlsIOn of insurance was a "fundamental requirement for the sound 
development of insurance activities," 
(2) insurance activities when subjected to proper supervision played significant role 
in the economic growth of every country, and 
(3) legislation should be developed in such a way as to furnish the basis by which 
insurance companies can be continually supervised, so as to ensure compliance 
with all aspects of legislation. 
The report further stated that "insurance supervision, while playing the traditional role 
for which it had been originally established, namely the protection of policyholders 
beneficiaries and third parties, should also constantly take into account the general 
economic, social and other national interests," such as: 
(a) the co-ordination of the investment activities of Insurance companies with 
national economic policies and 
(b) the prevention of foreign exchange outflows from excessive foreign insurance 
and reinsurance arrangements; 
The committee of experts also specified what they regarded as a very important task 
of the supervisory process, "to provide for measures to establish and strengthen the 
national insurance market" since this is an "essential characteristic of economic 
growth". Thus it is the case that in most developing countries, while insurance 
regulation and supervision may have as the primary objective policyholder protection 
and protection against the risk of insolvency, in some others its purpose goes beyond 
this. The activities of insurance companies are often coordinated with national 
36. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
37. Report TDIB1393. 1972. "Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing Countries." 
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economic activities. This is the case with Brazil and more relevantly Nigeria where 
government has attempted to co-ordinate the investment activities of the insurance 
companies with national development policies. Sometimes the insurance market is 
created and reconstructed with the purpose of promoting its growth and adapting it to 
national requirements. It has been observed that these objectives are usually not 
expressly stated in the relevant legislations and can be discerned only by 
interpretation.39 Thus, while public policy towards insurance may be initiated to 
influence the balance of payments position and regulate the insurance companies flow 
of funds, much of it derives from the desire to govern the structure and behaviour of 
insurance markets in order to influence market performance (Shelp, R (1986,p.xx). 
It can be seen that the professed purposes of insurance regulation are numerous, 
ranging from policyholder protection to nation building. There are, however, 
differences of opinion as to what are the "ends" and the "means" of regulation. 
Kimball (1969,p.16) argued that " ... Very little consideration is given to the 
relationship of ends and means ... we have often mistaken means for ends and have 
often been led into in pursuit of the wrong things." Achampong (1983) considered 
ideas for minimising this misdirection of the regulatory effort by suggesting that the 
focus of regulation should be on what he referred to as the "ultimate objectives" of 
regulation. He defined these purposes as the "end results" of the regulatory process, as 
opposed to the "means" by which these results could be achieved, the reasoning 
behind this being simply that "they [the end results] cannot be subsumed under a 
further or more fundamental objective" (see p.301). He went on to apply the "ultimate 
objectives" test to some of the regulatory objectives in order to identify their means 
and ends. For example, in considering the condition of solidity, he stated that it could 
be seen as a means of achieving the ultimate objective of policyholder and beneficiary 
security, with rate regulation and control of investments being ancilliary means to this 
objective. 
2.4 The Scope of Insurance Regulation 
The scope of regulatory possibilities in the context of public policy concerns is quite 
wide and extends somewhat beyond the common perception of public control of 
38. The objectives. nature and scope of insurance legislation in developing countries is examined in some detail in 
chapter 3. 
39. UNCT AD TD/B/393.pp.28-29. 
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private social and market related activities (Mitnick 1980,p.14). Mitnick (p.5) as 
stated earlier defined a "typology of regulation" in which he isolated four possibilities 
of regulation among public and private parties: (1) traditional regulation (public 
regulation of private activity); (2) capture (reverse regulation); (3) private self-
regulation; and (4) government regulation. 
Insurance regulation was stated to fall within the first three areas and the broad scope 
of regulatory activity4° is concerned with the activities of insurance companies with 
respect to the ensurance of compliance with laws affecting the legal, technical and 
financial requirements of the business of insurance (Bickelhaupt 1979) as well as the 
socio-economic aspects of the business in relation to the development of the 
economy.41 For the purpose of this discussion, the scope and nature of insurance 
regulation may be defined along the following lines: 
(1) Financial regulation 
(2) Product regulation, and 
(3) Business methods regulation of Insurance business (Mehr and Cammack 
1976,p.680). 
The constraints on the effective discharge (by a regulatory agency) of regulatory 
functions associated with the above are a function of (a) the financial resources of the 
agency, (b) the quality of it's personnel, and (c) the philosophy of the head of the 
agency (Mehr and Cammack, 1976,p.680). 
2.4.1 Financial Regulation 
Financial regulation is concerned primarily with ensuring insurer solvency. It involves 
the regulation of areas such as premium rates, expenses of operation, valuation of 
assets, technical reserves, capital stock and surplus, dividends, investments, legal 
requirements as to the organization and licensing of insurers, and the liquidation of 
insurers (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.680).42 An analysis of some of these areas could 
be an indicator of the efficiency or otherwise of insurer operations under differing 
40. Hellner (1963) discusses the scope of insurance regulation in detail. 
41. UNCTAD op.cit. p.29. 
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regulatory regimes and as such some of the regulatory requirements in these areas are 
examined briefly below. 
(1) Premium Rates 
The purpose for the regulation of premium rates is to ensure that the rates are, among 
other things, not excessive so as not to penalise policyholders unfairly, and at the 
same time not inadequate so that the solvency of the insurer is maintained at all times. 
Thus premium rate regulation should satisfy the objectives of equity, reasonableness 
and solvency. These requirements are codified in the All-Industry laws passed by the 
states in the U.S that insurance "rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, [or] unfairly 
discriminatory" (Kimball 1961,p.482). The requirement for equity is difficult to 
attain. For example, motor insurers commonly place an excess on young and/or 
inexperienced drivers because of the high probability of loss which has been 
estimated from past experience. However, that is not to say that every young or 
inexperienced driver will be involved in an accident. In such situations therefore, a 
group of policyholders is being discriminated against.43 
The provisions for the regulation of insurance rates vary. In most cases, prior approval 
laws are utilised. This means that the insurance concerns have to submit to the 
supervisory committee the rates they propose to charge on the various classes of 
insurance business for approval. The rates are usually filed with the appropriate 
statistical justification of the level of the proposed rates. The same process is usually 
needed before an increase in premium rates can be implemented by the insurance 
companIes. 
Although the purpose of rate regulation is to ensure the fairness, non-excessiveness 
and adequacy of rates, studies in this field indicate that the attainment of these 
objectives may in fact be hindered by the process of regulation. 
Frech and Samprone (1980) attempted to measure the welfare loss associated with 
rate regulation in property-liability insurance in the U.S between 1972 and 1974. 
They concluded that the costs of price regulation in this sector of the industry 
outweighed the benefits, especially for liability insurance. Witt and Miller (1980) also 
arrived at the same conclusion. They compared the relative costs for automobile 
42. See also UNCTAD TD/B/393. pp.27-29. 
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insurance under competitive and non-competitive44 regulatory regimes for the years 
1971-1978, and argued that since there were basically no differences in relative costs 
in both regimes, then by implication, consumers in the competitive states were better 
off than those in the non-competitive state. They concluded that it seemed there was 
no "empirical economic justification" for automobile rate regulation (p.184). Further 
study (Witt and Miller 1981) led them to suggest that rate regulation rather than 
preventing insolvency, tended to increase the probability of insurer insolvency in this 
sector, and may actually impair market efficiency (Joskow 1973; Ippolito 1979;, and 
Nadel 1982).45 
(2) Expenses 
Expenses are regulated as an indirect means of controlling premium rates. In life 
insurance, expenses, future interest rates and mortality experience are factored into 
the premium charged for coverage. The regulation of this item usually involves the 
regulation of acquisition costs, that is the cost of obtaining new business, including 
agents and brokers commissions. In some cases limits are set on first year and total 
field expenses, as well as renewal commissions (Mehr and Cammack 1979,p.683). 
(3) Asset Valuation 
Asset valuation is a very important aspect of solvency measurement. For an insurer to 
be solvent the value of his "admitted assets" must at least be equal to the value of his 
liabilities. Regulations may therefore specify the nature of the assets which the insurer 
may take into account in determining the solvency of the insurer. Such assets are 
referred to as admitted assets. Additionally the method by which such assets may be 
valued may be regulated. For example, the valuation of cash and bank deposits may 
be on the face amount of these assets while real estate may be valued at book or 
market value (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.684). 
43. Kimball (l961,pp.495-499) discussed the issue of equity at length. 
44. Witt and Miller defined competitive regimes as operating in states where competitive market forces were 
allowed to determine premium rates in the market, and non-competitive regimes as operating where the states 
in one fonn or the other regulated or constrained rates by not allowing market forces to operate in the setting of 
rates. 
45. See Harrington (1984) for a survey of research in this area. 
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(4) Reserves 
Different types of reserves are required for the various kinds of insurance business 
underwritten. The purpose of holding reserves is to cover the liabilities of the insurer 
to policyholders, beneficiaries and third parties under the insurance contract. These 
liabilities are in the fonn of claims payments. Some of these reserves are; the 
unexpired risk reserve, the reserve for outstanding claims and the mathematical 
reserves. 
To ensure insurance solvency, the role of the supervisory authority is to see to it that 
the actuarial valuation of these reserves is such that at all times the insurers liabilities 
to the aforementioned are covered. The degree of latitude allowed to insurance 
companies in calculating their reserves varies from country to country. In some 
countries, the regulations are liberal and the insurance companies are allowed 
considerable degree of freedom in the method and basis of the valuation of the 
reserves. At the other end of the scale, there are places in which the supervisory 
authority does not ensure a minimum level of solvency because there are no relevant 
provisions for doing so in the regulatory law. In fact, in many developing countries 
where minimum level of solvency regulations are in force, it is found that the 
regulation of technical reserves is more often a theoretical rather than practical affair 
and that the effectiveness or otherwise of the law is entirely dependent on the 
technical competence of the supervisory authority. In the developing countries 
reserves play a dual role, that of maintaining insurer solvency and as a potential 
source of development capital.46 The following reserves are maintained for non-life 
insurance business: 
(i) The Unexpired Risk Reserve 
The unexpired risk reserve is defined as the "unearned portion of the gross premiums 
of all outstanding policies at the time of valuation" (Mehr and Cammack, 
1976,p.627). Non-life insurance contracts are annual contracts, with premiums being 
payable at any point during the financial year. Consequently when the insurer draws 
up his balance sheet at the end of the year, there will be some risks on the books for 
which he has received premiums, but for which he is still liable for the duration of the 
policy year. 
46. See UNCT AD, op.cit pp.49-50. 
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For example, if as at the balance sheet date, the insurer has received an annual 
premium for a risk which still has nine months to run, then he is still liable for the 
unexpired or unearned portion of the risk for which he has received the premium. This 
is covered by the "unexpired risk" or "unearned premium" reselVe. In some of the 
developing countries47 studied by the UNCT AD experts the figure for this reselVe 
was arrived at by applying a fixed percentage to the premiums due during the year. 
The percentage used varied from 30 to 50%, 40% being the most preferred figure. 48 It 
was noted however, that at that time, the English-speaking African countries, among 
others, did not impose any regulatory requirements in this area. 
(ii) Reserves For Outstanding Claims 
This reselVe "measures the insurer's estimated liability for claims and settlement 
expenses as of the valuation date" (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.629). In other words it 
covers the insurer's liability for claims accepted by the insurer but for which the 
compensation remains unpaid at the date of valuation. It includes: 
(a) reported and adjusted claims which have not been paid, 
(b) claims which have been filed but not yet adjusted, In that the amount of 
compensation to be paid by the insurer to the policyholder has not been agreed 
to by both parties, 
(c) claims incurred but not yet reported (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.629), and 
(d) claims in connection with current life or annuity business which are aleatory 
and are calculated actuarially.49 
The method of estimation of outstanding claims varies across countries. The amount 
estimated may depend on the subjective influence of the company making the 
valuation and the only way in which to ascertain whether the valuation has been made 
correctly is by means of an a posteriori verification, that is by comparing the actual 
figure with estimated the amount. Some developing countries, for example, 
Cameroon, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago have however tried to rectify the situation by 
47. For example, Morocco, Egypt. Lebanon, Ceylon, Israel. Malaysia, Pakistan, among others. 
48. UNCTAD op.cit.p.51. 
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having specific regulatory requirements that make for a more objective method of 
calculating this reserve. 50 
(iii) Contingency Reserves 
The contingency reserve is set up as a "compulsory supplement" which serve to make 
up for any inadequacies in the other technical reserves. As with the other reserves, its 
provisions may vary across countries. 
(iv) Mathematical Reserves 
This is the major reserve held for life insurance business. Broadly speaking, it is "the 
amount, needed to cover all policy obligations as they become due (Mehr and 
Cammack, 1976,p.631). The method of calculation of the reserves or the technical 
basis upon which such calculations are based may be specified by law.51 In practice, 
the valuation of reserves is a difficult task, not only for the insurance companies, but 
more so for the supervisory authorities. 
(5) Investments 
Regulatory rules covering the investment of the funds of insurance companies are 
concerned with the qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the investment choice 
of the insurer (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.689). The qualitative rules prescribe the 
different types of assets into which the insurer is permitted to channel his funds, while 
the quantitative rules establish minimum percentages or maximum ceilings allowed 
for the various types of investment media. Regulations usually require the insurer to 
invest a minimum percentage of his assets in government stocks and bonds, while 
restrictions are placed on the amount of speculative securities, such as equity stock, 
that the insurance companies may invest in order to maintain solvency. For the non-
life fund, the investment portfolio has to maintain some degree of liquidity since the 
insurers liabilities are of a short-tenn nature. The life fund on the other hand, may be 
invested in longer term less liquid assets since life contracts are usually of a longer 
49. UNCT AD ibid.p.52. 
50. UNCT AD ibid.p.53. 
51. UNCTAD ibid.p.50. 
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duration. The rules usually prohibit the insurer from obtaining a controlling interest in 
non-insurance business. 
The regulations in developing countries, are usually more restrIctIve than those 
applied to the advanced economies. This is pursuant to the objectives of the 
supervisory authority, that is, ensuring the solvency of the insurer and covering the 
investment needs of the economy.52 For example, there is usually a restriction, in 
most cases a prohibition, on the insurer holding foreign assets in his investment 
portfolio. The purpose of this "localisation" of insurance funds is to ensure that scarce 
capital is retained in the country for development purposes. 
(6) Organisation and licensing requirements 
These requirements seek to prevent incompetent and/or fraudulent persons from 
establishing insurance companies. The legal form of insurance companies is specified 
by law. Insurance companies in most cases are allowed to take the form of limited 
liability companies and mutuals. Additionally, prior authorisation to engage in the 
business of insurance may be required. 53 This authorisation may be granted under or 
pursuant to an administrative act or decree as the case may be, the supervisory 
authority acting as an advisory body to the minister responsible for the authorisations. 
In some cases, the granting of authorisation is left to the supervisory authorities. The 
insurer may only engage in activities that are directly connected with insurance 
business and no individuals or partnerships may set themselves up as insurers. 54 In 
some cases, applicants for licensing for life insurance business are required to submit 
to the appropriate authority a business plan which gives a projection of the insurers 
business during the fIrst few years of operation and stipulates how the insurer expects 
to meet his future obligations under the contracts he propose to underwrite. 
In the U.K, The Insurance Companies Act 1974 stipulates that the business plan 
should include the following information: pessimistic and optimistic estimates of the 
expected volume of business over the first three years of the company's operation, 
estimated expected number of policies, types of policy and sums insured in respect 
52. UNCT AD ibid.p.60. 
53. UNCTAD ibid.p.35. 
54. UNCTAD ibid.p.9. 
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thereof. In addition, infonnation such as revenue accounts showing the expected 
income and expenditure, commissions and size of funds as well as proposed premium 
rates have to be given (Franklin and Woodhead 1980,pp.93-94). 
These requirements In most cases apply to both domestic and foreign insurers 
operating in the industry. In developing countries protectionist legislation is employed 
to protect the local industry from foreign domination and capital flight to the more 
advanced economies. If an insurer is to be regarded as domestic, then foreign 
participation in the insurance company is limited either by specific provisions relating 
to the insurance industry, or by laws which apply to the economy as a whole. In some 
cases the regulatory requirements in respect of foreign insurers are more stringent 
than that of domestic insurers. The regulations make provision for the classification of 
insurance business generally into life and non-life business, and specify the 
requirements for the application for registration, as well as the grounds for the 
cancellation of registration and liquidation of the insurer. For example, registration 
may be cancelled where insurance business is not being conducted in accordance with 
sound insurance principles, or where technical reserves are inadequate, among other 
things. 
The required share capital for each class of insurance (and reinsurance) business is 
also set out in the law. Sometimes the amount of share capital required in the case of 
foreign insurers is much higher than that of the domestic insurers. Regulatory 
provision may be made for the treatment of share capital. The supervisory authorities 
require insurers to maintain and submit in accordance with regulations, specified 
financial reports for example registers of assets, claims and policies. Annual reports 
and accounts in respect of insurance business also have to be submitted as laid down 
by the rules. There are usually additional requirements with respect to life insurance 
business such as the actuarial valuation report, summary and valuation of life policies, 
tables of premiums policy reserve values and guarantee surrender values, with the 
relationship between premiums paid and such surrender value. 
2.4.2 Product Regulation 
Insurance is an intangible product. Since it is basically a service activity, product 
regulation essentially involves insurance policy fonn appraisal and approval, since the 
policy is the written evidence of the contract between the insured and the insurer. The 
policy forms, general contract terms and conditions as well as insurance certificates 
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are submitted to the supervisory authority before the commencement of insurance 
business and approval of these documents by the supervisory authority is an essential 
prerequisite to the commencement of business. 
The purpose of doing this is to protect the interests of the policyholders under the 
contract and to ensure that the contracts have a legal basis. The aim is to prevent 
policies with contract terms that are ambiguous, deceptive or detrimental to 
policyholders from being issued. Insurance contracts are also examined to ensure that 
they do not conflict with the relevant insurance laws or commercial law (Mehr and 
Cammack 1976, p.694; UNCTAD TD/B/393,p.9). Policy form approval satisfies both 
the principles of reasonableness and fairness (Mayerson 1965,p.54). 
2.4.3 Business Methods Regulation 
Business methods essentially involves the marketing practices of insurance 
intermediaries and its regulation is aimed at protecting the insuring public from 
incompetent and dishonest insurance intermediaries and to maintain fair competition 
in the market (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.700). This is put into practice by (1) the 
specification of licensing requirements of agents and brokers and (2) the prohibition 
of some practices such as misrepresentation, twisting and rebating. In some cases 
advertising material and sales literature are examined to ensure that they do not 
contain any information that is deceptive or misleading (Mayerson 1965,p.56). 
The requirements in respect of brokers are more stringent than that of the agents 
because of the greater responsibility placed on brokers who are deemed to be 
professionals with a higher degree of expertise. The requirements are both financial 
(licensing fees) and organisational. The organisational aspect involves the 
establishment of minimum qualifications for prospective agents and brokers, the 
duties of both categories of intermediary as well as requirements as to the their 
general conduct. Generally licences are issued for a year and in some cases, agents 
may be required to take and pass a written examination administered by the relevant 
insurance association or other accredited examining body before a licence is issued. 
Regulatory requirements may prohibit "twisting" that is the inducement of a 
policyholder by an agent to substitute one insurance contract for another (Mehr and 
Cammack 1976,p.696). Agents do this in order to earn commission on new contracts 
since renewal commissions are usually much lower than first year commissions on 
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new contracts. "Rebating" laws are designed to maintain fair competition among 
agents. This occurs where agents in their efforts to secure a contract with insureds 
refund part of their commission to them (Mehr and Cammack 1976,p.696). The 
classification of rebating as an uncompetitive activity has been challenged (Yakubu 
and Mukubwa 1986,pp.15-16). These regulatory provisions ensure that the 
policyholder is treated fairly. 
The scope of insurance regulation varies from country to country and also across lines 
of insurance business. Insurance business may be subject to a close system of 
insurance supervision whereby practically every aspect of the insurers activities are 
regulated. On the other hand the business may be subject to fiduciary control, in 
which case supervision relates to only those aspects that affect insurer solvency. 
Summary 
The regulation of economic activity has been justified by the necessity to ensure that 
the public interest is protected. Economic theory defends this on the premise that 
market imperfections are inimical to consumer welfare. However, some theorists have 
postulated that in many cases, in the public regulation of private activity, producer 
interests, and not the consumer interest are served because powerful pressure groups 
within the regulated industry have "captured" the regulatory agency. 
The extensive regulation of the insurance industry has been justified on the basis of 
the fact that the insurance contract is fiduciary in nature and the existence of 
information asymmetry between the sellers and buyers of insurance services. In 
developing countries, the regulation of the insurance market is seen as being essential 
in co-ordinating the activities of insurers with national development policies. The 
scope of insurance regulation varies across markets, and while extensive regulation of 
insurance markets may be undertaken, it has to be recognised that the regulatory 
effects of such intervention may not necessarily be in the public interest. This issue is 
particularly important with respect to developing country insurance markets which are 
still in the early stages of development. It is thus vital to ensure that regulatory policy 
employed in such markets are selected within the context of the socio-political 
environment, in such a way that growth of the market is encouraged and not inhibited. 
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In the next chapter, the costs and benefits associated with the employment of various 
regulatory measures in developing country markets are examined within the context 
of the political economy of these markets. This will form the basis for the analysis of 
regulatory policy in the Nigerian life insurance industry. 
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Chapter 3 
The Insurance Industry in Developing Countries 
Introduction 
Insurance in general and life insurance in particular have significant contributions to 
make to the sphere of economic and social activity. Life insurance is said to play an 
important role in financial intermediation. 1 The degree of the significance of this role 
has been found to vary with the level of a country's economic development, and 
generally speaking, insurance activities attain more importance in the more developed 
economies. The linkages between financial development and economic growth in 
underdeveloped countries is discussed in the economic literature2 and developing 
country governments will attempt to influence the growth of financial markets, and by 
implication the economy, by employing various financial policies which are aimed at 
stimulating growth in the markets. Many of the policies utilised in the insurance 
markets in such economies are protectionist in nature. The necessity for, and efficacy 
of, these policies in stimulating insurance market growth in developing economies has 
generated some debate. 3 
It follows that in order to facilitate an understanding of the development of the 
regulatory philosophy in markets generally, a knowledge of the economic and 
political developments in the economy is essential. In this chapter, the characteristics 
of insurance markets in developing economies is examined, and the various 
arguments for and against the implementation of protectionist interventionist policies 
in these markets are discussed. This is intended to form a basis for the discussion of 
the development of, and regulation of the Nigerian life insurance market within the 
context of developments in the Nigerian socio-political situation. 
1. See chapter one. 
2. For example Patrick 1965 and Engberg 1988. 
3. Discussed further on in the chapter. 
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3.1 The Demand for Insurance 
The demand for insurance4 increases with the rate of economic growth and 
development and the importance of the insurance sector in the economy varies from 
country to country. This variation in demand can be attributed to first, the demand for 
the underwriting of risks, and secondly, the types of risks insured, as well as financial 
market structure, and government regulation (Hill 1986,p.121). 
This demand has been found to be positively correlated to the level of personal 
disposable income in the economy so that countries with a high income monopolise 
the demand for insurance. Generally speaking the demand for insurance (and, by 
implication, the volume of premium income) grows faster than national income, so 
that the contribution of insurance to GNP is more significant in the developed 
countries than in the developing countries (Diacon 1980; Wasow 1986; Hill 1986). In 
support of this assertion, Wasow (1986,p.161) states that in 1982, the ten largest 
insurance markets in the world were developed country markets. These markets 
accounted for 90% of world-wide insurance premiums while in the less developed 
countries (developing countries), the ten largest insurance markets accounted for only 
3% of world-wide premiums. His analysis of the relationship between per capita 
income and premium volume for 45 developed and less developed countries (1982 
figures, including Nigeria) demonstrates that insurance penetrationS increases with 
rising income, especially with respect to non-life insurance. 
The differences in the relative significance of the insurance sector in the developed 
and developing economies can also be explained by other factors apart from per 
capita income. Wasow (1986,p.161-173) identified a number of structural and policy 
variables which influence the size of a country's insurance market. These structural 
variables are expected to influence the demand for insurance while the policy 
measures should have a more significant effect on the supply side, although this is not 
always the case as some policy measures could have some effect on demand. For 
example, protectionist policies towards the local insurance industry, nationalization 6 
or licensing could affect both the demand for and supply of insurance services by 
increasing or reducing the confidence of consumers in the industry. These effects 
4. See Diacon 1980. 
S. Premium income relative to GNP. Wasow (1986) at p.161. 
6. Discussed further on. 
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create uncertainties In the prediction of the effect of policy on the demand for 
insurance (Wasow 1986,pp.165-166). 
The structural variables examined by Wasow in his study were (1) the levels of 
money supply relative to GNP, (2) government spending relative to GNP (3) the rate 
of inflation, (4) service imports relative to GNP, (5) the output capital ratio, (6) gross 
savings relative to GNP, and (7) the Islamic factor. The results of various regression 
analyses Wasow employed indicated that: 
(1) a low penetration of life insurance was associated with high levels of saving and 
inflation, and 
(2) nationalization, compulsory premium cessions to government institutions and 
restrictions on the remittance of profits appear to reduce life insurance premium 
volume. 
(3) predominantly Islamic countries were characterised by a lower degree of 
insurance penetration. 
It has been argued that the relationship between insurance premium income levels and 
national income is more significant and more stable for non-life than life insurance, 
and that financial market structure, and government policy, as well as the rate of 
inflation, have a stronger influence on the demand for life insurance (Hill 1986,p.122; 
Wasow 1986,p.162). 
Insurance has many benefits and7 life insurance in particular has a significant role to 
play in the development of a country.8 Apart from the provision of protection for 
individuals in society, it can aid development by among other things, creating a 
source of financing for new business, generating employment, and encouraging the 
undertaking of the risks incidental to business activities (Shelp, 1. 1986).9 
7. Insurance also has it's costs. These costs are in relation to the moral and morale hazards presented by 
policyholders which may increase loss costs to both the insurers and society at large. See Mehr and Cammack 
(1976,p.13), and Bickelhaupt (1979,pp.52-54). 
8. Discussed earlier on in chapter one. 
9. See also UNCTAD 1982, TDIBIC.3/177, "The Promotion of Life Insurance in Developing Countries." 
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Empirical studies have provided strong evidence of the close positive linkages 
between real growth of the economy and the real growth in financial assets, in both 
industrialised and developing economies,lO(Engberg 1986,p.2). Financial 
intermediation is essential for the channelling of real resources from the savers to the 
investors in the economy. Specifically in the case of life insurance, the conditions that 
encourage its growth in developing economies have been identified as follows: 
(1) adequate infrastructural facilities such as communication, transportation, health 
care, legal and education systems, 
(2) conditions that may create a demand sufficient to sustain the growth of the 
business, such as a fairly well developed manufacturing and service sector 
(3) the presence of institutions and companies that can meet such demand and 
(4) an economic and legal environment conducive to the growth of the business. 11 
The absence or inadequacy of one or more of these factors will inhibit the demand for 
life insurance. 
Engberg affirmed that in most of the developing countries with which he had been 
associated, the financial structure of the capital market has been a hindrance to 
economic development because the policymakers have failed to recognize the 
importance of finance to economic development. As a result, their interventions in the 
financial sector have been unsystematic, haphazard and counterproductive (pp.lll-
114). These [interventions] had led to some distortions such as the imposition of 
unrealistic interest rate ceilings, overvaluation of the domestic currency, financing of 
government through the financial sector, the collusive acts of financial institutions to 
restrict competition, as well as their reluctance to expand financial services to new 
geographical areas (Engberg 1986,pp.115-117). The distortions had resulted in 
"a patchwork of specialised financial institutions, each pursuing it's 
own narrow objectives with little coordination. of 
efforts; ... and ... financial policies consist of a hodgepodge [SIC] of 
controls and regulations that are more likely than not to prevent the 
10. See Patrick 1965 for a treatment of financial development and economic growth in developing countries. 
11. UNCT AD 1982, TDIB/C.3/177,pp.3-9. See also Nabolz (1986,pp.34-38). 
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financial intermediation mechanism from playing it's proper role in the 
economic development process" (p.118). 
3.2 The Insurance Industry in Developing Countries 
Shelp (1986) attempted to interpret the role of services in economic development. He 
argued that development strategies have focused mainly on the development of the 
manufacturing sector. These strategies have not been centred on the development of 
the service sector, nor have they emphasized the importance of the service sector in 
the process of economic development According to him the failure of economists in 
the industrialised nations to investigate the service sector has resulted in the 
development of inadequate and inconsistent theories of economic development. These 
theories have been transferred in their deficient form to the developing economies 
who, despite this inadequacy in theory, seem to recognize the important role of 
services in the economy. However their progress in the development of the services 
sector in these economies has been marginal (pp.3-5). 
Nabolz (1986,pp.34-48), examined the relative importance of the insurance industry 
in developing countries and was of the opinion that these countries were 
accommodating many new markets with large growth potential. He attempted to 
isolate some "common determinants" which he felt were characteristic of the majority 
of insurance markets in developing economies. Nabolz's findings were that, generally 
speaking, insurance markets in developing countries had the following characteristics: 
(1) They were former colonies, many of whom were still trying to find their 
political identity. The social structure in these countries had led to a politically 
unstable climate which affected the environment in which insurance companies 
had to operate. 
(2) Economic conditions were difficult. Many of the countries were still largely 
dependent on "low productivity agriculture" and unemployment was high. To 
the extent that economic conditions affect the volume of insurance and 
reinsurance business as well as the ability of the insurance market to obtain 
necessary insurance protection from abroad, this is an important determinant of 
the size of the insurance market. 
(3) Inefficient and inadequate communications and transportation systems, which 
served to hinder business activities. 
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(4) Pervasive government participation In the insurance industry. Although the 
availability of insurance protection is essential for successful economic 
development, in many developing countries this sector of the economy has been 
neglected by indigenous private investors. Consequently, the government has 
had to intervene in various ways in order to provide or increase the availability 
of insurance services in the economy. 
(5) The insurance portfolio of companies in developing country markets is usually 
unbalanced being dominated by a preponderance of motor insurance business. 
This could be attributed to the compulsory motor vehicle third party insurance 
legislation in force in these countries, as well as the fact that the insurance 
markets are small. 12 The results of motor insurance business in most countries 
is unprofitable. 
(6) Market development IS hindered by the lack of indigenous management 
personnel, and 
(7) Available underwriting material is ill-suited to local conditions. 
Nabolz (l986,p.41) also demonstrated that where the insurance industry is developing 
freely, there is a positive correlation between the ratio of insurance premiums to GNP 
(as well as per capita premium) and the rate of economic development. In other 
words, there is a relationship between the rate of development of the insurance 
industry and the rate of economic development (Diacon 1980; Wasow 1986; Hill 
1986). Thus if growth is stimulated in one sector, through public policy measures, this 
will affect the development in the other sector. 
Another characteristic of developing country insurance markets is that the control 
legislations in some of the markets had, in the past, been patterned after the 
legislations of their colonial masters, irrespective of whether or not they fitted in with 
the socio-economic aspirations of such countries (Ripoll 1974,p.75; EI-Hassan 
1981,p.43; Nwokolo, 1986,pp.l06-l07). 
12. UNCT AD 1980. TD/B/C.3/163/Add.I, "Third World Insurance at the End of the 1970's." 
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3.3 Government Intervention in Developing Country Markets 
The nature of government intervention 10 developing country markets has taken 
various forms; 
(a) Nationalisation of the insurance market. 13 Such markets are monopolistic with 
the government holding the general monopoly of insurance business. 14 
(b) The establishment of government owned insurance companies that compete 
with private indigenous insurers. The government sponsored companies usually 
enjoy certain advantages over their private counterparts, such as tied 15 
business. 16 
(c) The establishment of government insurance companies which operate as joint 
ventures with private local and/or foreign insurers. 17 
(d) The establishment of local government sponsored reinsurance institutions18 as 
well as regional companies and reinsurance pools. The pools are meant to 
facilitate co-operation between countries in the region for the benefit of local 
and regional insurance markets. Government compels companies operating in 
the market to cede a specified proportion of their premium income to these 
national reinsurance institutions and pools. 
The genesis of the establishment and implementation of nationalistic or protectionist 
policies in the developing country markets was facilitated by the co-operation of the 
UNCT AD secretariat. These countries had come to the realisation that a significant 
amount of funds in the form of direct insurance premiums and reinsurance premiums 
13. For example, Angola. Algeria. Afghanistan, Cuba, Libya, Ethiopia, India Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Tanzania. Zaire, and Zambia (UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/169/ Add.I) 
14. See UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/l69/Add.I, ibid. UNCT AD classifies categories (b)-(d) as pluralistic markets. 
15. This occurs where the insurance of all government property may be handled only by the government owned 
insurance companies. 
16. For example, Nigeria. 
17. For example, Nigeria. 
18. For example, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago Ghana. Kenya, Nigeria. Sierra Leone, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Korea (UNCT AD, TD/B/C.3/l69/ Add.l), Brazil, Nigeria and Tanzania. 
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was being remitted to the developed country markets as a result of their activities in 
these markets. In colonial times, these funds were directly extracted from the 
developing countries through premium and profit remittances abroad by western 
insurers. Although this practice had stopped with the independence of the developing 
countries and subsequent implementation of some form of protectionist measures, 
many of these countries were still largely dependent on western insurers, and the 
extraction of surplus still continued under the veil of reinsurance activities (Ripoll 
1974, EI-Hassan 1981). 
In order to assess the situation, UNCT AD investigated the insurance and reinsurance 
activities of developing countries. Subsequent to the investigation, it conducted the 
first of many sessions in July 1964, during which a number of recommendations were 
tabled. The recommendations emphasised "the need for developing and strengthening 
the insurance and reinsurance markets in the developing countries" and agreed that in 
order to do this a number of measures would have to be implemented, viz 
(1) Increasing retention capacity in the markets so as to reduce the outward flow of 
insurance and reinsurance funds to developed country markets; 
(2) Promoting insurance business in order to increase the level of savings and 
investment in the economy and, 
(3) The provision of reasonably priced Insurance protection for industrial and 
economic activity.19 
In order to achieve these objectives, the governments of many developing countries 
have actively intervened in insurance market operations with a view 
"To protect policyholders, limit foreign exchange li~bilities~ ens~e the 
provision of insurance services, prevent an exceSSIve prolIferatIOn of 
insurance companies, and generally to encourage a healthy 
ffi . . h' k t "20 environment of, and promote e ICIency In, t e Insurance mar e . 
With regard to the establishment of national reinsurance concerns UNCTAD saw the 
main advantages of such institutions as including the reliable recording of insurance 
19. See 10urnal of World Trade Law. 1967.pp.229-230. 
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business operations, the increased total retention capacity of the national market, risk 
redistribution among local companies and the improvement of the bargaining power 
of the local companies vis a vis the international reinsurance markets. 21 Since then the 
case for nationalistic (that is protectionist) regulation in developing country markets 
has been extensively examined and has been said to depend on some combinations of 
the following basic arguments; 
(1) Foreign insurers make excessively high profits in local insurance markets, 
(2) The purchase of insurance and reinsurance services from abroad puts an undue 
strain on the developing countries balance of payments position, 
(3) Insurance funds which could be channelled into development purposes are more 
likely to be invested abroad so that the growth of the local market is impaired, 
(4) The dominance of foreign insurers in the insurance market prevents indigenous 
personnel from acquiring necessary expertise in insurance business, 
(5) Developed countries such as Japan, Germany and France among others also 
protect their national insurance markets, and as such developing country 
markets would do well to pursue the same strategies (Hindley 1982,p.13). 
The above issues have been the subject of considerable debate and many of the above 
arguments have been considered to be untenable. Wasow (1986,p.90) argues that 
there is no evidence that international insurers are making excess profits in 
developing country markets, while Hindley (1982,p.14) believes that if and where 
excess profits are being made this has been caused not by the activities of foreign 
insurers but by restrictive barriers to entry imposed in the markets by the developing 
country policy makers. Although the possibility of foreign insurers charging higher 
prices than local companies is acknowledged, the higher prices are said to reflect the 
higher quality of service they provide (Carter and Dickinson 1979,p.38). EI-Hassan 
(1991,pp.34-35) argues to the contrary. He cited Britain as one country that has 
gained immensely from its operations in underdeveloped markets to the extent that 
the British policyholder was being subsidized by the consumers in developing country 
20. See Journal of World Trade Law, ibid. p.230. 
21. UNCTAD 1972. TD/B/393, "Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing Countries," p.l6. 
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markets22 in consequence of which it is the "most vocal antagonist" of protectionist 
policies in these markets. 
He suggested that Britain's support of the "freedom of insurance" doctrine23 could be 
attributed to self interest since the country has made immense profits from its 
overseas insurance business. Ironically although the doctrine is advocated by the 
developed markets, the available evidence suggested that in practice, developed 
country insurance markets did not pursue this policy.24 The activities of some EEC 
member countries in this regard is worth considering. A quote from The Economist of 
12 February 1972 in Ripoll (1974,p.84) illustrates the point: 
"A British Insurance Company, applying to the French insurance 
control authorities in the usual way for permission to underwrite in 
Paris was kept waiting for so long that it finally demanded an 
explanation. In reply it was told that things would be easier if foreign 
companies could get into the Institute of London Underwriters, the 
club of the company marine underwriters in the London market...It 
then emerged that other British companies had also been getting 
nowhere in their applications to write in France. French insurers are 
not alone on the Continent in their complaint that in practice the 
London insurance market...is hard to get into, even though in theory it 
is open to all comers having routine Department of Trade and Industry 
permission" . 
Similarly, in recent years the US, as a result of the relatively small percentage of 
world service exports and the growing limited capacity of the domestic market, have 
been supporting the concept of the liberalisation of trade in insurance services. 
Protectionism is said to be " ... a threat to international trade and to US national 
interests" and it is considered that liberalisation would secure the benefits of increased 
sales for the American insurance industry, since their expertise in the area of pricing 
and products amongst other things are often superior to those of the developing 
countries (Skipper 1987 ,p.64). 25 
22. See also Ripoll (1974) at pp.77-80). 
23. The principle that the restriction of the supply of insurance by foreign insurers results in the unavailability of 
suitable insurance cover at affordable prices. 
24. Carter and Dickinson (1979.p.2) state that practically all countries practice in varying degrees some fonn of 
discrimination in this regard. 
25. Skipper 1987 however concludes that though" the US insurance industry has a vested interest in minimizing 
protectionism ... [tlhis interest does not conflict with the concept of economic efficiency gains; it reinforces it." 
66 
In order to increase their volume of business many of these developed country 
insurers have to implement expansionist programmes which are naturally directed 
towards third world insurance markets which offer the least degree of resistance by 
reason of their comparative underdevelopment. In fact, western insurers have found it 
extremely difficult to penetrate into other western insurance markets (Ripoll 
1974,pp.76-77,84-85). It appears that the developed country markets have not been 
averse to employing some form of "coercion" to implement their expansionist 
programmes. UNCT AD notes that "A major inducement for liberalisation has been 
provided by international lending institutions, generally under 'conditionality' 
programmes ... particularly in Africa ... " 
Such moves have met with vigorous opposition in the third world markets. In June 
1988 the 15th General Assembly of the African Insurance Organisation appealed to 
all African Governments 
" ... to recognise that insurance is a vital tool for economic emancipation 
and growth and as such its control and basic utilisation should be in the 
hands of the nationals who are totally committed to the development of 
the country's economy. "26 
Despite this however the developed countries are intent on pursuing the policy of 
liberalisation in services in general and insurance services in particular. 27 Because of 
the belief that the purchase of international insurance and reinsurance services strains 
the balance of payments position, governments have implemented, in line with 
various UNCTAD recommendations, various "defensive" policy measures to address 
this issue. Such policies are usually part of a general commercial policy which is 
applicable to several subsectors of the economy. 
Not surprisingly, the western insurers were not supportive in this respect. They in fact 
accused the developing countries of being paranoid about the issues involved stating 
that the " ... developing countries often manifest schizophrenic symptoms on the issue 
of private foreign participation. "28 The developing countries at the first UNCT AD 
26. UNCT AD 1989. TD/B/C.3/229. "Insurance in Developing Countries: Review of Developments in 1986-
1988."p.3. 
27. The moves to liberalisation of trade in insurance services was reinforced during the Uruguay round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) of GAIT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Fonner 
negotiations had emphasised the trade in goods. but since the Tokyo round of MTN the US as well as the 
OECD countries had increasingly supported negotiations on the issue of trade in services. See Skipper 
(1987.pp.60-61). UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/229.pp.4-5. and Carter and Dickinson (1979.pp.61-70». 
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session solicited the developed countries assistance in implementing these policies. 
This assistance was not forthcoming as a result of which the 1972 UNCf AD 
resolution invited developing countries to take measures which would lead them 
towards the achievement of the objectives set out in the fIrst resolution (Ripoll 
1974,p.81). 
The policy measures eventually adopted in this regard were; 
(1) policies prohibiting or discouraging the purchase of insurance and reinsurance 
services from foreign insurers, 
(2) the requirement that foreign companies incorporate locally, and 
(3) the imposition of restrictions on the repatriation of net premium balances or net 
earnings of foreign insurers and reinsurers by implementing exchange control 
restrictions or insurance supervisory policies (Dickinson 1986,p.81). 
A distinction could be made as regards the above between restrictions imposed on 
"establishment" (categories 2 & 3 above) and "services" (category 1 above) business. 
Apart from direct barriers in the form of restrictions on the purchase of insurance and 
reinsurance services from abroad and the imposition of exchange control regulations, 
inter alia, indirect barriers to the foreign supply of insurance business may exist in the 
form of fIscal policy, and the requirement for the localisation of reserves. 
With respect to establishment business where the direct barriers may be imposed by 
nationalisation, indirect restrictions may include; restrictions on remittances, 
discriminatory capital requirements, domestication, restrictions on the employment of 
expatriate personnel and discriminatory market practices. 29 These policies have been 
criticized on the basis that, inter alia, the resultant insurance markets would be too 
narrow, with the consequence of increased costs to local consumers. Additionally, it 
has been argued that insurers seek to invest their funds in the developed country 
markets because the rates of return on investments in these markets are higher than 
28. Position paper on International Insurance and Reinsurance. International Insurance Advisory Council. 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Washington. D.C.. 1972. in RipoUi (1974.p.80). 
29. See Carter and Dickinson (1979.pp.19-33) and also Skipper (l987.pp.65-71). 
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those of local markets, as a result of defective policy measures in these markets which 
contribute to low returns (Hindley 1982). 
It has also been argued that "restricting" market operations in this sense is against the 
very concept of insurance (Ripoll 1974,p.82), that is, the geographical spread of 
numerous risks by the insurance companies in order to spread the loss occasioned by 
a few policyholders amongst a large population of policyholders. 30 It is thought that 
while restrictions on the supply of foreign insurance on a services basis could reduce 
to a significant extent, the product choice and quality of service available to the large 
industrial and commercial purchasers of insurance, individuals and small businesses 
are affected to a lower degree. The argument is that the needs of the latter are usually 
unsophisticated and can be supplied by domestic insurance companies,31 while the 
former usually require in addition to insurance cover, specialised loss prevention, 
engineering and risk management services that domestic insurers may not be able to 
supply (Carter and Dickinson 1979,pp.34-38).32 
With respect to the supply of life insurance business, foreign insurers are also said to 
bring the following benefits (1) experience (that is highly skilled foreign personnel, 
advanced technology and a knowledge base that can be transferred to the "national 
work force") (2) capacity (cost efficient creation and marketing) (3) competition and 
(4) increased revenues to host developing countries largely through the taxation of 
foreign life insurers and licensing fees (Greenberg 1986,pp.31-32). 
The argument that the purchase of foreign insurance services is a strain on developing 
markets balance of payments position has been criticised on the basis that the net flow 
of insurance funds between any two countries is probably substantially smaller than 
the gross flows. Though gross flows may at fIrst impression appear to be large, the net 
flows are said to be very small when compared with other items in the balance of 
payments accounts or GNP of the country. The figure is usually less than 3%, with the 
exception of the UK (Wasow 1982,p.89; Carter and Dickinson 1978,pp.16-17). Apart 
from this it is also argued that although fiscal or other policy measures implemented 
might result in a reduction in deficits on the current account, the size of the reduction 
depends on the ability of the local insurance market to meet the local demand for 
30. See generally. Athearn 1977. Bickelhaupt 1979 and Mehr and Cammack 1976. 
31. Carter and Dickinson argue that this holds true more so with respect to life insurance business since consumers 
in any case prefer to purchase insurance services from local companies rather than foreign companies. 
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insurance. This ability is usually impaired because of capital shortages and the lack of 
managerial expertise so that eventually the local demand is passed onto international 
reinsurance markets (Dickinson 1986,p.81).33 
However another factor has to be taken into consideration. Because the insurance 
portfolios of developing countries are usually small, the operation of the law of large 
numbers34 is often impaired so that reinsurance is increasingly used as a means of 
reducing portfolio risk. Third world insurers characteristically over-reinsure because 
of the lack of reinsurance expertise, their small and uneven portfolios and the 
temptation to receive insurance commissions. Consequently the outward flow of 
reinsurance premiums in developing countries does not bear a relationship to the local 
reinsurance protection needs. There appears to be sufficient justification for this 
argument. UNCT A035 noted that the demand for reinsurance in many developing 
countries was steadily increasing, despite the reduction in economic activities in these 
countries. The situation is compounded because international reinsurers not only fix 
the price for the reinsurance services they render, but also dictate to some extent the 
terms and conditions under the contract as evidenced by their use of "revision"36 and 
"stability clauses".37 Such premiums are based on the reinsurers global results and do 
not take into consideration the experience of the ceding country. As a result, "The 
balance of power in reinsurance transactions is thus constantly in favour of the 
reinsurer"(EI-Hassan 1981,pp.25-31).38 It is however argued that the imposition of 
localisation restrictions on premium balances on foreign reinsurers directly increases 
32. See also UNCT AD 1982, TDIB/C.3/178, "Insurance in DeVeloping Countries, Developments in 1980-
1981,p.27." 
33. Mr. J.O. Irukwu, the Managing Director of the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation, commented in an address to 
AIRMIC International Insurance Conference held in Paris in 1982, that" ... Risks [were] getting more complex 
and difficult to handle .. [there was] [a]cute shortage of experienced qualified personnel [and] [l]ack of expertise 
in the various supporting services ... " in UNCT AD,TDIB/C.3/178, ibid. p.27. 
34. This is a mathematical principle also referred to as "The Law of Great Numbers" or "The Law of Averages". 
Simply put, it states that as the number of exposures (to loss) increases, the more nearly will the actual results 
obtained approach probable results expected with an infinite number of exposures (Magee 1953,pp.73-74); 
Mehr and Cammack 1976,pp.32-33; Athearn 1977,pp.29-30). The application of this principle to insurance 
means that as insurers consistently increase the number of insureds in their portfolio, their ability to forecast 
the number of people who will actually suffer loss increases. 
35. UNCT AD TDIB/C.3/178, ibid.pp.24-27. 
36. Policy, July 1971, pp.666-678 in EI-Hassan (1981,p.33). Reinsurers make use of such clauses to adjust 
premium rates in line with inflationary trends in the developing countries. 
37. Bellerose,P.R., (1980). Reinsurance For The Beginner, London: Witherby & Co .. p.48 in EI-Hassan ibid.p.32. 
38. See also, UNCT AD TDIB/C.3/178, ibid.p.25 
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their production costs which are then passed on to local reinsurers and insurers in the 
market (Carter and Dickinson 1979,p.42). 
The unavailability and inadequacy of insurance statistics39 about the value of 
reinsurance cessions in the developing countries and their effect on the balance of 
payments makes it difficult to assess these effects and the developed countries who 
possess statistics on world insurance and reinsurance transactions conceal them 
because in view of 
It ••• the sensitivity of the developing countries over the possible earnings 
of outside insurers in their territories it is better not to say too much 
bout the achievements of Britain in the sphere of invisible earnings. It 40 
From this the conclusion can justifiably be drawn that some foreign reinsurers are 
making good profits on their activities in the third world. 
It has been proposed that the relevant issue in examining this question lies in the area 
of the opportunity costs involved in resource allocation. The developing countries 
have to devise ways of rationing foreign exchange to put into uses productive to the 
economy. Thus the issue in question is that of making a rational economic choice 
between alternative foreign exchange using activities by examining the relative costs 
and benefits involved in each activity and not by arbitrarily excluding insurance from 
this sphere of economic activity. When a resource such as foreign currency is scarce, 
it has to be rationally allocated among productive activities. However developing 
country governments do not permit the markets freedom of choice. They impose 
policy measures designed to prevent or limit the outflow of foreign exchange by way 
of reinsurance transactions which, it has been argued, leads to inefficient resource 
allocation (Hindley 1982).41 
For example, the probable results of setting up national reinsurance institutions with 
the sole purpose of protecting the balance of payments position might be that local 
direct insurers are forced to pay more for these services than would have been the 
case if they had been allowed to deal directly with foreign reinsurers (Hindley 
39. UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/178, ibid.p.27. 
40. Policy Holder Insurance Journal London 11 September 1970, in Ripolli (1974) at p.78. 
41. See Carter and Dickinson (1979,pp.44-54) for a discussion of this issue. 
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1982,p.45). Apart from this, because international reinsurance business is competitive 
in nature, it is sometimes the case that reinsurance balances are in favour of the 
ceding company despite the fact that large reinsurance premiums are ceded as in the 
case of proportional motor treaties (Nabolz 1986,p.49). In other words, the 
profitability of the domestic reinsurers portfolio has to be examined as a means of 
assessing the costslbenefits of these policy measures. This can be determined by 
examining the balance payable abroad by the domestic reinsurers over a period of 
several years, rather than taking a snapshot view of the gross premiums involved 
(Hindley 1982,p.45; Nabolz 1986,pp.48-55). 
UNCTAD42 recognised the fact that "effective skill and expertise" were a necessary 
requirement for the effective implementation of their recommendations on insurance 
in developing country markets and acknowledged the fact that this was "generally 
lacking" in most developing countries. They recommended the establishment of 
national training programmes and regional specialized training institutes to alleviate 
the situation. The lack of human resources in these countries was however seen as the 
main barrier to setting up these programmes.43 It has been asserted that the available 
evidence demonstrates that foreign competition does not prevent local insurers from 
acquiring the requisite skills, although it is acknowledged that their presence may 
hinder the process of market development. It is claimed that the presence of foreign 
insurers could actually increase the degree of advanced technical knowledge and 
expertise in the local market (Skipper, 1987,p.64). It is also argued that if the effect of 
restricting the activities of foreign insurers is to substitute inefficient local insurers for 
efficient foreign insurers, then the development of the market is also hindered. The 
situation is however believed to be changing over the years with the establishment of 
local, regional and international training schools for local market personnel (Nabolz 
1986,p.47). 
Governments are said to pursue protectionist policies because local insurers cannot 
provide insurance services at a competitive price compared with foreign insurers. It is 
also considered that protectionist policies obscure the underlying problem which is 
generally that of inappropriate policy measures in the local market. The effect of these 
policies may be to impose costs because producer interests are served by taxing local 
42. UNCTAD TD/B/C.3/121 "Insurance Education for Developing Countries,"p.2. 
43. UNCTAD TD/B/C.3/l21, ibid. 
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policyholders, and the misallocation of resources involved may serve to hinder 
innovation (Hindley 1982,p.6, Skipper 1987 ,p.64). 
Evaluating the effects of protectionist policies with respect to the growth of the 
insurance market will invariably lead to the conclusion that these measures are 
successful since in many cases, the industry's dependence on imports will decline and 
the market experience some growth. However there are other effects that are ignored 
such as increased costs of operation or changes in the quality and availability of the 
service, which hinders the growth of the market and ultimately affects the consumer. 
The benefits of protectionist policies should be viewed in terms of the associated costs 
of growth in the sector which costs are basically opportunity costs of the resources 
utilised in the market (Wasow 1986,p.91; Dickinson, 1986,pp.81-82). It is recognised 
that although the impact of restrictions on the operations of foreign insurers may 
result in a welfare loss for policyholders, such restrictions could nevertheless be 
justified on the basis of the possible benefits to the national economy. The supply of 
foreign insurance services may result in better product choices and improved quality 
of service to individual policyholders, but from the stand-point of the national 
economy, the benefits may not be so apparent. Protectionism appears to encourage 
inefficiency among domestic companies as the lack of foreign competition may act as 
a disincentive to efficiency (Carter and Dickinson 1979,pp.44-45). 
Although the improved financial control resulting from the regulatory system should 
outweigh the costs of regulation (Mortimer 1988,p.49), this is not always the case. 
The restrictive regulation of the developing country markets have associated costs 
which cannot be overlooked or ignored in assessing the extent to which regulation has 
conferred benefits on the market. Goodhart (1988,pp.17-31) in examining the costs of 
regulation in the context of The British Financial Services Act 1986, categorised the 
costs associated with the establishment and implementation of regulatory institutions 
and measures as follows; 
(1) Direct resource costs (human and physical resources) which represent an 
opportunity cost since they could have been used in alternative productive 
activities. Wasow (1986) argues that since insurance is basically human 
resource intensive, the opportunity costs in this area are mainly human resource 
costs. This is because the insurance sector utilises a large number of relatively 
highly paid and highly educated personnel, and because they have to be utilised 
more intensively to generate insurance services than other goods and services, 
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their productivity in terms of job generation and the generation of value added 
is extremely low relative to other sectors of the economy (p.99). 
(2) Guaranty fund costs that is the costs of establishing a guaranty (compensation 
fund) for the protection of investors, (in this case policyholders) in the event of 
the failure of an insurance company. 
(3) The risk of losing business in the event that the regulatory restnctIons 
discourage skilled labour from home or abroad operating in the market. 
(4) Increased costs of operation, reduced competition and consequently static 
inefficiency stemming from regulatory restrictions. 
(5) The costs associated with the stifling of innovative activities which lead to 
dynamic inefficiency in the market. 
These costs are applicable to developing country markets. and although it has been 
acknowledged that such costs may in practice be difficult to evaluate, (Mortimer 
1988; Goodhart 1988; Duguid (1988), it is considered that such an evaluation is 
essential before regulatory measures are implemented (Goodhart 1988). 
The "infant-industry"44 argument has been used to justify the employment of 
protectionist regulation in the developing country markets, but it is argued that this 
may not hold if the costs of protection of the industry outweigh the benefits of 
protection. In addition to this, although this theory may be applied to the trade in 
goods, it is not certain that it could be validly or appropriately applies to services in 
general or insurance in particular (Skipper, 1987,p.64). Thus it is considered that the 
argument for government intervention in developing country markets are not tenable 
from the viewpoint of rational economic policy and genuine national interest (Hindley 
1982 p.34). 
3.4 Case Study Analysis-The Evidence 
Although case study analysis of the effects of government intervention in specific 
insurance markets have given some insight into the probable effects of various policy 
44. The protection of a young local indust!), by restrictive policy measures which protect it from foreign 
competition. The idea is that this will enable the market to grow. 
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measures in insurance markets as a whole, the experience in these markets cannot be 
used to make sweeping generalisations from these analyses. 
".:.th~ best use ~f ~ase stu~ies is to explore what is possible and to 
disnuss generalIzatIOns whIch prove too simple" (Wasow and Hill 
1986,p.175). 
The potential effects of protectionist policies have to be evaluated in the light of an 
individual economy's prevailing (and potential) market environment and given that 
this may vary considerably across different economies, the effect of the same 
measures in different countries may not be the same. 
Skipper (1987,pp.82-83) agrees with the preceding sentiment and advocates the use of 
what he refers to as "[b]road temporary protective measures" in many developing 
country markets and believes that these measures should be gradually removed to 
guard against permanent protectionism which may not be in the interests of these 
markets. 
Gorre (1986) examined the effects of the nationalisation of some of the insurance 
companies in the French insurance industry by comparing the premium growth, level 
of capital and free reserves, and taxes on profits, of joint stock companies in the 
nationalised sector and private sector over the period from 1963-1980. His results 
indicated that the nationalised sector was inferior to the private sector in terms of the 
parameters he had defined. This differential, he discovered was mainly due to the 
increased level of expenses in the nationalised sector caused mainly by the greater 
number of executives and middle management personnel employed in the sector. The 
implication was that the nationalised sector companies were being run less strictly or 
less efficiently than the private sector companies which is usually the case with public 
sector organisations. 
However the analysis of the effects of nationalisation of the insurance industry in 
India (Wasow 1986,pp.228-239) does not indicate the same pattern. In fact it 
appeared that prior to nationalisation foreign insurers performed less efficiently than 
domestic companies. These foreign companies grew more slowly and had relatively 
higher expense ratios and inferior underwriting results than the domestic insurers who 
in turn were undercapitalised and poorly managed. Although as Wasow stated, 
detecting the results of nationalisation was difficult, the post- nationalised insurance 
industry appeared to be competently run and the records of the companies 
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"respectable" (p.228). However, there were indications of politicisation in the process 
of appointing senior level managers to the nationalised companies as well as wasteful 
non-price competition, while consolidation of the industry had increased the power of 
labour unions considerably. Additionally, the net positive effect of nationalisation on 
the balance of payments position appeared to be very small. 
In an attempt to control the insurance industry to facilitate Tanzania's econOITIlC 
development, the government opted to nationalise the insurance industry. It has been 
argued that this process has proved beneficial to the industry45 when compared with 
the "regulatory model"46 implemented by the Sudan to achieve the same purpose. 
Nationalisation is thus advocated as being " ... more appropriate to the needs of 
underdeveloped countries than a regulatory model of the Sudanese type" (EI-Hassan 
1981). The argument is that a regulatory code is an inadequate system to depend on in 
a country which is characterized by such weaknesses as 
" ... deficiencies in .. .legislation and, in particular, low observance and 
enforcement; lack of obedience to rules and directives handed down to 
public officials ... ; frequent collusion of those officials with lowerful 
persons or groups of persons whose conduct they regulate ... "4 
According to EI-Hassan (pp.339-340), the regulatory code in the Sudan was drafted 
by foreign insurers to serve their best interests with the result that the laws were 
generally liberal. For example, reinsurance activities and the imposition of premium 
rates and policy terms was not subject to any form of regulatory control. Additionally, 
investment regulations were not complied with and the method of valuation of the 
assets and liabilities of insurance companies, upon which the determination of their 
solvency was based, was left to the companies to determine. This coupled with the 
industry'S influence on the regulatory department had resulted in the regulatory 
agency being" ... destined to remain a mere depository of annual documents primarily 
engaged in the peripheral issues of regulation rather than a watch-dog on the industry" 
(p.340). 
45. For more details. see EI-Hassan (1981) at pp.245-350. 
46. That is the imposition of regulatory measures on the market via an insurance code. 
47. Myrdal. G .• (1968). "The Soft State in Underdeveloped Countries". U.C.L.A Law Review. Vo1.15. p.1120 in 
EI-Hassan 1981.pp.338-339) 
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In Korea (Wasow 1986,pp.242-263), public policy in the field of insurance has been 
protectionist and the insurance industry has been structured to facilitate the national 
policy goals of economic growth and industrialisation. The government controlled 
pricing, so that premium rates were high and loss ratios relatively low by international 
standards. The absence of price competition had hindered innovative activity as in the 
Indian experience. Despite these limitations, the industry was growing rapidly and the 
costs of protectionist policy in Korea was less than would have been the case in other 
developing countries. This was because Korea was well endowed with skilled, 
educated people so that the opportunity cost in terms of human resources was 
expected to be low as skilled personnel could be obtained for the insurance sector 
without a loss to other sectors of the economy (p.249). 
The Brazilian expenence (Hill 1986,pp.211-239) also debunks the theory that 
protectionist measures are inimical to the development of an insurance industry. Here, 
government increased the degree of regulatory control over the market in order to 
generate greater retention capacity for the domestic market and to facilitate asset 
growth. Pursuant to this the market was consolidated and restrictions placed on the 
participation of foreign insurers while efforts were made to reduce the volume of 
insurance imports. The implementation of these measures appeared to have improved 
the performance of the industry in terms of increased growth rates, reduction in 
expenses, higher profits and increasing consumer benefits. The projected 
improvement in balance of payments position with respect to insurance however did 
not materialise as has been the case with most countries implementing the "decrease 
insurance imports and limit foreign participation" strategy (Wasow 1986,p.249; Hill 
1986,pp.222-227). 
Despite the resulting increase in the price of insurance services, the implementation of 
protectionist policies in the Japanese insurance market appeared to be beneficial in the 
wider context of the prevailing economic environment in Japan during the period 
under consideration (Soejima 1986,pp.250-263). The Japanese economy was a fast 
growing one and the insurance industry was described as one of the fastest growing 
markets. However it was acknowledged that with the impending reduction in 
economic growth, these existing policies had to be modified to take into consideration 
new developments in the economy. 
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3.5 Government Participation in The Nigerian Insurance Industry 
The available literature on the Nigerian life industry in general have been mostly 
written by insurance industry practitioners and a few academicians who have 
developed an interest in the subject. Consequently, most of the work done in this area 
has been of a descriptive, rather than investigative or empirical nature. 
Akintola-Bello (1983,p.1) in his work on the structure of the Nigerian insurance 
industry, commented that the existing works in the area of insurance had not been 
sufficiently micro-analytic, being mostly general analyses of growth trends, market 
shares by line of business and investment patterns. A survey of the literature confmns 
this assertion. Most of these works have been of a descriptive nature and very few, 
such as Akintola-Bello (1983), Akhile (1990) and Msheliza (1991) have involved any 
empirical analysis. This is not surprising if the following factors are taken into 
consideration: 
(1) many of the papers have been written by industry practitioners who have had 
the tendency to produce papers which although informative have not been 
scholarly in approach, 
(2) insurance has only recently (as late as the 1970's) become an academic subject 
in Nigeria's institutions of higher learning and as such the area has not been 
subject to much scholarly research.48 
(3) the lack of adequate, reliable, and consistent insurance industry statistics to 
work with and 
(4) the lack of funding for insurance based research. 
The lack of formal methodical research into the industry has been frequently 
commented upon. Lijadu (1987,p.25) observed that the area of insurance research has 
been neglected. He stated that 
" ... there is no institution in Nigeria today that offers post graduate 
courses in insurance ... The success of the Nigerian Insurance Industry 
48. This trend appears to be changing. There are now two doctoral works on the Nigerian insurance industry, 
Falegan 1991 and Msheliza 1991. 
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will almost certainly depend on research ... the willingness of top 
managers in the industry to sponsor research ... has not been too 
encouraging. " 
Because insurance company investment behaviour and performance are essential to 
insurance company profitability, solvency and viability, quite a lot of work has been 
done in this area in the developed insurance markets such as the UK and the USA. 
This is not, however, the case with the Nigerian Insurance Industry. There are a few 
papers, notably Ogunshola (1976), looking at the investment and related problems 
with which Nigerian insurance companies are faced. Ogunshola's finding was that the 
existing regulatory framework for the investment of insurance funds was restrictive 
and this, coupled with the increasing inflation in the economy, was adversely 
affecting the performance of the funds. This is consistent with the arguments in 
Falegan (1976). 
Falegan (1982) examined the regulatory framework for the investment of insurance 
funds. In his appraisal of the effectiveness of the use of the portfolio ceiling device 
and the regulation of interest rate method policy instruments as regulatory measures, 
he concluded that these measures led to " .. .less efficient markets, imposes adverse 
distributional effects and distorts relative factor prices between sectors" (Falegan 
1982(d)). 
In his study on the economic contribution of the insurance industry in Nigeria's 
economy, Akintola-Bello (1985) tentatively concluded that the predominance of very 
small but non-specialist firms could affect the investment and claims performance of 
the industry and stressed the need to extend regulation to improve investment quality. 
Agu (1986) came to a similar conclusion in his assessment of the actual and potential 
contribution of the insurance industry to the nation's economic development. He 
stated that the investment pattern of insurance companies "should be a matter of 
concern to the economy" and believed, like Ogunshola (1976) and Falegan (1982(d),) 
that the unattractiveness of the investment opportunities available to the insurance 
companies was as a consequence of the implementation of the monetary authorities 
public policy measures. 
Akhile's (1990), empirical study into the interrelationships between insurer size, 
ownership and labour efficiency in non-life insurance business suggests that insurers 
with some degree of foreign capital ownership were more efficient (in terms of the 
generation of premium income relative to the size of labour force) than their fully 
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indigenous counterparts, while the larger insurers (in tenns of asset base) were 
relatively less efficient in generating premium income. Since the study was limited 
non-life business, the conclusions reached cannot be properly extended to the life 
market. 
Msheliza's (1991) examination of the strategic planning in the Nigerian insurance 
industry yielded results that suggest, among other things, that the government owned 
insurance companies are less involved in strategic planning than the other companies 
in the industry. In addition to this, empirical analysis appeared to suggest that there 
was evidence of economies of scale in non-life but not life insurance business, that 
there was evidence of price competition in life insurance, and that there were 
economies of scale in respect of management expenses (p.223). Msheliza's analysis 
also suggested that medium size companies have lower cost structures and higher 
profits than the small and large companies which implies the existence of minimum 
efficient scale. His analysis was however, limited to a 1984 cross-sectional study of 
the companies concerned. 
A detailed examination of the role, nature and effectiveness of government 
intervention in the Nigerian insurance industry was carried out by Falegan (1991). 
The study is descriptive. His conclusion, among other things, was that the apparent 
benefits of the protectionist measures implemented by the government were more 
apparent than real because these policies had resulted in increased transaction costs 
and market frictions (p.319). His conclusions were based on a theoretical analysis of 
regulatory provisions, and a survey of the perceptions and opinions of insurance 
company executives as to the relevance and effectiveness of these regulations and 
their impact on industry structure, conduct and perfonnance. On specific issues such 
as governments participation in the industry, Falegan argued that this had resulted in 
market concentration, with a resultant welfare loss49 to consumers in tenns of the 
increased prices they had to pay for insurance services. He also stated that the 
country's balance of payments position in respect of insurance services was not 
showing any improvement since domestic reinsurers were retroceding a large portion 
of the risks which had resulted in an outward flow of foreign exchange 
(pp.227 &307).50 In addition, he described the insurance market as being oligopolistic 
while like Msheliza (1991), he said life insurance, " ... readily responds to competition 
49. Falegan did not attempt to measure the extent of the welfare loss. 
50. See Falegan 1986 for a general discussion of the effects of localisation policy on the Nigerian insurance 
market. 
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[because there was] ... no restriction on [it's] ... supply other than it's fiduciary 
regulation" (p.315). 
In the study he hypothesized that " ... although established insurers tend to favour 
market discipline, they do not want regulation for it's own sake but only if they can 
profit by it" (p.325). Falegan attempted to detennine if this was true by interpretation 
of the responses to some questions on regulatory provisions by means of an 
administered questionnaire. He analysed the responses by classifying them according 
to the ownership pattern of the insurance companies, joint venture,51 state owned and 
private domestic. His results appeared to confirm the hypothesis. Falegan concluded 
that the joint venture firms were not averse to capital requirement and licensing 
provisions since they, by virtue of their size were able to absorb the costs of 
regulation (p.324). He concluded that based on these factors government should focus 
on the development of the capital intensive sectors of the economy and leave the 
insurance sector to private interests. 
Falegan's study was the first comprehensive investigation into the effect of 
government intervention on the activities of insurers. His conclusions are significant 
with respect to the study at hand, but most of them were arrived at without any 
rigourous empirical analysis. Furthermore the study was a general analysis of the 
whole insurance market and does not treat the life market specifically. The insurance 
product is however heterogeneous across the various classifications of insurance 
business and for an effective analysis of the industry, the main lines of business have 
to be analysed separately. 
Summary 
The demand for insurance is positively correlated with the rate of econonuc 
development. As a result, government policy in the insurance market in developing 
country insurance markets is geared towards, not only policyholder protection, but on 
implementing measures that will stimulate the growth of the market. The objective of 
policy is to strengthen the market by increasing retention capacity and reducing the 
reliance upon the importation of insurance services. Thus many developing 
economies implement protectionist policies of various kinds in order to co-ordinate 
51. The term includes domestic (local) subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies and companies with part 
government and part domestic ownership. 
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the activities of insurers with national development objectives. It is argued in some 
quarters that these policies do not benefit the developing economy markets in the long 
run, and many western economists and insurers object to their implementation. At the 
opposing end are the protagonists of protectionist policies who argue that the 
developed countries objectives are simply to control the premiums and profits in third 
world markets, as an extension of past colonial interferences in such markets. 
Although the evidence from case study analysis generally appears to favour the 
imposition of protectionist policies in such markets, sweeping generalisations cannot 
be made. The economic conditions and structural characteristics of individual markets 
has to be taken into account in determining the policies best suited to each country, 
and the potential costs and benefits of regulatory interventions have to be taken into 
consideration in the determination of public policy. 
The Nigerian life industry has not been the subject of much scholarly research. 
However, the evidence from available studies suggests that the market is price 
competitive, and there are no indications of the existence of economies of scale. 
Government intervention in the life market is said to have restricted investment 
choice. No attempt has been made to study the relative efficiency between the 
different categories of companies operating in the market. 
In the next chapter the political economy of Nigeria is discussed first, to form a basis 
for the analysis of both regulatory developments52 and industry structure, conduct and 
performance. 53 
52. Discussed in chapter 5. 
53. Discussed in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4 
The Political Economy of Nigeria 
Introduction 
In order to facilitate the discussion on the political economy of Nigeria, the 
developments in the country from colonial times up till the present will be examined 
in three phases. First, a brief excursion will be made into the colonial background of 
the country up till independence in 1960. Then the post-colonial era will be examined 
in three phases, the Agrarian Period, the "Oil Boom" period and the Period of 
Economic Recession. 
Nigeria is located on the West coast of Africa and has an area of 356,669 square 
miles, about four times the size of the United Kingdom. It lies approximately between 
30 and 150E longitude and between 40 and 140N latitude and is bordered to the west 
by the Republics of Benin i and Niger, to the east by the Cameroons, northwards by 
the Niger and Chad Republics and to the south by the Gulf of Guinea2 (Ekundare 
1973,p.5). The capital is Lagos, in the southern coastal region. 3 
Nigeria is a tropical country and physical conditions vary within the country. The 
northern part of the country is dry and sandy, while the coastal region is damp and 
swampy. The seasons are delineated by a dry season which begins in the northern 
parts in October, ending in April. The dry season is characterised by the harmattan, a 
dry north-easterly cold wind. In the south the dry season is of a shorter duration, 
lasting from about November to March (Burns 1972,p.23; Ekundare 1973,p.5). The 
country's population is 105.2 million,4 1989 figures5, and per capita income is 
estimated at $250, 1991 figures. 6 The country is currently divided into 31 states, 
1. Formerly Dahomey Republic. 
2. This includes the Bights of Benin and Biafra. 
3. The capital city is in the process of being transferred to the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. 
4. Nigeria is believed to be the most populous country in Africa. It is estimated that one in every four Africans is a 
Nigerian. 
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inclusive of the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. Although the lingua franca is 
English, Nigeria is a multi-lingual and multi-cultural society (there are over 250 
ethnic groups in the country)7 and the two predominant religious groups are the 
Christians and the Moslems. A proportion of the population practice some form of 
African traditional religious practices. Nigeria has been under military rule SInce 
1983, although it is currently in the transition process to civil rule. 
4.1 The Colonial Era 
Nigeria was created by the amalgamation of the two British protectorates of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria in 1914. The country had become a British protectorate in 1865, 
when the British in a reversal of their averred policy on colonialism claimed a 
protectorate over the Niger Districts.8 The country had a thriving export trade in 
cocoa, palm oil and palm kernels (from the southern part of the country) and 
groundnuts and cotton, which came from the north, and the British saw no sense in 
continuing trade agreements with the "natives" when they could take over the factors 
of production. Agriculture accounted for almost two-thirds of the country's gross 
domestic product. 
Foreign firms had considerable commercial operations in the country and some of 
them established manufacturing enterprises.9 This was actively encouraged by 
incentives and inducements to attract foreign capital. In the period between October 
1946 and March 1958, 1,027 foreign companies were registered in the country, a 
considerable increase from the 182 that were registered in the previous decade 
(Akinsanya 1983,p.149). At this time although an industrial policy was designed for 
the country, the policy measures were primarily in the form of import duty and tax 
reliefs geared towards facilitating the trading activities of the foreign companies in the 
market. The Colonial Government had never had the intention of industrialising the 
economy since Nigeria was supposed to be a trading post from which raw materials 
were extracted to the metropolitan capital and other overseas markets, and to which 
finished goods could be exported without hindrance. As a consequence of the high 
5. IMF International Statistics Year-book 1991.p.571. 
6. Financial Times Survey on Nigeria. Monday March 16. 1992.p.I. 
7. Lloyd's Bank Ltd Overseas Dept.. 1976. Economic Report on Nigeria. 
8. Reference sources on the history of Nigeria include Crowder. M .• (1978). The Story of Nigeria.. London: Faber 
and Faber. and Bums. A.. (1969). History of Nigeria.. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
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level of foreign capital in the country, government control of the industrial sector at 
this stage of the country's development was minimal (Teriba and Kayode 
1977,p.322,330). 
The fIrst attempt of the British to "plan" the Nigerian economy was in 1945, when the 
"Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria 1946" was designed. The 
plan was revised in 1951 to cover the 1951-1956 period. The plans were however not 
considered to be plans in the true sense of the word since they were not co-ordinated 
or related to any single economic target. The International Bank designed another 
plan in 1955 to cover the 1955-1960 period, but it was not till after independence that 
serious attempts were made at co-ordinated planning in the country. 10 
4.2 The Post-Colonial Era 
4.2.1 The Agrarian Economy 1961-1970 
Following the rise of nationalist sentiments and the associated political upheavals, the 
British relinquished their political rights over Nigeria in a peaceful transfer of power 
in 1960. Subsequently successive post-colonial governments in power designed 
development plans which were aimed at "shaping the design of [the] nations 
economic development," and one of the objectives of development planning was to 
give the country "an increasing measure of control over her own destiny." 11 The 
ultimate objective of development planning was to develop the Nigerian economy to 
the point where it would become increasingly independent so that it's reliance on 
foreign capital and technical assistance would be reduced. 
Before independence, Nigeria's industrial life had been dominated by the export of 
raw agricultural products, with agriculture accounting for 56.7% of GDP. Thus the 
first National Development Plan 12 document accorded "the highest priority to 
agriculture, industry and technical education" and it's major objective was to maintain 
an average growth rate of 4% per year in the country's GDP. This was to be attained 
9. See The Economic Development of Nigeria. 1955. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press 
10. Federation of Nigeria. National Development Plan 1962-1968. pp.6-7. 
11. Federation of Nigeria. National Development Plan 1962-1968.pp.2-3. 
12. Federation of Nigeria. Federal Government Development Programme 1962-1968. Sessional Report No.1 of 
1962. and National Development Plan 1962-1968.p.23. 
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through the investment of approximately 15% of GNP per year into the "directly 
productive sectors of the economy." The government aimed to stimulate the growth of 
the industrial sector by encouraging and stimulating growth in the private sector in the 
economy. Although the desirability of encouraging a high level of indigenous 
participation in the economy was recognised, it was however realised that in order to 
achieve the desired growth "A substantial amount of foreign assistance and capital 
imports" would be required. Government policy at this time was one of limited 
participation in enterprise, and it focused it's attention on the development of 
infrastructure in the economy. The National Plan document described the Nigerian 
economy as a mixed economy13 and although the public utilities, shipping, airways, 
railways, power, communications and marketing boards were nationalised, 
government leaders indicated that there were no plans to nationalise industry beyond 
these measures. As far back as 1952, the Minister of Commerce and Industries, A.C 
Nwapa, had declared, 
fly ou must realise what government can do and what it cannot do. 
Industry is a purely commercial enterprise ... The Government's 
responsibility is to provide communications, power, social services-
those are the things which fall rightly within the province of 
Government, but a shoe factory, an umbrella factory-No-that is too 
much to ask of Government (Blunt 1977,p.81). 
In 1956, his successor, R.A Njoku also spoke in the same vein; 
"The Government has to evolve a policy of industrialization. We do 
not believe that all the industries should be started by the Government 
and should be controlled by the Government. The Government's work 
is to help companies, corporations and private people to establish their 
industries, and experience has shown that where the Government ~as 
engaged in industry the whole thing could not be run on a commercial 
basis" (Blunt 1977,p.81). 
The Government's intentions were specified in the fITst National Development Plan 
document. However the lack of domestic and foreign capital and expertise was an 
obstacle to the successful implementation of Governments industrial policy and the 
necessity of foreign capital was acknowledged. However from the start the possibility 
of the Nigerianisation of foreign interests in the economy was indicated. Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa the country's first Prime Minister, in a parliamentary speech stated 
that 
13. National Development Plan 1962-1968.p.21. 
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"It .must be obvious that no 1':Iigerian can be content so long as any 
major sector of the economy IS controlled by foreigners. But we are 
realists and we say that so long as. there is a dearth of Nigerian capital, 
so long must there be an opportumty for foreign capital in Nigeria. We 
do not seek the withdrawal of foreign capital from any area of the 
economy before Nigerian enterprise is able to replace it. When the 
time for withdrawal has come, due notice will be given (Proehl in 
Akinsanya 1983,p.146) 
The Government also promised that when the time came for the "withdrawal" of 
foreign capital, adequate compensation would be paid, and this was provided for in 
the provisions of section 30(1) of the Nigerian Constitution (Akinsanya 
1983,p.146,147). The Governments policy was therefore to encourage direct foreign 
participation in the industrial base of the economy while indigenous businessmen 
were encouraged to move into areas where they had some expertise such as retail, 
semi-wholesale and service activities, among others. These local entrepreneurs were, 
however, faced with many problems. In addition to shortages in capital and 
entrepreneurial capacity, there were obstacles/difficulties in the economic 
environment. These came in the form of capital equipment and [skilled] human 
resource problems, problems encountered in the procurement of raw materials and 
intermediate goods, as well as infrastructural problems among others. The foreign 
investors, unlike their indigenous counterparts, were not hindered by most of these 
difficulties. They had large capital bases, skilled personnel, and overseas links which 
did much to facilitate the conduct of their business operations in the country (Schatz 
1977,pp.35-46). 
The Governments policy stance towards foreign investment had been taken as far 
back as 1952, before the country's independence. In order to encourage foreign 
investment in industrial activity, some industries were designated as "pioneer 
industries" and companies investing in them were given, among other things, tax 
holidays for a period of between two to five years depending on the levels of 
investment made. During the succeeding years more liberal legislation and economic 
inducements directed towards this were implemented. 
There was some OPPosIllon In some quarters to this strategy. The Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives, the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, in 
1960 was of the opinion that although foreign investors should be encouraged, 
Nigeria should say "in effect to foreign investors 'come to our aid in the meantime but 
in due course we will buy you out" (Phillips in Akinsanya 1983,p.150). This 
statement led key political figures at home and abroad to make statements clarifying 
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the Governments stance on this issue. Dr Michael Okpara, the then Premier of the 
former Eastern Nigeria, referred to Chief A wolowo as a communist stating that 
"Those who are advocating nationalization are communists and should have the moral 
courage to say so" (Blunt 1977,p.82). 
The debate on nationalisation continued. Chief A wolowo advocated the 
nationalisation of the insurance, mining and merchant marine businesses among 
others, on the basis that, among other things, nationalisation was essential to the 
successful development of the nation. Chief Okotie-Eboh, the Federal Finance 
Minister and the Leader of the Government Business in the Federal Parliament firmly 
opposed such measures. He had earlier noted that it "was most distressing" that 
"people who should know better are propounding new and dangerous philosophies" 
which include "loose talk of Nigeria being in the pocket of Britain, economically, 
politically and otherwise, and talk of nationalisation". He gave a warning that such 
talk would only serve to frighten off foreign investors at a time when foreign capital 
and foreign technical assistance and expertise was so badly required. One of the 
ministers objections to nationalisation was the experience of the existing statutory 
corporations which he said almost all paid exorbitant salaries and were not properly 
managed. The minister stated that he was not opposed to nationalisation in principle, 
but believed that it was not in the interests of the Nigerian populace at that point in 
time. He however conceded that there could be some circumstances in which 
nationalisation could be possible, for instance if foreign participation was not desired 
and indigenous capital was inadequate or not forthcoming. Thus Government policy 
towards state intervention in industry was one of opposition to such intervention 
except where the intervention was in the public interest or for national security or 
economic development (Blunt 1977,p.82, Akinsanya 1983,pp.150-156). 
The fears of those advocating a policy of nationalisation of industry were expressed in 
a speech by the Opposition Chief Whip, Chief Akin-Olugbade, who after denouncing 
the "imperialist exploiters" concluded that there was 
" ... no need to nationalise if the economy of our country is in the hand 
of indigenous Nigerians .. .if we fail to act, and to act quickly, the 
chances for our economic survival will be made more remote" (Blunt 
1977,p.85). 
This period in Nigeria's political history was a turbulent one. Ethnic and regional 
rivalry had resulted in political disturbances and since independence, there had been 
friction between the tribes in the country. The Ibos in the east were becoming 
,,", ~-,- ~ --~ ~,,-" "~_'='n"" -"" '_'~""h"'" ''''''''hh'''''''ated by the powerful northern HausaslFulani. J(JIII\l~,ll\ J11;:-..\HI( I(~ H W Itll--4,fjU( H \U{)( \Ui)l IL¥\4JU(j( fC..., \i.J~VJ\ ij ll.,li.¥iI 
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There were violent clashes and disturbances between the various ethnic factions in the 
regions. Ultimately, after a bloody coup in January 1966, the anny intervened and 
Major-General Aguyi Ironsi became the nations leader. His leadership was shortlived 
however. His attempt to impose unitary rule led to a counter coup and General 
Yakubu Gowon became the new leader of the federation. In order to remove the fear 
of domination by the northern region, the country was divided into twelve states in 
1966.14 The ethnic rivalry and political disturbances still continued, however, and on 
the 30th of May 1967, the Eastern region of the country (led by Colonel Odumegwu 
Ojukwu) seceded and declared an independent "Republic of Biafra". This move was 
firmly resisted by the Federal Military Government and thus began the Biafran war, a 
bloody bitter civil war which lasted until January 1970. 
4.2.2 The Oil Economy 1971-1979 
The Second National Development Plan was launched in 1970, after the end of the 
civil war. The plan was developed for the five year period from 1970-1974, but was 
later extended to March 1975. New policy goals were set in keeping with the 
governments plans of reconciliation, reconstruction, rehabilitation of the economy. 
Thus the main objectives of the plan were stated as the establishment of 
(1) a united, strong and self-reliant nation 
(2) a great and dynamic economy 
(3) a just and egalitarian society 
(4) a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens 
(5) a free and democratic society. IS 
Following the change in the political power base of the country from civilian to 
military rule, there was a marked shift in the Governments industrial policy. The 
increasing dominance of foreign business in many sectors of the Nigerian economy 
was a matter of concern for the Federal Military Government and this initiated a 
14. The country was further divided into nineteen states under General Mohammed's rule. 
15. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Second National Development plan 1970-1974.p.32. 
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change in government policy towards foreign investment. In the Second Plan, the 
Government had stated that it would 
"... seek to acqu~e: by l~w of ne~essity, equity participation in a 
number of strategIc mdustnes that wIll be specified from time to time. 
In or~er ~o ensure that the economic destiny of Nigeria is detennined 
by Nigenans themselves, The Government will seek to widen and 
intensify its positive participation in industrial development" 16 
The Government subsequently identified a number of "strategic" industries in which it 
decided to invest. The strategic industries were defined as those which were of 
national significance and in which private indigenous capital might be unavailable or 
inadequate. Even where such capital was forthcoming, the Government decided to 
invest in certain industries for reasons of economic nationalism, among others. The 
Governments ownership and control of strategic industries was aimed at maximising 
the local retention of profits, increasing the industrial contribution to the economy 
(Ogunpola 1977,p.310). 
This was the genesis of active government intervention and partICIpation m the 
economy. A number of control measures were implemented pursuant to the Military 
Governments industrialisation policy. Some of these controls were physical, financial 
and managerial in nature. In 1968, the Companies Decree 1968 was promulgated. 
This decree made regulatory provision for the formation and operation of businesses 
in the country, and made it compulsory for foreign companies to incorporate locally 
in the country. Regulations were made requiring that import licenses be obtained for 
the importation of specific goods into the country, and in 1970, in an unsuccessful 
effort to mitigate the rising inflation in the country, the Price Control Decree was 
passed. The decree established a Price Control Board to set prices at which 
commodities could be sold, and banned the hoarding of such goods. The proliferation 
in the number of mushroom banks prompted the promulgation of the 1969 Banking 
Decree which regulated bank paid-up capital and statutory reserves. There were also 
controls on immigration and foreign exchange imposed on the country)7 
Apart from considerations of Nigerianisation of the economy, there appeared to be 
other motivating factors behind the Government's policy towards foreign capital. It 
has been suggested that mounting pressure was put on the government by indigenous 
businessmen of the bourgeoisie class who wanted "a protected niche in the economy 
16. Second National Development Plan,p.289. 
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free from foreign competition and a share of the proceeds of the most successful 
(foreign dominated) sectors of the economy." Their desires were compatible with that 
of the ruling military elite who were said to have become "increasingly distrustful" of 
foreign capital (Biersteker 1983), and in February 1972 the Military Government 
promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972, which came into effect 
in April 1974. This was the fIrst indigenisation decree which was aimed at increasing 
the participation of Nigerians in economic activities in the country. The decree 
banned foreign participation in 22 types of business activity,18 which included 
advertising and public relations, forwarding and clearing agencies, bread making and 
the retail trade among others. These business activities were classified as schedule I 
enterprises and were exclusively reserved for Nigerians. Schedule II businesses 
consisted of business activities in which foreigners could participate provided that 
Nigerians held a minimum of 40% of the equity capital of such businesses. 
In addition to this the Government acquired equity interests in petroleum production 
and petroleum distribution (55% and 60% respectively), and nationalised Esso 
Standard Ltd. Before this time the Government had refrained from making direct 
investment in the mining and extraction industries because of the technology and 
extensive capital outlay required (Ogunpola 1977,p.311). As a result the extractive 
industry was dominated by foreign capital, for example, Shell-BP (British), 
Agip/Phillips (Italian/American), Mobil Oil (American) and Elf Oil (French). 
The Nigerian Industrial Development Bank, Nigerian Bank for Commerce and 
Industry and the Nigerian Agricultural Development Bank were also established to 
provide credit facilities for Nigerian businessmen who desired to take advantage of 
the business opportunities created by the provisions of the decree (Akinsanya 
1983,p.161,171). The government also invested 55% in the iron and steel and 
fertilizer production. This was the era of the oil boom and the government had the 
requisite funds to undertake these policy initiatives. At a point during this period, in a 
speech on national television General Gowon stated that Nigeria's problem was not 
lack of money, but how to spend it. The country, the Government and the governed 
alike were on a spending spree which would have terrible consequences. 
Government spending went on relentlessly and unabated. The Governments 
budgetary expenditures were rapidly exceeding oil revenues and the oil revenues were 
17. See Teriba and Kayode 1977 and Akisanya 1983 for discussion of these control measures. 
18. See schedule 1 of The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972. 
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not being utilised to develop the economic infrastructure. Thus although the economy 
was experiencing rising growth in GDP, it was not developing (Sadri and Williamson 
1989). The Gowon government launched the Third National Development Plan 1975-
1980, which was aimed at using the country's oil wealth to extensively transform the 
economy, socially, physically and in terms of infrastructure. The plan was ambitious 
and priority was given to the development of industry and agriculture. Although the 
agricultural sector employed about 70% of the population, its contribution to foreign 
exchange earnings had fallen from 80% (pre oil boom era) to 10%.19 
In July 1975, after 13 years in power, General Gowon was displaced in a military 
coup and was succeeded by General Murtala Mohammed. There had been increasing 
dissatisfaction with his government with regard to the way in which oil revenues were 
being disbursed. General Mohammed's short leadership was marked by a series of 
radical changes. He commenced a programme of "War Against Indiscipline" that 
covered almost all aspects of socio-economic life.2o There were mass dismissals of 
public servants and military personnel in an attempt to rid Nigerian society of the 
general laxity and indolent work attitudes that had characterised the public sector, 
which had become a lumbering bureaucratic machine. It was at this time that one of 
the most important amendments to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree was 
made (the 1972 decree had been amended and updated in 1973, 1974, 1975 (Ake 
1985), after the Federal Military Government appointed an industrial enterprises 
panel in 1975 (Aliko 1976), to examine and review the provisions of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree. The purpose was to reassess the extent of foreign 
investment in the country in order to increase the extent of local participation in 
medium and large sized firms. At this time, the amount of U.K and U.S investments 
in Nigeria were estimated at about £800 million and US$l ,0000 million. 21 
In February 1976, General Mohammed was assassinated in a "bloody" coup attempt 
and General Olusegun Obasanjo, with "great reluctance" assumed the leadership of 
the nation. The military fervour with which the late General Mohammed implemented 
decisions continued under the new leadership albeit to a lower degree. The industrial 
enterprises panel at this time made recommendations to the Government, under which 
19. Lloyd's Bank Ltd . .1976. op.cit 
20. For example. the government imposed the "queuing culture" on the populace. Nigerians are not known for their 
patience. 
21. Figures obtained from ABECOR (Barc1ays) Country Report on Nigeria. 17th May 1976. 
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all businesses were classified into three schedules. The result of this effort was the 
1977 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. As with the earlier decree, schedule I 
enterprises were the exclusive preserve of Nigerians, while Schedule II contained a 
list of 57 enterprises in which the equity participation of Nigerians could not fall 
below a minimum of 60%. This included banks and insurance companies. Schedule 
III covered all businesses not otherwise classified in which the minimum equity 
participation was stipulated at 40%. Thus "Nigerianisation" of the Nigerian economy 
became the basis of the country's industrial policy. 
This policy however merely produced cosmetic changes in the economy. Although 
ownership had changed, indigenous representation at the managerial level did not 
increase appreciably. Many reasons have been adduced for this, among which are, the 
shortage of skilled manpower in the economy, the efforts of foreign investors (aided 
by some Nigerians) to frustrate the indigenisation effort,22 and the fact that the equity 
interest of Nigerians in many companies was weak because of it's atomistic nature 
(Akinsanya 1983,p.178-179). Apart from this the 1977 decree in section 7 made 
allowance for continuing foreign ownership in business enterprise under specified 
conditions, and as such encouraged foreign ownership and control of the economy. In 
addition to this the indigenisation exercise simply served to transfer the wealth into 
the hand of some privileged indigenous businessmen and bureaucrats (the national 
bourgeoisie) who were thus able to assimilate themselves into Nigeria's capitalist 
class. These people supported and co-operated with the policies of their colonial 
mentors which served their self interest (Williams 1976,p.33, Obasi 1988). In the 
financial sector, foreign minority shareholders were able to stymie the indigenisation 
efforts to some extent by the use of weighted voting shares23 and through 
manipUlating the technical and service agreements between the institutions and their 
foreign partners. This resulted in a situation where the economic surplus from the 
country's banks and insurance companies was (as in the colonial era) still being 
extracted to the metropole (Obasi 1988; Agu 1989,p.8). 
Agricultural and industrial output in the economy were depressed for most of 1975, 
and food shortages were a problem. The Government earmarked N63 million for the 
importation of foodstuffs to relieve the shortages. Inflation had accelerated, from 14% 
in 1974 to 43% in 1975. Among the factors responsible for this were a high level of 
aggregate demand in the economy coupled with an inadequate supply of domestic and 
foreign goods. The Government was concerned about the growing inflationary trend 
22. See Biersteker (1983,pp.192-205), for the various ways in which this has been accomplished. 
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in the economy and set up an Anti-inflation Task Force to examine the issue.24 In 
order to stimulate production in the neglected agricultural sector, the government 
introduced some measures such as tax incentives for investments in agriculture and 
processing, and the removal of import duties on raw materials for livestock feeds 
among other things. Preferential interest rates were also allowed for investments into 
the "preferred" sectors of the economy. In the insurance sector, minimum and 
maximum ceilings were placed on the proportion of insurance company funds to be 
invested in specified sectors in the economy.25 In addition to this, the rates of interest 
on insurance company loans to specific sectors were brought under the regulatory 
rules of the Central Bank. These measures however had only a limited success.26 
4.23 The Recession 1980-date 
In 1979, the Military Government as they had promised under the Obasanjo regime, 
handed power over to the civilians, and on the 1st of October 1979, after a certain 
amount of public debate and controversy, Alhaji Shehu Shagari was sworn in as the 
country's President. During the Shagari administration, the Fourth National 
Development Plan (1981-1985) was launched. The focus of this plan was the 
achievement of self-sufficiency in food production and the consolidation and 
diversification of the economy so as to reduce the reliance on petroleum as the main 
source of revenue. This was necessary in view of the fact that as a consequence of the 
world-wide oil glut, Nigerian crude oil production had slumped by two-thirds. The 
country was in a delicate economic situation. Although there was a balance of 
payment surplus, the country was, and still is, dependent upon petroleum which 
accounted for over 90% of exports, 80% of government revenue and 25% of the 
Gross Domestic Product.27 
The Shagari administration was the subject of many allegations of fraud and 
mismanagement of public funds. Ethnic and regional differences in the country 
contributed to the tension among various groups in the country. Nepotism and 
tribalism were rife in the country. The deterioration in the economic and political 
23. The foreign shareholdings were weighted in order to increase foreign voting power. 
24. Barclays Country Report on Nigeria 17th May 1976. 
25. This is examined in some detail in sections 5.2.2.1.2 and 5.2.2.2.4 in chapter 5. 
26. For an analysis of the effects of these policy measures on insurance company investment income. see Falegan 
1982(d). 
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situation led to the military seizing power once again in December 1983, when Major-
General Buhari came to power. The new military government was reformist in 
character and introduced sweeping changes in the socio-economic structure of the 
economy. Austerity measures were introduced in the form of curbs on domestic 
expenditure and imports, foreign exchange restrictions, limitations on overseas 
borrowing and a wage freeze among others.28 The austerity measures did not however 
affect government spending, and "it appeared that there was [a] separate rule for 
government spending and this was unaffected by ... austerity" (Sadri and Williamson 
1989,p.6). 
The Government continued negotiations with the IMF and World Bank for an IMF 
U.S $2-$3 billion extended facility, $300 million structural adjustment loan, and the 
refinancing of the estimated U .S$2-$3 billion the Government owed to export credit 
agencies. The loan would involve the devaluation of the Naira, liberalisation of 
import controls and the relaxation of petroleum subsidies. The negotiations had 
commenced when the country was under civilian rule, but the Shagari administration 
had been unwilling, in the interests of political expediency, to submit to the harsh 
conditionalities that came with the IMF package. 
The Buhari regime became increasingly repressive 10 nature. There was general 
dissatisfaction with the increasing levels of unemployment and inflation as well the 
scarcity of essential commodities. The government however did not tolerate any form 
of criticism although it was obvious that the "Austerity Measures" it was 
implementing were causing a lot of economic hardship to the majority of the 
populace. These issues among others, led to the August 1985 bloodless coup in which 
General Ibrahim Babanginda came to power. The Babangida government 
implemented the two-tier foreign exchange rate system which was in effect a 
devaluation of the Naira. In addition to this, restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
were implemented in an effort to stabilise the economy without any success, a 
situation which led a former economic adviser to the government to state that 
" ... As the [balance of payments] deficit grew, so did.the pressure ~or 
some further administrative intervention. New regulatIOns-commercIal 
and monetary-had to be put in place to buttress the existing 
machineries for controL.new tariff changes were announced, new bans 
on imports were promulgated, all in the name of protecting local 
27. Barclays Country Report October 1981. 
28. ABECOR Country Report November 1984. 
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industries. It was clear that the economy was being choked to death by 
massive regulations administered by a corps of bureaucrats whose 
interests could not be regarded as identical with those of the businesses 
they were seeking to protect" (Okigbo 1988,p.8) 
In 1985, the self styled "President" launched a "national debate" on the question of 
whether the IMF loan should be accepted or rejected. This proved to be a farce, for 
although public opinion was fiercely against accepting the loan, in view of the 
potential economic impact on the economy, 29 in 1986 the Government accepted a 
World Bank approved $425 million structural adjustment loan. Thus the country 
continued to remain largely dependent upon foreign technology and capital. This 
dependency is considered to have led to a number of structural problems such as the 
excessive dependence on manufactured imports, the inability of the domestic 
economy to satisfy both production and consumption needs and a weak balance of 
payments position among other things (Obasi 1988). 
The structural adjustment programme or SAP as it came to be called, was intended 
among other things: 
(1) to restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to 
reduce dependence of the economy on imports, 
(2) to achieve fiscal and balance of payments viability, 
(3) to lay the basis for sustained non-inflationary growth in the economy, and 
(4) to limit the degree of unproductive investment in the public sector and intensify 
growth in the private sector. 
These policies were to be achieved by, among, other things; 
(1) the introduction of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) in order 
to achieve a realistic level for the Naira, 
(2) the adoption of trade and payments liberalisation policies, 
29. For a discussion of the economic and political implications of the acceptance/non-acceptance of the loan. see 
Olashore 1988. Olashore argued that although the loan would defmitely cause economic dislocations. there 
appeared to be no feasible alternatives to the conditionalities attached to it 
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(3) deregulation of the economy and, 
(4) the removal of government subsidies on public goods and services.30 
In August 1987, the Government in an attempt to increase the volume of savings in 
the economy, announced the deregulation of interest rates31 in the economy and in 
1988, the termination /suspension of SAP. Measures to deregulate the economy were 
implemented. The Government as part of these measures promulgated the 
Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree 1988 by which it made known it's 
intention to divest itself of many of its investments in the public sector. The 
Government's rationale for this move was stated as follows; 
"The public enterprise sector .. .in Nigeria is quite large, comprising at 
the federal level alone about 100 enterprises ... Government investment 
in this sector is over N23 billion (N8 billion in equity and N15 billion 
in loans) but the returns thereon are less than N500 million annually. 
The Government is thus clearly not receiving a fair return on it's 
investment outlay, while it continues to pay interest charges and 
principal on huge loans ... This state of affairs will no longer be allowed 
to continue. "32 
Schedule I Enterprises included enterprises that were to be partially privatised 
(commercial and merchant banks; Agricultural, co-operative and development banks; 
oil marketing companies; steel rolling mills, among others)33, and enterprises to be 
fully privatised.34 The latter included fourteen insurance companies in which the 
Government held equity. Although the Government did not specify any clear cut 
objectives for the decree, it was viewed as an attempt not only to deregulate the 
market, but to encourage the rationalisation of the public sector, generate revenue for 
government, reduce the public sector borrowing requirement, develop the "fragile", 
inefficient and underdeveloped capital market35 and diversify the ownership base of 
30. For a detailed treatment of these issues and how they affect the manufacturing sector, see for example, Eleazu 
(1988),pp.50-56. 
31. It is argued that government control over interest rate structure in Nigeria has led to a high degree of financial 
repression in the market (Agu 1989, Ikhide 1990). See Ikhide ibid. for the arguments for and against the 
deregulation of interest rates in Nigeria. 
32. Section VI(53) of the Structural Adjustment Programme Package 1986. 
33. Schedule I, Part 1 of the decree. 
34. Schedule 1 Part 2. 
35. For the role and efficiency of the Nigerian capital market, see Nwankwo 1980; Okigbo 1981; Ojo and 
Adewunmi 1982; and Akinnifesi 1988 among others. 
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enterprises in the economy (Usman 1988). Although the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
had been established as a formal and specialist market as far back as 1961,36 the 
majority of the instruments available for trading were government securities and 
shares. In addition to this the volume of trade in the securities market was low and 
mainly in government stocks. The returns on these stocks were quite low (especially 
compared with the yields on the industrial share issues) and did not reflect the 
inflationary trend in the economy.37 
Despite the various policy measures taken to stimulate the economy, a lack of private 
indigenous capital still existed. Since the implementation of the provisions of the 
1977 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, the levels of total investment as a 
percentage of GDP had fallen, and the Government attributed this to, among other 
things, insufficient foreign capital inflow and low levels of internal savings. This led 
the Government to backtrack on previous policy and state that it 
" ... welcomes foreign capital into the manufacturing 
sector ... [and] ... Easier capital and dividend repatriation through less 
cumbersome procedures is a by-product of recent changes in the 
regulations. II 
The Government therefore made an amendment to the 1977 Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree which was amended to contain only one list of scheduled 
enterprises which are exclusively reserved for Nigerians. All other enterprises (with 
the exception of banking, insurance and petroleum prospecting and mining) were left 
open to 100% foreign participation subject to a minimum investment of N20 million. 
The new measures applied to new investments only.38 
Six years after SAP was implemented, the structural deficiencies in the economy still 
remain. The SAP basically encouraged the growth of the country's trade surpluses 
with the objective of using them to service foreign debt repayments. In March 1991, 
Nigeria's foreign debt stood at US$33.4 million,39 inflation40 and unemployment4I 
36. It was then known as the Lagos Stock Exchange. 
37. See Appendix A, tables AI-A5. 
38. See "Extracts From Nigeria's Industrial Policy" in Management in Nigeria. Vo1.26(3). May/June 1990.pp.43-
53. 
39. The Financial Times, Monday March 16 1992. 
40. The consumer price index rose from 105.3 in 1986 to 259.65 in 1990 (IMF Yearbook 1991). 
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were still rising, the Government was still excessively dependent on oil revenues 
which in 1992 was 96.2% of total exports, and the debt-service ratio stood at 36%.42 
Summary 
The economic and political developments in Nigeria give the appearance of a country 
that is politically and economically unstable. The newly independent civilian 
government intended to pursue an industrial policy of industrialising the economic 
base of the country by stimulating private investment in a mixed economy. However 
the lack of private domestic and foreign capital necessitated the utilisation of foreign 
capital and expertise. The political leaders had not realised that political independence 
is not synonymous with economic independence. Although the Military Government 
has made attempts at the Nigerianisation of the economy, the underdevelopment of 
the capital market, inadequate infrastructure, pervasive government interference in the 
economy, as well as government financial mismanagement have had deleterious 
economic effects. 
The fact that the political structure of the country is unstable has contributed to the 
inadequacies in financial policy and by implication the problems in the economic 
system. Between the period from 1960 to 1992, Nigeria has been under democratic 
rule for 12 years (1960-1967; 1979-1983) and military rule for 20 years (1966-
1979; 1983-1992). Since the period of military rule there have been five coups 
accompanied by changes in the military leadership, and numerous attempted coups, 
accompanied by an unnecessary waste of human lives.43 
The non-permanent structure of the political leadership of the country has led to a 
situation in which government policy has not been consistent over the years. When 
coup d'etats or changes in the nature of the political base occurred, the new leadership 
tended to undo and/or modify the policies of the former government in power. 
Thus the Governments economic policy does not appear to have been properly 
designed, co-ordinated and implemented. Over the past few years financial policy has 
41. The official unemployment figure (1988 figures) was 7.8%, but it is estimated to have been closer to 28%. See 
Okigbo (1988, p.13). 
42. The Financial Times op.cit. 
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been indirectly detennined by external sources such as the IMF and World Bank. The 
country is presently in the transition stage from military to civilian rule. This presents 
uncertainties in terms of the nature of economic policy that the new civilian 
administration will pursue. It is within the context of these developments in the 
economy that the regulatory developments in the insurance industry are examined in 
the next chapter. 
43. Unsuccessful coup plotters are summarily executed. For a discussion ofthe ascendancy of the military into 
power in Nigeria, see Okediji O.A, 1989,pp.1-37. 
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Chapter 5 
Life Insurance Regulation in Nigeria 
Introduction 
For a proper understanding of some of the developments in the life market during the 
period under review, it is necessary to examine these developments in the light of 
several of the legal and economic factors present in the environment. The preceding 
chapter looked at the economic and political developments in the Nigerian economy: 
this chapter examines the objectives, sources, nature and evolution of government 
regulation in the Nigerian insurance industry within the context of the political 
economy. The extent of implementation and enforcement of the regulatory measures, 
as well as the degree of industry influence on the regulatory process, is also discussed. 
Prior to 1961, government intervention in the industry was practically non-existent, 
and there had been no previous attempt to regulate the activities of the companies in 
the market. There had, however, been attempts to regulate the behaviour of motor 
vehicle owners and drivers by the passage of the Motor Vehicle (Third Party) 
Ordinances. This lack of control over company operations has been attributed to a 
number of factors, the most important of which appeared to be the domination of the 
market by foreign (mainly British) insurers (Falegan 1982(a),pp.189-190). Apparently 
it was not in their interests for any form of restriction or control to be imposed on the 
market at the time, since the lack of control measures in the insurance market enabled 
them to operate as they desired without any fear of intervention by the authorities. 
The newly independent federal and regional governments of Nigeria appeared to take 
the view that government intervention in certain areas of activity were essential for 
the growth of the Nigerian economy. The First National Development Plan Document 
for the 1962-1968 planning period stated that "the Federal Government has an 
exclusive constitutional responsibility for certain major fields of governmental 
activity. These include ... [among other things] ... the creation of financial institutions 
appropriate to a sovereign state and the maintenance of confidence in these 
institutions. " 
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The first piece of local legislation which was enacted to control the insurance industry 
was the Insurance Companies Act 1961.1 The objective of this act was the registration 
of insurers by compelling them to register under the provisions of the Act. Since then, 
the government has employed various methods to control the insurance industry some 
of which have been the enactment of legislative instruments. Some of the legislation 
(The Insurance Companies Act 1961, The Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1964, The Insurance Companies Regulations 1968, The National Insurance 
Corporation Decree 1969, The Insurance Decree 1976, and The Nigeria Reinsurance 
Decree 1977) have been enacted specifically for the control of insurance company 
operations, while others (The Companies Decree 1968, The Indigenisation Decrees 
1972-1977, among others) are of general application to the Nigerian economy as a 
whole. The legislative developments affecting insurers activities in the industry are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
5.1 The Objectives of Government Intervention in the Nigerian Insurance 
Industry 
The objectives of government regulation of insurance business have been examined 
elsewhere.2 In order to ascertain the objectives of government regulation of insurance 
business in Nigeria, two sources will be examined. 
First, the objectives as stated by various public officials at different points in time are 
identified; and second, in the next section, the relevant legislative instruments will be 
examined in order to determine from their content the intent of regulation. 
In Nigeria the main objectives of insurance regulation have been identified at various 
times as follows: 
(1) To ensure that the operations and development of insurance are within the 
framework of the country's national economic and social objectives (Nwokolo 
1984; Ojo 1986,pp.5-12). 
1. The Marine Insurance Act was also passed into law in 1961. This Act, however. was specifically "An Act to 
provide for marine insurance and to prohibit gambling on loss by maritime perils." 
2. See chapter three. 
T"ble 5.1 
~velopments in Insurance legislation in Nigeria 1960-1988 
Ll=gislation 
~surance Companies Act 1961 
Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1964 
Insurance Companies Regulations 1968 
Companies Decree 1968 
NICON Decree 1969 
Indigenisation Decrees 1972-1977 
Insurance Decree 1976 
Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation Decree 1977 
Insurance (Special Provisions) Decree 1988 
Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree 1988 
Legislative Focus 
Policyholder protection 
Strengthen Domestic Economy 
Strengthen Domestic Economy and Insurance Market 
Strengthen Domestic Economy 
Strengthen Insurance and Reinsurance Market 
Strengthen Domestic Economy 
Policyholder Protection 
Strengthen Insurance and Reinsurance Market 
Policyholder Protection 
Strengthen Domestic Economy and Insurance Market 
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(2) To conserve Nigeria's foreign exchange resources for developmental purposes3 
through the operations of the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria and the 
Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation. In 1978, the Federal Commissioner for 
Trade4 addressing an international reinsurance seminar stated that 
:' .. .legisla.tions establi~hing ... natio~al companies ... [ are] designed to 
lmprov~ .1Osur~ce bus1Oess ... and glye ... governments ... the opportunity 
to partICIpate 10 many aspects of msurance business ... [and] national 
insurance companies ... [are] meant to function as lead companies ... to 
ensure that government policies are adhered to and also to assist in 
raising the standard of insurance companies operations .... "5 
He also stated that reinsurance institutions were established 
" ... to ensure that the outflow of foreign exchange in the country is 
considerably reduced ... [and to ensure] that the valuable financial 
resources were mobilised are essentially utilised for economic 
development purposes. "6 
(3) To ensure that the highest standard of discipline and integrity are maintained in 
the industry. 7 
(4) To ensure that insurance companies and intermediaries are lawfully established 
and conduct their business on sound insurance principles, so as to protect the 
interests of the insuring community,8 and to prevent badly managed and 
undercapitalised companies from operating in the market, to support and protect 
3. See The First National Development Plan. that is. Federation of Nigeria. Federal Government Development 
Programme, 1962-1968. Sessional Paper No.1 of 1962.p.14, and see also Ojo. M.O., (1986). 
4. The Ministry of Trade was the ministry which was charged with the control of insurance company operations at 
the time. 
5. Statement made by Prof.I.U.W Osisiogu, see W AICA Journal, 1988. Vol.IV.p.12. 
6. See also Statement by the Federal Commissioner for Trade. Major-General M. Shuwa, Journal Of The Insurance 
Institute of Nigeria. 1976/1977. VoI.V&VI,p.l7. 
7. Statement made by Ibrahim Babangida. the President of The Federal Republic of Nigeria in a presidential 
address on the occasion of the opening of "Reinsurance House". See The Risk Bearer, 1988 VoI.13(13), p.lO. 
The Risk Bearer is the Journal of the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation, a federal government owned company. 
Ibid,p.l0 
8. This statement was made by Eugene Okwor. the Director of insurance. Federal Ministry of Finance. See The 
Risk Bearer. ibid. pp.2-8. 
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the better run companies, in order to achieve an efficient and prompt insurance 
service.9 
5.1.1 The Sources of Insurance Regulation in Nigeria 
This section reviews the sources of regulation in the Nigerian insurance industry. 
Since the focus of this study is on the regulation of life insurance business, the review 
of the regulatory sources will be based primarily on their application to life business. 
Most of the provisions of the various legislative instruments examined, however, 
apply to both life and non-life business. The enumeration of these legislative 
instruments and the examination of their content is carried out in order to ascertain the 
change in regulatory philosophy over the time period under consideration, as well as 
the associated changes in regulatory objectives over time. It is appreciated that the 
enumeration of these regulations and their content is simply a statement of the intent 
or desire to regulate and does not throw light on what is actually being done, the 
impact of the regulations on the industry or the extent of enforcement of, or 
compliance with, regulatory measures. lO Therefore these issues will be dealt with in 
the following sections11 as well as in the next chapter. 
5.2 Historical Background 1900-1959 (The Colonial Phase) 
The insurance industry in Nigeria is known to have been in existence before 1900 
(Okigbo 1981,p.154), more specifically since the late 19th century (Barback 1977). 
The industry was dominated by the early British merchants who had established 
trading posts on the west coast of Africa (Irukwu 1978,p.132). These merchants acted 
as agents for some British insurance companies and it is well documented that at least 
two British insurance companies appointed agents in Lagos, the capital of the country, 
to represent their interests well before 1900 (Okigbo 1981,p.154). The general agents 
so appointed were initially expatriate banks and trading companies although later on 
Nigerian traders and merchants were appointed (Adeyemo 1972,pp.90-91; Irukwu 
1987,p.37). They had the power of attorney to underwrite and settle claims on behalf 
9. Shuwa, ibid. 
10. Stigler (1962,p.1) puts this across rather hwnorously " ... if wishes were horses, one would buy stock in a 
harness factory", and EI-Hassan (1981,p.ix) notes that "A legal doctrinal study preoccupied with the analysis 
ofrules and procedures is unlikely to provide insight into how the institution operates ... ! and] is ... unlikely to be 
of value when legal rules are not truly reflective of practice." 
11. Sections 5.2.2 to 5.3.5. 
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of their expatriate principals (Ngwiri 1978,p.189). Through their activities insurance 
business became the virtual monopoly of British companies in the country (Olayide 
1976,p.166). The general agents later appointed sub-agents and the resultant activity 
from their operations in the market eventually led to the establishment of some branch 
offices representing British insurers in Lagos, and subsequently, other principal 
towns. 
The Royal Exchange Agency, the first insurance agency in West Africa, was 
introduced into Lagos in 1919 by the African and Eastern Trade Corporation 
(Braithwaite 1990,p.173). It later opened a full branch office in 1922 (Nwankwo 
1980,p.115), having the distinction of being the first foreign insurer to open a branch 
office in Nigeria, and it remained until 1949 the only locally established company 
with an office in the country (Adeyemo 1972,p.92). Most of the other companies 
operated mainly on the traditional British agency basis mentioned above (Ojo 
1976,p.48). The Royal Exchange initially concentrated on fire insurance business 
which was its main source of income and later branched out into general accident 
insurance business (Okigbo 1981,p.155). 
At this time, the insurance market was not overly active, business consisting mainly 
of marine cargo insurance for produce exports, a few fire and burglary insurances of a 
personal nature, bank mortgage security, and a few motor insurances (McNesty 
1973,p.37). Although there was at this time no active life insurance market, records 
do show that friendly societies existed from the late 19th century, and as at 1933 there 
were about 28 of them. 12 These were all established under the United Grand Lodge of 
England, Scotland and Ireland. They were instituted primarily for the object of 
freemasonry and, in the case of the Irish grand lodges, mutual aid. The number of 
members in individual lodges varied between 11 and over 400, the lodges being 
scattered over wide geographic areas-specifically Lagos, which had nine, Calabar, 
Warri, Port-Harcourt, Kano, Jos and Enugu. Only 6 kept invested funds, the amount 
of which varied from between £50 to £1,900. 
In theory the activities in the market were controlled by the provisions of a UK 
statute, the Life Assurance Act of 1874, which was a statute of general applications as 
from the 1st of January 1900 (Nwokolo 1986,p.24). It is, however, doubtful whether 
the Act was indeed applied in practice and this has been attributed to the very small 
12. Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria Blue book 1936. Federal Government Printer Lagos. 
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percentage of insurance business transacted 10 Nigeria at the time (Akinkugbe 
1976,pp.57 -8). 
Several factors have been identified as having provided an impetus for the growth of 
general insurance business in the country at this time. First, the second world war 
which led to [some fonn of] social and technological progress; second, government 
legislation in the forties and early fifties which imposed such liabilities as 
Compulsory Motor Insurance and Workmen's Compensation on the public (McNesty 
1973,pp.37-38); and third, the need to fmance the marketing of produce since the 
banks always insisted on policies of insurance as security for advances (Falegan 
1986,p.5). This led to increased activity in the Nigerian general insurance market. 
Consequently, in 1945, three companies, The Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society 
(which now operates as part of The Guinea Insurance Company Ltd), The Tobacco 
Insurance Company Ltd, and The Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 
commenced operations in the market (Okigbo 1981). There followed an influx of 
insurance companies which were subsidiaries of British offices. At this time there 
were no indigenous, that is, fully Nigerian owned insurance companies in existence 
(Okigbo 1981). This changed when Dr K.O Mbadiwe established the African 
Insurance Company, an indigenous company, in 1950 (Farnsworth 1975). The 
Nigerian General Insurance Company and The Lion of Africa Insurance Company, 
which was fonned jointly with a British office, later came on the scene (Olayide 
1976,p.166). The frrst crop of brokerage frrms in the country were under foreign 
ownership,13 and the first indigenous brokerage frrm was owned by T.A Braithwaite, 
a Nigerian. This was followed by the establishment of 11 indigenous brokerage firms 
between 1959 and 1968 (Braithwaite 1990,pp.174-175). 
Before 1960, life insurance was still not of any significant importance in the insurance 
market. There is not much statistical evidence available for the pre (and indeed much 
of the post) 1960's period but it is on record that life insurance business started much 
later than non-life business (Nwankwo 1980). In fact life business only started to 
attain some measure of importance in the 1960's (Ojo and Adewunmi 1982,p.162), 
nearly three quarters of a century after the inception of non-life operations in the 
market. 
13. C.T Bowring & Co . .1955. Glanvill Enthoven 1957. 
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The market was, relatively speaking, small. An examination of the list of registered 
insurance companies in various editions of the Nigerian Insurance Year Book shows 
that in the 1950's there were only three life insurance companies in the market: The 
Nigerian General Insurance Co., registered in 1951; The Lion of Africa, registered in 
1952; and The Guinea Insurance Co., registered in 1958. These offices were all 
composites, underwriting both life and general insurance business. The African 
Alliance Insurance Company is said to have been the first specialist indigenous 
company to underwrite life insurance business only. 14 
Although the financial and legal barriers to market entry appeared to be low, the size 
of the market was small, both in terms of the numbers of companies underwriting this 
category of insurance, and the level of consumption of life insurance at the time. This 
could be attributed to a number of factors: 
(1) The few companies in existence were not interested in insuring the lives of 
Africans mainly because of the alleged high costs of doing so.15 This was a 
precedent set by the earlier (colonial) practitioners in the field who did not 
consider it worth while to assure the lives of Nigerians. The colonial view of 
African lives is illustrated by the following passage in a British history text on 
Nigeria: 
"The physique of the Negro is generally very fine, though there is 
often combined with a well-developed, muscular body an extremely 
feeble constitution which succumbs easily to disease ... [b]oys and girls 
come to puberty at a very early age, and grow old more rapidly than 
does the European, the women particularly being passee at an age 
when an Englishwoman would be at the prime of life." (Bums 
1972,p.62). 
Consequently there was a "Tropical Loading"16 imposed on premiums charged on 
Nigerian lives. This, coupled with the absence of adequate data from which realistic 
14. This statement is attributed to Chief M.O Odele, the then Managing Director of the Nigeria Reinsurance 
Corporation in The Sunday Vanguard, May 5 1991,p.15 and was confirmed by Mr. Ope Oredugba, the Chief 
Executive of The African Alliance during a discussion with him in July 1991. 
15. Discrimination in respect of "negro" lives was a universal feature of insurance underwriting. See Kimball 
(1961,p.496). 
16. The tropical loading was an additional expense factor computed into premium calculation to take into account 
the perceived additional risk involved in insuring such lives. 
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mortality tables could be computed, made both the purchase and underwriting of such 
policies unattractive to all concerned. 
(2) Apart from this, socio-economic forces were involved. The industrial and 
commercial sectors of the economy were underdeveloped which meant that the 
levels of disposable income and savings was low. The existence of commercial 
banks and other forms of competitive savings media, such as the traditional 
financial institutions,I7 as well as religious attitudes predominantly among the 
Islamic population in the country, have been said to have negatively influenced 
the demand for life insurance (Ojo and Adewunmi 1982; Onoh 1980, pp.ll-
29).) 
(3) Additionally, insurance servIces In general were not given pnonty In the 
national development plans implemented by the Federal Government. In the 
1962-1968 plan, for example, in the proposed capital expenditure on trade and 
industry, insurance was allocated 2.3% of the total proposed expenditure, out of 
a total of 13.3% allocated to trade and industry, of which 9% went to the 
Nigerian Development Bank. The allocated expenditure was to be utilised 
solely for the establishment of an insurance company to take charge of the 
insurance of export crops. IS 
It can be inferred from the above that various factors contributed to the smallness in 
size of the life market Apart from the issues raised the product offering was poor, 
whole life insurance being the only kind of product offering in the market. Almost all 
the life offices and their agents operated solely in Lagos so that the market was not 
geographically penetrated. Thus, not only was access to the product restricted to a 
certain geographic area, in addition the product-choice set was limited. All this 
coupled with an expensive product only served to severely restrict the demand for life 
insurance services, and since there were substitutes readily available the consumption 
of insurance services was at a minimal level. 
17. For example, the Isusu and Ajo traditional financial systems found among the Eastern Ibo and Western Yoruba 
tribes respectively. 
18. See Federation of Nigeria, Federal Government Development Programme 1962-1968 Sessional Report 
No.l,pp.l4-15. 
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5.3 The Post-Colonial Phase 1960-1988 
5.3.1 The Era of The Civilians 
As previously mentioned, before 1960 there was no specific local legislation 
governing the operations of insurance companies in Nigeria. This deficiency in 
legislation led to, among other things, a dearth in official statistics regarding 
insurance company operations, since they were not required by law to submit returns 
to the Insurance Division of the Ministry of Trade (Olayide 1976). In fact, for the 
period until 1967, the Federal Office of Statistics publications specifically stated that 
foreign insurers transacting insurance business in Nigeria were not required to submit 
data on their life insurance operations within the country (Ogunshola 1973,p.50). 
5.3.1.1 The Insurance Companies Act 1961 
The first attempt by the newly independent (civilian) government of Nigeria to 
control the activities of insurers operating in Nigeria was the enactment of the 
Insurance Companies Act, 1961. The Obande Commission Report (1960) formed the 
basis of this Act. The Commission had been set up by parliament to examine the 
question of the regulation of the insurance industry in Nigeria (Okwor 1984,p.33). 
The Act repealed the United Kingdom Life Assurance Companies Acts 1870,19 1871, 
and 1872 insofar as was applicable to Nigeria. 20 
The Act provided for the appointment of "a fit person" as the Registrar of Insurance 
as well as Assistant Registrars for the administration of the Act.21 The Registrar of 
Insurance was under the Federal Minister charged with the responsibility for 
insurance.22 The Act regulated three main categories of insurance business as follows: 
(1) licensing of insurers (2) solvency and business methods regulation and (3) 
amalgamations and, to a limited extent, investments. 
19. The main emphasis of this act was on policyholder protection as a result of many unscrupulous insurance 
companies that had been declared insolvent with a resulting loss to policyholders (UNCT AD TD!B!393. 
1972.p.29). 
20. Section 46. 
21. Section 5. 
22. Section (2). 
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No insurer could commence or carry out insurance business in the Federation unless 
such insurer was registered for the purpose of the Act23 and, in the case of an external 
insurer,24 the Registrar had to be satisfied that the insurer was duly registered under 
the laws of the country in which its head office was situated.25 In addition the 
Registrar had to be satisfied that the business of insurance was or would be conducted 
in accordance with "sound insurance principles. "26 The paid up capital provisions 
discriminated between locaP7 and external insurers, the capital requirements for the 
former being in the amount of not less than £25,000, and the latter not less than 
£50,000. If an application to underwrite insurance business was refused by the 
Registrar, the applicant could appeal to the Governor-General through the Registrar. 28 
The Registrar could, under certain circumstances, cancel the registration of an 
insurer.29 
No provisions were made in the Act for the licensing of insurance brokers and agents. 
The Act imposed margin of solvency requirements for local and external insurers. For 
life insurance business the requirement was that the liabilities under unmatured life, 
industrial, and sinking fund policies should not exceed the amount of the local 
insurers life insurance fund. 30 For all other business it was required that the value of 
the assets of the local insurer in respect of the business which he underwrote should 
exceed the liabilities in respect of same by the amount of £25,000 (or its equivalent in 
another currency), or one-tenth of the premium income in the last preceding financial 
year whichever was the greater amount. In addition it was provided that for all classes 
of business, including life business, the value of the assets of the local insurer in 
respect of all underwritten business should exceed the amount of the life insurance 
fund together with all the insurers liabilities (excepting liabilities in respect of 
23. Section 6(1). 
24. An external insurer was defined as "an insurer carrying on business within or outside of the Federation whose 
head office is not in the Federation" (section 2), that is a foreign insurer. 
25. Section 7(c). 
26. Section 7(a). 
27. Insurers whose head offices were within the Federation (section 2). 
28. Section 8. 
29. Section 9. 
30. The life insurance fund was defined as the fund to which the receipts of an insurer in respect of his life 
insurance business are carried (section 2). 
111 
unmatured life, industrial insurance and sinking fund policies) by the amount of 
£25,000 (or its equivalent in any other currency) or one-tenth of the premium income 
(not being life insurance premium income) in the last preceding financial year, 
whichever is the greater amount31 
The requirements for external insurers and local insurers carrymg on insurance 
business within and outside the Federation or solely outside the Federation were the 
same as for life insurance business32 in respect of local insurers, but were more 
stringent in respect of non-life business (£50,000).33 No provisions were made 
however as to the basis for determining the value of assets and liabilities. Although 
UNCT AD experts had recommended a "country-by-country"34 approach to the 
valuation of assets as being the most appropriate way of determining the asset values 
by taking into consideration local conditions in each country, nevertheless they were 
of the view that such valuations should be made on a "prudent and conservative" basis 
to ensure the solvency of insurance concerns.35 This requirement for prudence and 
conservatism was not addressed in the Act 
The Act also required an insurer to prepare and submit to the registrar within six 
months after the end of the financial year, a certificate of solvency signed by an 
actuary in the case of life business, a duly audited balance sheet, profit and loss 
account, a certified copy of the revenue account for life and non-life business, a 
statement of life insurance business which excluded industrial and sinking fund 
policies and other documents as required by the Registrar from time to time. 36 The 
accounts of local insurers were required to be audited annually by an auditor approved 
by the Registrar and the Act specified the duties of the auditor in this regard. 37 
31. Section 4(1)(a). 
32. Section 4(b)(i&ii). 
33. Section 4(b )(ii&iii). 
34. Such an approach would take into consideration local conditions in each country. 
35. UNCT AD TD/B/393. 1972.p.13. "Insurance Legislation and Supervision in Developing Countries". Some of 
the problems involved in not establishing a specific valuation basis were identified by El-Hassan (1981) in his 
study of insurance regulation in the Sudan. They included wrongful and downright fraudulent valuations in 
order to give the appearance that the companies were solvent when in fact they were not. 
36. Section 12. 
37. Section 29. 
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The provisions in respect of external insurers in this regard were less stringent. They 
were merely required to keep a record of all local policies with the rights and 
obligations and premiums received thereunder as well as documentary evidence of 
their assets in the Federation.38 With respect to the requirement for the annual audit, 
all the external insurer had to do was "furnish evidence to the satisfaction of the 
Registrar that its accounts are subject to an annual audit by an independent auditor."39 
The insurer was required to maintain separate records for life insurance business, and 
the life fund was to be kept separate from receipts in respect of all other business in 
the interests of life policyholder protection. This requirement of separation of funds 
was not applicable to marine, aviation or transport insurance business.4o The 
periodical investigation of long-term business41 by an actuary at least once every five 
years was required. Amalgamations, transfers and acquisitions of long term business 
or workmens compensation business was not allowed unless the transaction was 
approved by the High Court.42 With respect to investments, the regulatory 
requirements were concessionary and, not to say the least, ambiguous. The Act stated 
that 
"The Minister may if he thinks fit and not withstanding any other 
provision of this Act, require any insurance company to invest in 
Nigeria a percentage of the profits of the insurance company accruing 
in respect of its business in Nigeria, and not exceeding three percent in 
any financial year of the insurance company profits" (italics mine).43 
Thus the Act concentrated mainly on specifying conditions for the registration of 
insurance companies in Nigeria, although a very slight tendency towards 
protectionism could be seen in some of its provisions.44 A provision for the issuance 
of regulations was made in the Act.45 However, although the paid-up capital 
requirements were heavier for external insurers, the provisions for the regulation of 
38. Section 14. 
39. Section 30. 
40. Section 15. 
41. Life. industrial and bond investment business (section 2). 
42. Sections 17 and 18. 
43. Section 28. 
44. Sections 4 and 30. 
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their business methods was superficial and investment regulation was, to all intents 
and purposes, non-existent.46 No provision was made in the act for the method to be 
used in the actuarial valuation of assets and liabilities for solvency purposes, which 
left the process subject to abuse.47 
The provisions of the Act have been described as "scandalously inadequate". Apart 
from this the implementation and enforcement of its provisions was lax. In one case, 
the prosecution of an insurer who had contravened the provisions of the act with 
respect to registration requirements was not initiated until 5 years after the alleged 
offence had been committed. Even then the charge made was under the criminal code 
rather than under the Insurance Companies Act since "It never occurred to anybody to 
prosecute under the Insurance Companies Act" (Olawoyin 1976,p.63). In view of the 
laxity in regulatory control, it is not surprising that " ... many insurers operate[d] on the 
fringe of the law, whilst others blatantly disregare[d] it" (Olawoyin 1976,p.62). 
In addition some of the legislative provisions proved difficult to comply with. For 
example, although the Act required an actuarial valuation of long term insurance 
business once every five years, at that time, there were no professionally qualified 
Nigerian actuaries in the market (Adeyemo 1972,p.l0 1). 
In an attempt to stimulate the purchase of insurance products the government 
introduced a provision for life assurance premium relief. Section 17(5) in the fourth 
schedule of the Income Tax Management Act 196148 made provision for tax relief of 
not more than £1000,49 in respect of individual insurances. Under the provisions of 
section 16(w) of the third schedule of the Act, the investment income of pension, 
provident or other "approved" schemes were exempted from taxation. This provision 
created discriminatory taxation with respect to insured pension schemes, because the 
pension funds of life companies writing pensions business were subject to taxation at 
45. Section 44. 
46. It is only fair to note that the inadequacy of investment regulation applied to both local and foreign insurers. 
47. Insurers could over-value assets and undervalue liabilities to comply with the solvency requirements. 
48. This Act has been superseded by the Companies Income Tax Management Act 1979. The basic provisions with 
respect to insurance however remain unchanged. 
49. The currency in use at the time was the Nigerian pound. The currency was later changed to the Naira in 
January 1973. and initially £1 was equivalent to ~1. 
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the standard company tax rate, while the funds of the uninsured schemes were not 
taxed. 
Another taxation problem arose with respect to the mode of taxation of life offices. 
The standard company tax rate, which varied from year to year, was applied to the 
investment income (less allowable expenses) of the life offices. An ordinary trading 
company could adjust the prices of the products it sold in line with the variation in 
company tax rates. However, life offices were not able to do this since the premium 
rates on life policies issued were usually fixed throughout the term of the policy 
(Ogunshola 1976n7,p.84). 
5.3.1.2 The Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1964 
In the 1960's, the dearth of indigenous capital and technical expertise in the economy 
had led the government to pursue industrial policies that encouraged direct foreign 
investment in the country. 50 At this time, most of the insurers in the industry were 
foreign. In 1960, during the debate on the 1960 Federal Budget, some politicians had 
demanded that the insurance industry be placed under public control. The Federal 
Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh, responded to this demand in a manner that 
clearly stated the new governments stance on the matter; 
"This is a very serious matter. We all know that nationalization of 
industry is akin to communism (Several Hon. Members: No, no!). Yes, 
it is. This sounds all very simple but this simplicity is most misleading. 
First, this talk of nationalization is dangerous to our economy. All the 
Governments (of the Federation) have publicly declared that no steps 
of further nationalization beyond various public utilities will be 
undertaken. It is therefore shameful that the Leader of the Opposition 
(Chief Awolowo) who had been heading a Government and who is a 
party to this assurance comes here to call upon this Government to 
nationalize insurance which is a private enterprise (Shame, shame!). 
The new talk of further nationalisation can only frighten off those who 
wish to invest in Nigeria. Thus the first point is that his suggestion is 
economically dangerous. The second point is that insurance business is 
highly technical (Blunt 1977,p.81)." 
It soon became apparent that many insurers especially the foreign insurers were not 
investing their funds in Nigeria. 
50. See section 4.1.1 of chapter 4. 
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The foreign insurers remitted most of their profits to their home offices so that capital 
was being extracted from Nigeria to the developed country capital markets such as the 
London market. Additionally, they were not investing their funds in Nigeria, at a time 
when the country was in need of capital for development projects.51 This problem was 
however not specific to the life market, it affected the whole of the economy. 52 In 
response to this, the government passed the Exchange Control Act of 1962.53 This act 
prohibited residents of Nigeria from making payments outside the country except with 
prior exchange control approval. However, the Act did not specify any penalty for its 
infringement and as such could not be effectively enforced, 54 and the flight of much 
needed capital overseas continued. 
The situation appeared to be getting out of control and in 1964, the government took 
steps to keep capital in the country by enacting the Insurance (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1964. This Act established the office of the Inspector of Insurance 
who could also hold the office of the Registrar of Insurance.55 Its main purpose was, 
however, to tighten the control over the investment behaviour of insurers in the 
market. It repealed sections 28 and 44(2)(b), the provisions relating to the investment 
of profits in the Insurance Companies Act 1961,56 and required insurers to invest a 
minimum of 40% of their previous years premiums (less reinsurance premiums) and 
all endowment funds57 in Nigerian investments.58 Nigerian investments for the 
purpose of the Act were defined as government stocks, notes, bonds and other federal 
government securities, Nigerian company stock, shares and debentures, as well as the 
rights to receive interest or dividend on such securities. 59 There was a requirement for 
51. Figures relating to the amount of funds remitted abroad by foreign insurers during this time are unavailable. 
52. The effects of direct foreign ownership and control of some areas of economic activity in Nigeria are discussed 
in chapter four. 
53. Under military rule, the provisions were tightened under the provisions of the Exchange Control (Anti-
Sabotage) Decree 1977. 
54. Alhaji A.O.O. Otiti, Executive Director (Operations), Central Bank of Nigeria See WAICA Journal, 1978 
Vol.1 V,p.42. 
55. Section 3. The powers of the Inspector of insurance have been described as "inquisitorial" (Nwokolo. 
1986,p.ll) 
56. Section 7(4). 
57. Section 2. 
58. Section 2. 
59. Section 5. 
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a minimum investment of 25% in government securities and a ceiling of 10% for 
investment in property. 60 
In addition to these measures, the Act made the provision that contracts of insurance 
in respect of local risks would be considered void unless the insurer was a Nigerian 
company.61 However this was not a particularly stringent requirement as a Nigerian 
company was defined as "a company which is formed and registered under the 
Companies Act or which complies with the provisions of ... that Act (which relate to 
companies incorporated outside Nigeria which establish places of business within 
Nigeria) ... "62 and so included foreign insurers. Again, as with the previous Act, any 
measures made as regards the domestication of insurance business were more 
apparent than real, since foreign insurers could still operate in the market without any 
serious restrictions on the establishment of foreign companies. 
The 1964 provisions had been drafted by officials in the Ministry of Finance who had 
held meetings with the Nigerian Insurance Consultative Committee, who represented 
the insurance companies in the market. The Ministries of Trade and Justice were also 
involved in drafting the Act. When the Act was being considered by parliament in 
1964, some members again raised the issue of the nationalisation of the insurance 
industry. Chief Okotie-Eboh's response to this was; 
"I must say ... that we do not contemplate in this country, the 
nationalisation of insurance business ... Nationalisation is not our 
po1icy .. .It is not the policy of this Government to nation~lise any 
private industry. When the time comes for us to set up our Insurance 
business, we will do so" (Proehl in Akinsanya 1983,p.156). 
This was the first intimation that the government was planning to establish a national 
Insurance company. 
The provisions of the 1961 and 1964 acts could, however, not be implemented due to 
enforcement problems, and there were deficiencies in the regulations. 63 Both acts 
were in fact not gazetted until years later, on the 11 th of May 1967. They were 
however retroactively brought into force from the 4th of May 1967.64 The acts were 
60. Section 5(2). 
61. Section 1(1). 
62. Section 6. 
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patterned after British enactments which were aimed at ensuring "freedom with 
publicity" and solvency to the industry as opposed to a close system of control and 
supervision.65 The powers of the Registrar of insurance under the Act were limited 
and many potential new entrants into the industry devised a way of obtaining the 
capital licensing requirements by arranging with commercial banks who would 
initially make the deposit available to satisfy the legal requirement and afterwards 
withdraw the deposit (Okigbo 1981,p.157). Although it was the general feeling at the 
time that the two acts should be co-ordinated and enforced, difficulties arose with 
respect to their implementation and this resulted in delays. The government did not 
possess officials with expertise in this area and as such it had to resort to requesting 
for assistance from a foreign organisation (Okwor 1984,p.34; Falegan 1991,p.242). 
The request for assistance was made to the United Nations Technical Board which 
was requested to formulate proposals for merging the two acts and rectifying their 
defects. The Board responded by providing the government with the expert assistance 
of Dr. Karl Reichel, an UNCTAB expert. Subsequently, in 1966, Dr Reichel was 
appointed the Federal Government Adviser on Insurance Matters. His assignment was 
to formulate policies on insurance matters and to assist in the establishment of a 
national insurance company (Okwor 1984,p.33). Under his leadership it was 
recommended that the Insurance Acts of 1961 and 1964 be repealed and replaced by a 
new and comprehensive act. 
Reichel started work on drafting a new insurance bill and accompanying regulations, 
and by the end of 1967 he had completed the draft bill. The bill contained stricter 
control measures for the regulation of the industry because Dr. Reichel was of the 
opinion that "such a system was more appropriate for developing countries where 
insurance has to be guided to a certain extent, often from its infancy, to a sound stage 
of development" (Falegan 1991,p.254). The provisions of the draft bill had been 
extensively discussed and commented upon by officials in the Ministries of Trade, 
Justice, Finance, Industries, Labour, and Economic Development. The Federal 
Executive Council, as well as the Foreign Legislation Division of Lloyd's, were also 
involved in the process. The insurance industry, represented by the Nigerian 
63. Reichel 1966-71 in Falegan 1991. 
64. Journal of The Chartered Insurance Institute. Vol.65 1968,pp.312-313. 
65. Insurance legislation in the developing countries is sourced from either the UK enactments or the legislation of 
the European countries, especially France. It has been observed that the UK which developed the "freedom 
with publicity principle" is gradually moving towards tighter regulation. See UNCT AD TD!B!393, 
1972,pp.30-32 and also more recently the UK Financial Services Act 1986. 
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Insurance Consultative Committee,66 is reported to have received the bill well 
because "Its objectives were to safeguard the interests of the insuring public as well as 
the insurance companies themselves" (Falegan 1991,p256). The bill was to be called 
"The Insurance Supervision Decree of 1967." 
This period was one of serious political unrest in the country. The political situation 
was tense and extremely volatile,67 and the military decided to intervene. In July 1967 
the military took over from the democratically elected civilian government, 68 and it 
was unclear what effect this change of governance would have on the decision 
making processes of government with respect to legislative decisions. 
Under civilian rule, draft bills of proposed legislation in the area of insurance activity 
had been the subject of intense discussion and analysis by both industry and 
government officials and foreign expert advisers. 69 Under colonial rule and indeed for 
some years afterward, Nigerians had been subjected to oppression and had been 
margin ali sed in the public and private sectors (Ogunlana 1985,p.33). Very few had 
been encouraged to acquire expertise in key areas of the economy.70 Thus, in drafting 
and passing much of the legislation in force at this time, the assistance of various 
experts was employed, and quite naturally, industry advice would have been taken 
into consideration in the passage of these Acts. It is therefore not surprising that the 
1961 and 1964 Acts were patterned after the British enactments since the dominant 
insurers in the market at the time were British. The prospect of continuing to 
dominate the insurance market (as well as other sectors of the economy) must have 
been very appealing to the former colonial rulers. Nigeria was Britain's largest market 
in Commonwealth Africa 71 and the British were concerned to maintain the status quo. 
66. The Nigerian Insurance Consultative Committee represented 46 of the 92 registered insurance companies in 
the market at the time (Falegan 1991,p.256). 
67. This is discussed in chapter 4. 
68. See chapter 4. section 4.2.2. 
69. For details see Falegan (199l,pp.241-278). 
70. The colonial extreme prejUdice towards "Negroes" formed the basis of the neglect of Nigerians in the country. 
This prejudice extended far back into the 16th century. when the west coast of Africa was being explored. 
Bums (1972.p.63). quotes a traveller who wrote that the "Negroes [are] a people of beastly living, without a 
God, laws. religion or commonwealth". and another who said they "are all without exception Crafty, 
Villainous. and Fraudulent, and very seldom to be trusted; being sure to slip no opportunity of cheating a 
European ... [a] man of integrity is as rare among them as a white falcon ... and it would be very surprising if 
upon a scrutiny into their [l]ives we should find any of them whose perverse Nature would not break out 
sometimes; for they seem to be born and bred villains." 
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Thus it is perhaps understandable, if not justifiable, that the British insurers did not 
encourage extensive Government participation in the insurance market. These 
insurers were accustomed to operating under relatively liberal market control rules 
with their emphasis on "freedom with publicity."n This provided a situation in which 
insurance companies were given a lot of latitude with respect to their operations. 
Their detailed operations in the area of, for example, investments were not monitored. 
The supervisory authority was mainly concerned with ensuring that the insurance 
companies remained solvent, and independent actuaries and auditors in individual 
companies were charged with the responsibility of determining insurers solvency. The 
supervisory body concentrated primarily on the local operations of these companies. 73 
Thus like the case with many other developing countries 74 the British enactments and 
supervisory model were applied to the Nigerian insurance market, to the benefit of the 
foreign insurers. The socio-economic situation of the country was not taken into 
consideration. The lack of managerial expertise among indigenous insurers was 
intentionally or unintentionally overlooked. Many of the indigenous insurers 
operating in the market at this time were undercapitalised and lacked adequate skilled 
personnel. The laxity in regulation and supervision enabled them to continue 
operating and the insuring public in many instances fell prey to companies which 
were unable or unwilling to pay compensation. The foreign insurers did not suffer 
from these constraints and were able to make huge underwriting and investment 
profits from their business in the country. 
The new military government were well acquainted with the general laxity in the 
regulation and supervision of the economic activities of the country. In colonial times, 
regulatory control over economic activity was firmly in the power of the British and 
Nigerians had no say in the matter. Although after independence in 1960, it appeared 
that the power to control economic activity in the area of insurance had been handed 
over to the Nigerians, in reality, this was not the case. Foreign vested [European] 
interests were still in control of economic activity in the country, while the Nigerians 
who badly needed foreign assistance, both financial and managerial, became 
unintentional or possibly more appropriately, ignorant pawns in this political farce. 
71. See Lloyd's Bank Ltd Overseas Department-Export Promotion. Economic Report on Nigeria, various issues. 
72. See. for example. Supple 1984 and Westall 1990 for the history and regulation of insurance in Britain. 
73. See UNCT AD TD/B{393. op.cit. p.33. 
74. UNCT AD TD/B/393. ibid. 
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5.3.2 Under Military Rule 
5.3.2.1 The Insurance Companies Regulations 1968; The Companies Decree 1968 
The mass proliferation of insurance companies in the market without accompanying 
supervision was not in the public interest and, as such, the Government attempted to 
impose some form of control by enacting the Insurance Companies Regulations in 
1968 (Okigbo 1981,pp.157-158; Falegan 1991). 
Although discussions pertaining to the passage of the regulations had been going on 
during the civilian era, it was not until the 10th October 1969, that the regulations 
were gazetted. They came into effect retroactively from the 4th May 1967, when the 
1961 act was brought into force. 75 The regulations made it compulsory for all foreign 
insurers in Nigeria to incorporate locally in order to be able to register as insurers in 
the country. Thus the foreign insurers operating in the market through the activities of 
their branches were by law precluded from doing so. The tone of the regulations was 
an indication of the future stance of the military government as regards the role of 
foreign investors in Nigeria. However at this time the military had a war to fight and 
win 76 and most of their energies and resources were devoted to doing just that. It 
appeared that the military rulers laid down the general tone for regulatory action and 
left the civil servants to the mundane business of debating and drafting legislation 
while they went off to fight. 
The effects of the continuing foreign dominance of economic activity in the country 
was, however still, an issue which the military was concerned about, and a shift of 
policy towards foreign investment appeared to be in the making. In 1968, the 
Companies Decree 1968 was, in military parlance, promulgated. It was gazetted on 
the 16th October 1968 and brought into force retroactively from the 1st October of the 
same year. The speed with which the Decree was gazetted appeared to be an 
indication of the importance of the subject matter of the decree to the military 
authorities. Like the previous 77 legislation, it was patterned largely on the UK 
Companies Act 1948. However it decreed that all foreign companies operating in the 
country were as from the 18th of November 1968 to be considered as separate entities 
from their parent companies in respect of their operations in Nigeria. The companies 
75. Journal of The Chartered Insurance Institute, Vol.66 1969,p.254. 
76. The Nigerian civil war, 1967-1970 (see chapter 4. section 4.21). 
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were required to infonn the Registrar of insurance within a three month period from 
the 18 November of their intention to either continue operations in Nigeria or to 
withdraw from the country. 78 
It is on record that the insurance companies for the most part completely disregarded 
these requirements.79 As stated earlier the military were busy defending the 
sovereignty of Nigeria and presumably did not have either the time, or the inclination, 
to supervise compliance. The fact of the matter was that the department charged with 
the supervision of insurance company activities, like so many other civil service 
departments at the time, was ill-equipped (in tenns of both the quality of expertise 
and the amount of manpower required) to do so. It was not until July 1970, after the 
war had been fought and won, that the Government got around to gazetting the list of 
insurance companies authorised to transact business in the country.80 
Meanwhile, the work which had earlier begun on the draft insurance bill, ran into 
some problems. One of the problems was that portions of the draft bill conflicted with 
the Government's policy towards foreign participation in the Nigerian economy. The 
relevant sections of the Companies Decree imposed the requirement that all such 
companies should incorporate locally or, alternatively, withdraw from the country. On 
the other hand the draft bill pennitted the operation of foreign insurers in the country. 
Although Dr. Reichel attempted to convince the Government that this provision did 
not in any way conflict with Government policy, he was not successful. In addition to 
this the Government was preoccupied with matters of war. Discussions on the bill 
therefore stopped and it was in effect killed. 
5.3.2.2 The National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria (NICON) Decree 1969 
The Civilian Government's encouragement of foreign investments In the 
manufacturing and service sectors had led to the establishment of a viable 
manufacturing sector and this, coupled with other factors, led to the rapid economic 
growth experienced in Nigeria during the 1960's. This development was however 
77. The 1961 and 1964 Acts. 
78. See section 8 of the Companies Decree 1968 and The Journal of The Chartered Insurance Institute. Vol. 66 
1969,p.254. 
79. See Reichel (1966-1971), "Report on Insurance in Nigeria", Lagos: Federal Ministry of Trade. in Falegan 
op.cit at page 273. 
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interrupted by the adverse effects of the civil war. The ravages of the war caused the 
ruling military government to implement policies of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.81 
One of the ways in which the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the economy was 
tackled was by the implementation of policy measures aimed toward the 
domestication of the manufacturing and services sectors of the economy. Provision 
had been made in the First National Development Plan for an insurance company to 
handle the insurance of crops. The purpose for the establishment of the company was 
to conserve the country's foreign exchange resources for national developmental 
purposes.82 This company, at the time, had not yet been established. Based on 
information available from a number of reports, the Government had decided to limit 
the scope of the proposed company to certain classes of insurance business. Advice 
from "local experts" in the insurance market, however, seemed to indicate the 
unworkability of the proposed national insurance company. They advocated the 
establishment of a national reinsurance company in addition to a national marine 
insurance company. Feasibility studies carried out by foreign insurers, however, 
indicated that this course of action was uneconomical. 83 
Meanwhile there appeared to be growing dissatisfaction in some Government and 
industry circles as to the performance of some of the insurance brokers and agents in 
the market. There were allegations that the brokers inflated sums assured in order to 
receive huge commissions, and that they did not remit premiums received from 
policyholders to the insurance companies for periods of up to two years. It was 
additionally claimed that some brokers received premiums for risks which they did 
not insure. Unethical practices occurred. Some top officials of Government bodies 
and corporations were said to have been appointed directors of the insurance 
companies with which they placed their insurances (Adebowale 1979,p.53). Insurance 
agents were said to be unskilled and inadequately trained (Aigbe 1982,p.8), 
misrepresented facts in order to make a quick sale (Kiladejo 1987,p.103), and were 
perceived by the public as school drop-outs who had nothing going for them. The 
agents were easily identified by their old briefcases, narrow ties, weatherworn jackets 
80. Reichel (1966-1971). ibid. 
81. See chapter 4. section 4.2.1. 
82. See Federation of Nigeria. Federal Government Development Programme 1962-1968. Sessional Report No.1 
of 1962.p.4. 
83. See Reichel (1966-1971) op.cit at page 243. 
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and more often than not, dusty shoes (Ogunrinde 1983, Uzoma 1978,p.11). The 
Director of Insurance, remarking upon the activities of insurance agents during this 
time, described them as uncontrolled, unsupervised and unorganised (Okwor 
1094,p.35), and the industry was referred to as having been " .. .inundated 
and .. .infested by not too qualified and .. .illiterate canvassers. 84 
In response to the situation in the market, on 1 July 1969, the Military Government 
promulgated the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria Decree which provided 
for the establishment of one national insurance company, The National Insurance 
Corporation of Nigeria (NICON) a national insurance company with an initial share 
capital of £1000,000.85 The purpose for establishing this company was not, however, 
for the insurance of crops. Its objective were: 
(1) To compel all insurers in the market to reinsure with the corporation at least 
10% of the premium on every policy issued or renewed by them on or after the 
1st October 1969.86 The purpose of this was to promote reinsurance in the 
industry and reduce the outward flow of funds due to reinsurance outside the 
country (Ojo 1986,p.5). 
(2) Additionally, NIeON was to Insure any property of the State or Federal 
government, or statutory corporation in which they had an interest. NICON was 
also to operate in the capacity of an insurance agent or broker in relation to the 
insurance of the aforementionned property,87 and was given the discretion to 
either refuse or accept such reinsurances. NICON also had the power to 
determine the amount of commission payable on such business.88 
(3) NICON was also established to assist in manpower development in the industry 
(Ojo 1986,p.5). 
84. See address given by the Lagos State Commissioner for Education to the Nigeria Insurance Institute, in 
Conference Papers of The Insurance Institute of Nigeria, Vols. V &VI 1976n7,p.22. 
85. Section 11(1). 
86. Section 8 (1). 
87. Section 4(2). 
88. Section 8(2) 
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However, life, flre and marine insurance business were exempted from the provisions 
of section 8 by the Exemption of Certain Classes of Insurance Business Order 1969.89 
The NICON decree was not well received by various interest groups within the 
industry. By the provisions of the decree, NICON was enabled to act in the capacity 
of both an underwriter and broker with respect to all Government property insurances. 
This meant that all the non-life insurance companies in the market were precluded 
from a huge portion of insurance business, the insurances of government property. In 
addition, section 5(2) granted the corporation discriminatory tax concessions by 
providing that it would not be liable to taxation "until the amount in the general 
reserve fund of the Corporation is for the first time equal to the amount of paid-up 
capital of the corporation." This provision was applicable to NICON only and did not 
extend to other companies in the market. The insurance market viewed the 
establishment of NICON as a sly attempt to nationalize the insurance industry. As a 
leading broker (Braithwaite 1990,p.176) in the market put it, 
"The effect of the creation of NICON on Nigerian brokers was 
devastating ... with one stroke of the pen, the livelihood of indigenous 
insurance brokers came to a stop; because at that time, up to 1969, 
most of the indigenous insurance brokers concentrated on the business 
of the Federal Government parastatals ... " 
Braithwaite was unimpressed with Dr. Reichel who had been instrumental in the 
drafting of the decree. 
He was referred to as a "so called expert. .. who did not appear to know much about 
international business and was not prepared to accept help from anyone". It is 
apparent from the comments that some groups in the industry felt that they had not 
been consulted in the process leading up to the promulgation of the decree 
(Braithwaite 1990). 
The Government through the operations of NICON was in effect operating as a 
regulator, an insurance company, an insurance broker as well as majority shareholder 
in the area of insurance and reinsurance in the economy. Many regarded these roles as 
conflicting (Ogunlana 1972; Okediji 1986(b)) and others were concerned that NICON 
did not have the managerial expertise to perform the brokerage function. Instances are 
given of times when the government, having spent a great deal of money (in one case 
about £11,000)90 were unable to negotiate and collect compensation for some aviation 
89. Journal of The Chartered Insurance Institute. Vo1.67. 1970.p.269. 
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and marine losses because NICON lacked skilled brokers. The corporation in many 
cases had to resort to the services of one the leading private brokers in the market in 
order to negotiate and collect compensation from their overseas reinsurers 
(Braithwaite 1990,pp.175-181). 
The managing director of NICON defended the company's position by stating that 
NICON's role in the industry was justified because of the existence of [unspecified] 
market imperfections. His view, which in effect was the official government line, was 
that NICON had to play these multiple roles in order to remove the foreign 
domination of insurance business in the country (Lijadu 1987). The official line taken 
by the government in response to criticisms of its action with regard to NICON was 
that 
" ... no attempt has been made by government to restrict the operations 
of the privately owned companies and there is no nationalisation of the 
industry. Private companies operate in free and open competition with 
state-owned insurance companies. "91 
However it appeared NICON was unable to effectively discharge its brokerage 
functions both locally and overseas. Premiums were not remitted to overseas 
underwriters promptly, with the result that many claims were unpaid by these 
underwriters. Eventually some of its customers applied to the government to allow 
them to appoint their own brokers, and in 1976 the Government granted their request. 
This was " ... the beginning of the end of the insurance broking function of NIeON", 
and soon the indigenous brokers were back in business (Braithwaite 1990,p.182). 
5.3.2.3 The Indigenisation Decrees 1972-1977 
Although the quantum of legislation affecting insurance company activities had 
increased since 1960, the regulations were still seriously lacking in content. All 
classes of insurance business were still, in effect, accessible to foreign insurers and 
there were no restrictions on the classes of insurance business that could be purchased 
directly from abroad. Additionally, the Government did not regulate tariffs in any 
90. In this specific case the money was spent on airline tickets and hotel fees for two officials who were sent to 
London to negotiate and collect an aviation claim. When they did not succeed in doing so, two government 
delegations were despatched to London to resolve the matter. They also failed (Braithwaite 1990, pp.l75-181). 
91. The Risk Bearer 1988,p.4. 
126 
class of business, as a consequence of which premium rates were high (Adeyemo, 
1972,p.10l). None of the acts specified minimum requirements for the establishment 
of mathematical reserves, unexpired risk reserves, and the reserves for outstanding 
claims, as well as their valuation basis. There were also no rules regarding the 
evaluation of investments and apart from margin of solvency and capital 
requirements, no other financial guarantees were required in respect of insurers 
operations. Although the regulations appeared to provide for the localisation of 
insurance business by requiring foreign insurers to incorporate locally, this was a 
superficial measure since there were no criteria to determine the ownership structure 
of these companies. Thus, although for the purposes of the law a company could be 
classified as a Nigerian company, it could actually still be owned 100% by foreigners. 
The resultant effect of this was that the insurance industry was still at this time 
dominated by foreign insurers and many incapable and fraudulent entrepreneurs were 
taking advantage of the lack of effective supervision to form financially unstable 
companies (Okwor 1978). 
The problem of the dominance of foreign capital was not limited, however, to the 
insurance industry alone. In many sectors of the economy, foreign capital had 
gradually taken over.92 In order to tackle this problem during the second development 
plan period, the military government in power promulgated the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree 1972.93 This was the first indigenisation decree which was aimed 
at increasing the participation of Nigerians in all the economic activities in the 
country. It was however silent on some business activities such as insurance which 
meant that foreigners could still have exclusive ownership and control of insurance 
business in the country. 
Subsequent amendments and updates of the decree resulted in the final legislative 
instrument, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977,94 under which all 
businesses were classified into three schedules. As with the earlier decree, schedule I 
enterprises were the exclusive preserve of Nigerians, while schedule 11 contained a 
list of 57 enterprises in which the equity participation of Nigerians could not fall 
below a minimum of 60%. This schedule included life insurance business. In addition 
92. See chapter 4. 
93. The decree is discussed in chapter 4 section 4. 
94. See chapter 4, section 4. 
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to this indigenisation measure, the Federal Military Government acquired 49% of the 
equity of all foreign insurance companies in the country. 
5.3.2.4 The Insurance Decree 1976 
Despite the passage and implementation of the enterprises promotion decree, 
distortions were still apparent in the market. The transfer of share holdings from 
foreign to local participation was a slow and laborious process and many dishonest 
insurers who had no intention of compensating their policyholders in the event of a 
genuine claim were operating in the market. Others were financially unsound and 
could not, even if they had wanted to, satisfy the claims of their policyholders. 
Producer interests were effectively being served rather than consumer interests. The 
continuing foreign domination of the market by foreign insurers was apparently not in 
the national economic interest. Additionally the activities of insurance brokers and 
agents were not subject to any form of legal supervision. Insurance contract tenns and 
other policy documents were not supervised, so that policyholders were invariably 
prejudiced in cases of disputes between insurance companies and insureds. The policy 
terms of most insurance contracts at this time were described as "unfair" and 
"oppressive", with policy terms being "treacherous". Some of the companies indulged 
in "sharp practices" (Osinubi 1990). To make matters worse, the courts sometimes 
enforced some of these terms enabling " .. .insurers to defeat the ... honest claims ... on 
mere legal technicalities" (Anifalaje 1984,pp.84-7). 
The Government was aware of the problems in the insurance market. In the Third 
Development Plan Document it stated that 
One of the main problems in the insurance subsector is the multiplicity 
of insurance companies-both underwriting and broker [and] ... the 
tremendous foreign exchange leakage caused by (a) the re-insuring of 
a large percentage of the risk outside the economy and (b) the 
dominance of foreign companies in the sector."95 
In the Plan, Government had also listed as its policy mam policy objective the 
elimination or mitigation of many problems in the economy, including those specified 
for the insurance sector. One of its objectives in this regard was to "narrow the zone 
of official ignorance in the Commerce and Finance sector and increase contact with 
the economic agents in the private sector."96 This implied a willingness on the part of 
95. Federal Government of Nigeria Third National Development Plan, 1975-1980 VoU at p.l84. 
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the Government to listen to suggestions or recommendations by insurers as to the way 
in which the problems in the insurance market could be dealt with legislatively. 
Meanwhile Nigeria's fortunes had changed. In 1969, oil had been discovered in the 
south western part of the country and the country was beginning to "enjoy" the 
benefits associated with this. The liquidity in the economy increased and many 
entrepreneurs decided to enter the insurance sector of the economy, thus 
compounding the problems in the already inefficient regulatory control system. 
Pressure was continuously exerted by consumers and some insurers on the 
Government to actually do something about the situation. The older more established 
insurance companies were pressurising the government to flush out what they referred 
to as "mushroom"97 insurance companies. Some insurers called for the government to 
increase the paid-up capital requirements which were considered as inadequate by 
some of the bigger, older more established insurers in the market (Ogunlana 
1972,p.99). Ostensibly the reason for this was to rid the market of inefficient, 
undercapitalized and possibly fraudulent companies. However, others98 in the 
industry felt that the bigger companies simply wanted to maintain the status quo by 
encouraging and entrenching their exercise of monopoly power in the industry. It was 
suggested that what the industry needed was not more regulation (except in the area 
of raising the entry requirements), but self regulation (McNesty 1973,p.41). 
Meanwhile, a change of leadership occurred in the military. General Yakubu Gowon, 
the incumbent head of state was deposed in what was referred to as a "bloodless" 
military coup d'etat in July 1975. General Murtala Mohammed's style of governance 
was very radical, and the effects were felt in the insurance market. A t this time, the 
Government started to implement its policy of increasing its contacts with the various 
sub sectors of the economy. It commenced negotiations with the Nigeria Insurance 
Association with the specific objective of reducing motor insurance premium rates. 
This was its first attempt at the control of non-life insurance rates. However, despite 
industry reservations as to the ability of the insurers to operate effectively under a 
system in which motor premiums were subject to control, the rates were reduced. This 
96. Ibid.,p.185. 
97. The relatively smaller (in tenns of premium income and size of labour force) and undercapitalised companies 
in the insurance market 
98. See for example. the Business Times. Monday June 2 1986.p.7. 
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proved to be the genesis of a somewhat stricter control of insurance market operations 
(Ogunshola 1976,p.65). 
In 1976, under the Obasanjo regime, the Federal Government promulgated a new 
decree, the Insurance Decree 1976 which came into effect on the 7th December 1976. 
The Insurance Regulations of 1977 were issued pursuant to the decree.99 The 1976 
decree repealed the Insurance Companies Act 1961 and the Insurance (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1964. Some of the provisions of these Acts were re-enacted while 
some new provisions were made. 100 
Provision was made for the establishment of the post of the Director of Insurance and 
the decree became the main legislation governing the operation of insurance business 
in Nigeria. It dealt to varying extents with financial, product and business methods 
regulation of insurance business in Nigeria, and classified insurance business along 
two main categories, life and non-life insurance. Non-life business was further 
classified into fire, accident, motor vehicle, workmen's compensation, and marine, 
aviation and transport insurance business. I01 
The Director of Insurance stated that the objective of the decree was " ... to ensure the 
effective control and supervision of the activities of insurance companies" (Okwor 
1984,p.34). The explanatory note to the decree states that apart from this some of the 
other provisions contained in the decree " ... relate generally to the better management 
and regulation of insurance business in Nigeria." 
Section 8 detailed the licensing requirements for carrying out insurance business. 
These requirements were more stringent than the provisions contained in previous 
enactments. The Registrar had to be satisfied that among other things the class of 
insurance business for which an application was being made would be conducted in 
accordance with "sound insurance principles", and that "adequate and valid" 
reinsurance treaties in respect of every class of business were arranged. In addition 
the registrar had to be satisfied that the proposal forms, terms and conditions of 
policies were "in order and acceptable" and that there was at least one "competent and 
99. Schedule 2 of the 1977 regulations relating to the prescription of registration fees payable by insurance 
intermediaries was subsequently amended by the Insurance (Amendment) Regulation 1983. The various fees 
were increased. 
100. See the "Explanatory Note" to the 1976 Insurance Decree. 
101. Section 2. 
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professionally qualified" person to be placed in charge of each department of 
insurance business.102 The conditions under which the registration of an insurer could 
be cancelled were also set out in sections 7(a)-(r) of the decree. The paid-up capital 
requirements were N500,000 for an applicant for life insurance business and N300,00 
in respect of non-life insurance business. For reinsurance business the requirement 
was for at least ten times the preceding amounts.103 In addition to this every 
prospective applicant was required to deposit such share capital with the Central Bank 
of Nigeria for the period of time during which the insurer was engaged in the 
transaction of insurance business in the country. The Director of Insurance was 
permitted to release not more than 50% of this statutory deposit to the insurer after 
registration had been completed. 104 The Director could also release, if the insurer so 
required, not more than 25% of the statutory deposit in a situation where the insurer 
had suffered a substantial loss that could not be reasonably met from its own 
resources. This however had to be replaced within thirty days after the withdrawal 
date. 105 
The decree introduced more domestication policies by increasing the percentage of 
assets required to be invested in Nigeria to 100% for all classes of business and, in 
addition to specifying the categories of permissible investments, stipulated that not 
more than 10% of the non-life fund, and 25% of the life fund respectively could be 
invested in real property.106 Provision was also made for the establishment of various 
reserves in respect of life and non-life business,107 although as with the previous 
enactments, no bases for the valuation of assets was stipulated. 
Rate regulation was also included in the decree. No insurer or group of insurers in the 
form of an association was allowed to make rate increases without the prior approval 
of the Director of Insurance, and the decree made provision for the Commissioner of 
Insurance to appoint "from time to time" a rating committee to review rates. The 
rating committee was to consist of industry representatives and their functions among 
other things were "to ensure that rates are non-discriminatory ... to 
102. Section 5. 
103. Section 8. 
104. Section 9. 
105. Section 10. 
106. Section 18. 
107. Section 17. 
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examine ... applications for general increase in rates and premiums ... having regard to 
general anti-inflationary measures ... and to review insurance commissions from time 
to time." 108 
Section 19 provided for the regulation of the accounts of the insurer and made 
specific provisions for life insurers to submit an abstract of an actuary report and a 
valuation report, a summary and valuation of life policies, as well as information as to 
premiums, policy reserve values and guaranteed surrender values, among other things. 
Non compliance with these provisions made the insurer guilty of an offence and liable 
on conviction to a fine of N2000. Section 20 made it mandatory for the insurers 
accounts to be audited annually. 
The decree incorporated product regulation by requiring the prior approval of all 
insurance policies, documents and certificates of insurance, as well as any changes to 
be made to these documents. 109 
For the first time in the history of insurance regulation in the country, the regulation 
of intermediaries was incorporated into the provisions of the decree. Section 25 made 
it mandatory for insurance agents to be licensed under the provisions of the decree, 
while section 26 stipulated that premiums collected by agents should be remitted to 
the insurer within a maximum period of 15 days. Section 27 dealt with the licensing 
of insurance brokers. Brokers were subject to more stringent requirements. They were 
required to, among other things, deposit the sum of N25,000 with the Central Bank, to 
maintain a minimum professional indemnity insurance cover of N50,000 or 25% of 
annual brokerage fees in the preceding year, whichever was the greater amount, and 
were subject to higher penalties than applicable to insurance agents for infringement 
of their duties under the law. l1O The decree prohibited the rebating of commissions 
and premiums (except as prescribed).111 
The 1976 decree was a comprehensive piece of legislation. It increased the scope of 
regulation by making provision for the regulation of the financial, product and 
business methods aspects of insurers. It appeared to raise the barriers to entry into the 
108. Section 33. 
109. Section 14. 
110. See sections 26(3) and 28(3) & (4). 
111. See section 47. 
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industry by increasing the capital requirements in respect of all classes of insurance 
business considerably (from N50,000 (£25,000) to N500,000 in the case of life 
business). Apart from this, it also appeared to place restrictions on the category of 
people who could establish insurance companies by requiring that "there is at least 
one competent and professionally qualified person to man each department of 
insurance business." 112 
The regulation of rates in non-life insurance business l13 was introduced, and although 
life insurance rates were not directly regulated by the act, the provisions for the 
control of the investment behaviour of insurers was an indirect way of controlling life 
rates. 114 Although the decree specified maximum rates of commission in respect of 
non-life business,115 it was silent on commissions in life business. The decree 
required life companies to establish a general reserve fund and a contingency reserve 
in respect of life business. The requirement is that the general reserve will be 
maintained with an amount which is equal to the net liabilities on policies in force at 
the time of the actuarial valuation. 
The contingency reserves should be at least 1% of premiums or 10% of profits 
whichever amount was greater, with the reserve accumulating until it reached the 
amount of minimum paid-up capital. l16 The method for determining the solvency of 
the life fund was left to the discretion of the actuary handling individual company 
returns, so that different insurers in the market use different methods of computing 
solvency.117 Since the basis for determining the value of insurer assets and liabilities 
was also not stipulated by law, this constituted a potential area of abuse by insurance 
companies, since incompetent insurers could conceivably falsify the figures to 
maintain a semblance of solvency. 
112. See section 5(1(0). 
113. This came in the form of prior rate approval. While tariffs exist for workmens compensation and motor 
insurance business, other types of non-life policies have minimum rates of premium specified. However, 
applications for rate increases had to be processed by the insurance department 
114. This is because in life business, premium rates are calculated upon a consideration of interest rates on the life 
insurers business, the expenses of management as well as the future mortality experience of the life portfolio. 
115. See section 34(1(a&b». 
116. See section 17(3(a&b». 
117. Information obtained from the Insurance Department, Federal Ministry of Finance, Lagos in May 1991. 
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From the provisions of the decree it is apparent that the main focus was on 
policyholder protection, that is, the protection of the public interest. There was no 
need to address the issues of domestication of business in the decree because the 
Government had implemented this by use of other legislative provisions applicable to 
the economy as a whole and the insurance market in particular. 118 
Various sectors of the market had different views on the new decree. The Government 
saw it as the means to consolidate the market and ensure that insurance business was 
run along actuarially sound basis in the interests of the policyholder, and the 
comprehensiveness of the decree led to it's being described as " ... an excellent 
document to serve as a legal basic protection of the public ... " (Graves 1976,p.166). 
The Government also declared that the decree had "revolutionalised the industry and 
resulted in its efficient" regulation in accordance with the provisions of the decree. 119 
It was also stated by the Director of Insurance that "The two principal objectives of 
the decree was to ensure, as a means of control, that insurance companies, 
brokers/adjusters and agents are lawfully established and operated at all times on 
sound insurance principles, and also to give better protection to members of the 
public."120 
However, it was also considered that the decree had several "objectionable features" 
especially with regard to entry requirements, the investment of insurance funds, and 
the extensive powers accorded to the Director of Insurance. With regard to the capital 
entry requirements especially, it was stated that the new law was 
"prohibitive and ... promoted by men ... motivated by self-interest...it has 
restricted competition and protected entrenched positions ... enshrined a 
likely monopoly by the present successful insurers"(Falegan 1982(c )). 
Falegan went on to state that the powers granted to the supervisory authorities under 
the decree were too wide and dictatorial despite the fact that the Nigerian experience 
had 
118. The Companies Decree 1968, NICON Decree 1969 and Indigenisation Decree 1977, among others. 
119. The Risk Bearer 1988,p.3. 
120. Okwor 1984,p.34. 
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"dem0!l~trated beyond rea~onabl~ doubt that the supervisory 
authonttes not only lack officIals wIth the expertise and knowledge of 
insurance ... but are also subject to red tape ... "(ibid). 
5.3.2.5 The Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation Decree 1977 
In April 1976, the Military Government inaugurated the Financial System Review 
Committee to examine, the structure and adequacy of the Nigerian financial system, 
as well as the organisational and ownership structure of institutions within the system, 
with a view to evaluating their relevance and viability in the context of the Nigerian 
economy. The Committee submitted their report to government on the 23rd of 
December of the same year. As part of its recommendations, the committee proposed 
the following: 
(1) the establishment of a National Reinsurance Corporation whose prime objective 
would be to focus on the development of a national reinsurance market It 
recommended that the corporation should "concentrate its efforts on developing 
the reinsurance market in Nigeria but should not aim at regulating the industry". 
The military government accepted these recommendations. 
(2) the monopoly of Government business enjoyed by NICON "should be revoked 
in the light of the further Nigerianisation of the equity of foreign owned 
insurance companies in the country". 
The military government rejected this recommendation,121giving no reasons for its 
decision. However, it accepted the Committees recommendation that NICON 
" ... should ... be treated by the Government as the lead company and should take on 
leadership responsibilities within the industry." 
(3) part of the equity of NICON (which was fully federal government owned) 
should be offered to the state governments. 
121. One of the reasons government had given in respect of it's decision to participate directly in the market was 
the fact that the market was dominated by foreign insurers. Since this had been dealt with somewhat by the 
provisions of the Indigenisation decree, in principle, there was no reason for government to continue its 
operations in the market 
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The government rejected this recommendation, stating that" ... State Governments are 
free to go into insurance business subject to satisfying the necessary conditions under 
the Decree." 
(4) the discriminatory tax provisions under section 16 of the Income Tax 
Management Act 1961 relating to the taxation of insurance companies pensions funds 
should be reviewed. 
The Government accepted this recommendation. 122 
(5) A board with powers invested in it under the Insurance Decree should be 
established by the Ministry of Trade to regulate the insurance industry. 
The Government rejected this recommendation, stating that it did not see the 
necessity for setting up another body in addition to the Ministry of Trade to regulate 
the industry .123 
The Committee had apparently had knowledge of the Government's intention to raise 
the capital requirements for entry into the industry. In the report, it "fully endorsed" 
the Governments decision to raise the capital licensing requirements in life business 
to N300,OO. In the 1976 Decree the capital requirements for life business was in fact 
raised to N500,OOO. 
Subsequently, in 1977, the Federal Government promulgated the Nigeria Reinsurance 
Corporation Decree.124 The decree was passed in keeping with the policy of 
localisation and domestication in the economy at the time and was deemed to have 
come into effect on the 1st of July 1976. It provided for the establishment of a 
corporation, The Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation l25 (or Nigeria Re as it came to be 
known), with an initial authorised share capital of NI0,OOO,OOO. The functions of the 
122. Although government accepted this recommendation, up till the time of writing, nothing has been done to 
redress the situation. Ogunshola (1976n,p.84) noted that representations had in fact been made to the Federal 
Ministry of Finance by the Nigeria Insurance Association and the Life Offices Association as regards this 
problem." ... but each approach has been met with blunt refusal." 
123. See Federal Military Government's Views on the Report of the Committee on the Nigerian Financial System. 
1977 Federal Ministry of Information. Lagos. pp.21-24. 
124. Otherwise known as Decree Number 49 of 1977. 
125. Section 1. 
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Nigeria Re were set out in section 2 of the decree, that is, the reinsurance of all 
classes of insurance business including life insurance business, both within and 
outside Nigeria, among other things. Every registered insurer was required by the 
provisions of section 7 to reinsure with the corporation 20% of the sum insured on 
every insurance policy issued or renewed by it on or after the 1st of January 1978. 
Additionally the insurers were required to pay to the Nigeria Re 20% of the premium 
received on such policies. 126 The Nigeria Re in turn was required to pay the insurer's 
commission at a rate determinable by the corporation, although no profit commission 
was payable on such cessions.127 The Nigeria Re also had the right of first refusal 
over any reinsurance business over the legal cessions before such business was placed 
on the international reinsurance market. 128 Since some of the functions of NICON 
were in effect transferred to the Nigeria Re, sections 4(2)(c), 8 and 9, as well as 
schedule 2 of the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria Decree 1969 which dealt 
with reinsurance, were repealed by section 7(5) of the Nigeria Re Decree. The 
corporation was also charged with the responsibility for ceding compulsory cessions 
from Nigeria to the African Reinsurance Corporation. In addition the Nigeria Re was 
to II ••• create a focal point for the collection of market statistics,"129 and carry out 
insurance market research activities. The Nigeria Re, as with the case of NICON was 
also granted discriminatory tax concessions. 130 It has been estimated that for the year 
1988 alone, the effect of the tax limitation clause (with respect to the operations of the 
Nigeria Re) has been to deny the government of some N3.2 million in tax revenue 
(Naiyeju, 1990,p.8). 
However, while the government had accepted the recommendations of the Financial 
Review Committee that the Nigeria Re should focus on the development of the 
reinsurance market, and leave regulation to the Insurance Department, in its official 
publication, The Nigeria Insurance Year Book, the corporation states; 
The Insurance Department of the Federal Ministry of Financ~ .3.!ld 
Economic Development is responsible for the Control. of the a~tlVltleS 
of Insurance Companies so as to ensure complIance wIth the 
126. Because it was impracticable for the Corporation to participate in every life policy, it decided to compel life 
insurers in the market to cede compulsorily 25% of all life insurance treaties. It exercised it's right of first 
refusal on any facultative cases. The Nigeria Re increased it's participation on treaties to 40% with effect from 
1st July 1986. See Osoka (1990,p.7). 
127. Section 7(2). 
128. Section 7(3) and (4). 
129. "Ten Years of Professional Insurance in Nigeria", p.S1. 
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provisions of the Nigerian Insurance Decree 1976 and other relevant 
legislation and regulations touching upon the business of insurance in 
the country. The Department which is headed by an official known as 
th~ ~irector! is assisted in its ~esponsibility in this regard by the 
Nlgena Remsurance CorporatIOn and the National Insurance 
Corporation of Nigeria. These three institutions ensure that 
government policy in the field of insurance and reinsurance is 
complied with by members in the Nigeria Insurance Market"(italics 
mine).131 
5.3.2.6 Extent of Industry Influence on Regulatory Decisions 
The extent of influence that the insurance market has had on the regulatory process 
appears to have varied with the political and economic developments in the country. 
In the early 1960's, the dominant insurers in the market were the foreign ones who 
influenced regulation to the extent that the controls on the market were loose. This 
benefited both the foreign insurers as well as the indigenous ones. When the country 
was under civilian administration, the views of the industry were solicited through the 
Nigerian Insurance Consultative Council, who it is reported were pleased with the 
provisions of the draft insurance bill. 132 
From the available evidence the conclusion can be drawn that the insurance industry 
as an entity did not have much of a say in the discussions that led up to the 
promulgation of the NICON Decree 1969 and Insurance Decree of 1976. After the 
decree was passed there was much dissatisfaction with many of its provisions among 
industry practitioners. A lot of the dissatisfaction had to do with the capital and other 
licensing requirements as regards entry into the market. Some considered that the 
capital requirements were unnecessarily high, while others felt they were too low. The 
restrictions on investment behaviour were also criticised. 133 Indeed, during this period 
it appeared that the extent of industry influence on the public decision making 
processes that ultimately affected the operations of the insurance market was minimal. 
There was talk in the industry and within official Government circles as to making 
130. See section 4(2) of the Nigeria Re Decree. 
131. See Nigeria Insurance Yearbook publications. various issues. for example 1989. p.l86. 
132. See Reichel (1966-1971) op.cit..p.256. 
133. See for example. Ogunshola 1976. Falegan 1982(d). Ojo and Adewunmi 1982 and Akintola-Bello 1983. 
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amendments to the decree. 134 However, it appeared that this process was shrouded in 
some degree of secrecy. 
In 1979, the Military Government handed power to the civilians and the country was 
once again ruled under a democratic system of Government. During this time 
however, there was no regulatory action with respect to the insurance industry. At the 
end of 1983, the military administration swept themselves back into power after 
allegations of fraud, corruption and financial mismanagement on the part of the 
civilian administration. The change in government did not appear to have resulted in 
any significant changes in terms of increasing the influence of the industry on the 
regulatory body. 
At the annual meeting of the Nigeria Insurance Association in 1985, the Chairman, in 
an address to members stated that the Governing Council of the association had 
submitted to the Insurance Department, its comments on the proposed amendment of 
the 1976 decree. He stated that the Council had unsuccessfully been trying to obtain 
from the Department information as regards when the proposed amendments would 
be put into effect. 135 
Similarly, at the First National Workshop on Life Assurance in 1986, the Chairman of 
the Education Sub-Committee, who also happened to be the senior manager in 
NICON's life insurance department, commented on the need of the Nigeria Insurance 
Association to make representations to the Government as to the desirability of 
raising the amount of tax relief allowable on life assurance from N2,000 136 to 
N10,000.137 This issue had been raised repeatedly, because with the extremely high 
inflationary trends in the economy, N2000 Naira was a highly inadequate amount to 
serve as an inducement to life insurance purchases. 138 The possibility of the 
government increasing the amount allowed on investment in property by life offices 
from 25% to 50% was also discussed, and the question of the discriminatory taxation 
134. Information obtained during discussions with industry executives and an Insurance Department official 
during May to July 1991. 
135. Address delivered by MrJ .S. Bedi. See Journal of the Insurance Institute of Nigeria. December 1985.p.9. 
136. This was the amount prescribed the Income Tax Management Act of 1961. 
137. Report by Chiejina, E.O, 1986, Chairman in Life Insurance, a half yearly journal of the Life Offices 
Committee. 
138. The consumer price index had risen from 7.41 in 1961 to 105.3 in 1986. By 1991 it had risen to 259.65 
(1985=100) (International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1991,p.568). 
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of life offices was again raised.139 However, up to the time of writing, the requested 
amendments to the Decree had not been made. 
According to the Insurance Department, the insurance industry participates in public 
policy making directly relevant to the insurance industry to a very large extent. The 
Insurance Department is said to arrange for meetings with industry representatives 
who represent the industry on various Government committees, in order to hear the 
representatives' views on regulation of the industry. Indeed in 1981, when the country 
was still under civilian rule the Insurance Department met with "leading" insurers in 
the industry to discuss ways in which the 1976 Insurance Decree could be amended, 
and in 1983, in response to the decision of the Government to lower the registration 
requirements in respect of all classes of insurance business, the various groups in the 
industry moved to stop this by exerting pressure on the government to pass a new act. 
Discussions with a regulatory official in the Department revealed that the Department 
believes that the insurance industry is adequately represented in such discussions and 
that their input is taken into consideration when insurance laws are to be 
implemented. That the government holds consultations with some "representatives" of 
the industry is not in doubt.14O It is (1) the extent to which such representatives are 
acting in the interests of all the member companies in the market, and (2) the extent to 
which the government takes into consideration the suggestions made and advice 
given, that is in question. Discussions with executives in some life insurance 
companies141 between May and July 1991 reveal that their belief is that the 
government does not as a rule consult with the industry and when they do they seek 
the opinions of only a few "non-representative" bodies such as NIeON and the 
Nigeria Re which are government corporations. A typical illustration given is that of 
section 5(1(f) of the 1976 Act which requires that professionally qualified personnel 
be placed in charge of each department in insurance companies. 142 It is argued that if 
139. Chiejina 1986. op.cit. p.5. 
140. See. for example. Ogunlana (1985.p.34) who stated that "The ... consultations which government has had on 
the proposed revision with representatives of the industry is to be commended as it will make for better 
legislation" . 
141. Interviews were held with the following executives: 
Mr. Ope Oredugba, Managing Director. African Alliance Insurance Company; Mr. Willie Ezeogu. Senior 
Manager. American International Insurance Company; Mr Saka. Crusader Insurance Company; Mr. Femi 
Ajigbo. Crusader Insurance Company; Mr. Sola Thomas. Financial Insurance Company; Mrs Omope. Deputy 
Manager. Life Underwriting. Great Nigeria Insurance Company. Mr Adegbenle. Manager. Great Nigeria 
Insurance Company; Mr. Chiejinna, Life Manager. NICON. Full details of the method of these interviews have 
been provided in chapter one. See appendix B for the interview schedule. 
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the Government had actively solicited the views of those in the industry they would 
not have included this provision since it is well known that there is a shortage of 
professionally qualified personnel in the industry. 
It indeed appears that with the 1976 decree at least, most of the private insurance 
companies in the industry were not actively involved in the fonnulation and 
discussion of the decree. The 1976 decree has been described as being 
" ... relatively free from the frustrating influences of vested interests, 
[since it was] ... an enactment of the federal military 
government. .. promulgated without debate or fanfare [and] ... the 
antecedent formalities that would normally provide a legislative 
history for a civilian legislation" (Anifalaje 1984,p.88). 
The evidence from the interviews held indicates industry dissatisfaction with some of 
the current regulatory rules. Nearly 50% of the executives interviewed stated their 
preference for less regulation of the market. The areas in which less regulation was 
desired were, not surprisingly, with respect to the investment rules, the life assurance 
premium relief and the taxation of the life fund. Three of them claimed to be in favour 
of increased regulation, but further discussion revealed that the areas in which they 
desired this were with respect to the supervision of life insurance intennediaries 
(many of who defaulted in remitting premiums to the companies) and the raising of 
the financial requirements for licensing new companies. A senior executive with 
access to the Director of Insurance said he had raised the issue of the necessity for the 
increased supervision of the intermediaries with the Director 
" ... but nothing has been done and one gets tired of talking." 
Another executive claimed that increasing the capital requirements would 
" ... sort out the chaff from the grain." 
The Insurance Departments apparent inability to supervise the industry in an effective 
manner was also a cause for concern. As one executive put it 
"should we make ... regulations that we know cannot be supervised?" 
142. Section 5. 
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There are many interest groups in the market with varying degrees of "power". Their 
power appears to be dependent not only upon their financial resources, but also upon 
their status. Status in this case can be measured by the degree of close intimacy or 
personal relationships with members of the political elite, that is, those at the heart of 
the regulatory decision making process. 143 The various interest groups can be 
classified along the following lines; 
(1) The big national companies such as NICON and the Nigeria Re. 
(2) The big companies with some amount of foreign equity ownership. 
(3) The "small fry,"I44 that is, the medium sized and small wholly indigenous 
owned companies. 
(4) The consumers of insurance services. 
The managing directors (in essence bureaucrats) of the national companies are 
appointed by the Government and it is to be assumed that they would have the 
advantage over the other companies in being able to influence public policy making. 
Being government appointees they would presumably be in close contact with the 
"powers that be" who, having no specialist knowledge of insurance would be inclined 
to rely upon their advice when contemplating legislative action in the industry. This is 
especially true since insurance is low in salience and high in complexity and in 
Gormley's (1986) regulatory framework this leads to a situation in which policy 
making is dominated by a "power elite" made up of bureaucrats, professionals and 
business groups in the industry. Apart from this it is the bureaucrats in the national 
companies that can be perceived as playing a dual role: they are government 
employees and yet at the same time they are professional people. In some cases these 
two roles could be conflicting. 
However, the extent to which the bureaucrats in the industry (which term includes the 
Director of Insurance, the heads of the national companies and the heads of all 
Committees in which decisions pertaining to the insurance industry are taken) can 
influence the scope and nature of regulatory rules is not clear. This is because 
143. See section 2.2.2 in chapter 2. 
144. Small in terms of size of life premium underwritten. 
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although an appearance of a democratic decision making process is given by the 
setting up of committees, under military rule, in the final analysis, the political elite 
are the ones responsible for public policy making. The political elite consist of the 
Minister of Finance, as well as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, 
the Council of Ministers acting through the Secretary to the Government, or the Chief 
of General Staff. However when regulatory decisions are made 
" .. .it is not always clear whether it is the decision of the Council of 
Ministers or the singular decision of the President (conveyed through 
the Secretary to t~e Government) or the decision of an aereopagus 
headed by the ChIef of General Staff ... [and] contradictions [in the 
regulatory decisions] only illustrate the pathology of our financial and 
economic administration" (Okigbo 1988,pp.ll&12).145 
The medium sized and small companies in the market would probably only be able to 
make their views known via the market associations. This would have been the ideal 
medium through which these companies (including the foreign companies) could 
make their views known and felt. However, lack of cooperation among the companies 
has to a large extent reduced their ability to exercise some strength in this area. For 
example, it was not until 1986, 27 years and 16 years after the formation of the 
Nigerian Institute of Insurance and the Nigerian Insurance Association, respectively, 
that statistics concerning insurers operations in the market could be complied and 
published.146 Similarly, the progress of the Life Offices Committee of the Nigeria 
Insurance Association was slowed down considerably by politicking among member 
offices. 147 Therefore it was not until 1986 that the maiden issue of its journal, Life 
Insurance, was published, and it was in the same year that it held the frrst national 
workshop on life assurance. 
The inability of some of the various market associations to work as a team (Ogunlana 
1985,p.3) may have affected their ability to influence policy to some degree. For 
example, at the Insurance Department it is claimed that representations by the market 
for an increase in rates for some classes of business are not sufficiently supported by 
the requisite actuarial data, and as such have been refused. 148 This was confrrmed by 
145. This comment was made specifically with reference to the governments interventions in the banking sector, 
but are of relevance to the insurance sector, since both sectors are regulated by the Ministry of Finance. 
146. The Nigeria Insurance Digest, published by the Nigeria Insurance Association. 
147. Information obtained during an interview with the Chief Executive of African Alliance Co., a specialist life 
office, in July 1991. 
148. Interview with Mr.1. Oni, Principal Actuary in the Insurance Department, 6th May 1991. 
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some of the executives interviewed who stated that the Life Offices Committee had 
been charged with the responsibility for presenting the life offices arguments to the 
Nigeria Insurance Association, who in turn were to present their case to the Insurance 
Department. However, they had been unsuccessful because they had not 
" ... marshalled their points effectively ... " and did " ... not present their 
case to the [Insurance Department] adequately enough .... " [49 
Another case in point is the question of mortality tables. The mortality table provides 
estimates of mortality probability at various ages and is the instrument by which the 
probability of living, or dying is measured. It forms the basis for determining the 
premium rates in life insurance (Magee 1952,p.27; Athearn 1977,p.404). Life offices 
make use of these tables to ascertain the probability of death occurring at each age for 
all policyholders and from this basis take into account other factors such as future 
interest rates and expenses in order to arrive at the price to be charged for the risk. 
Thus the mortality assumed is an important factor in determining the underwriting 
profitability or otherwise of the life portfolio. However, Nigerian life offices have 
been making use of British and American mortality tables 150 which may not be 
particularly suitable to Nigeria because of the different environmental conditions that 
exist. The mortality experience of the lives assured under various policies indicates 
that the mortality of European and Nigerian lives is different. The Life Offices 
Committee attempted to commence investigating the mortality experience of the 
various life offices but was unsuccessful in doing so.151 The information obtained 
from the executives interviewed indicated that the lack of success in doing this was 
due to the lack of cooperation from member companies. All the life offices were 
requested to submit information on their mortality experience. In some cases, the 
request was ignored, and the requisite data not supplied and in other cases, was 
actually unavailable. This unavailability of mortality data precludes accurate 
computation of mortality experience and as such· adequate and non-discriminatory 
rates. 
149. Quotations from interviews. The respondents names have not been given in this and subsequent quotations in 
order to preserve confidentiality. 
150. The mortality tables in use in the industry at the time this study was undertaken were: The 1924/29 (A24/29) 
and 1949/52 (A49/52) U.K Tables; The 1953 and 1983 U.S Tables and the 1976 U.K Rate Book. 
151. See paper presented by Akinwande, A.A., "The Insurance Industry in a Changing Economy-Opportunities 
and Challenges- Life Insurance Aspects", at the 20th Education Conference of The Insurance Institute of 
Nigeria. 1991,pp.l8. 
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The reasons for the lack of cooperation among the life offices in the industry appear 
to be due to a combination of inefficiency (as displayed by the inability to supply 
requisite data) and some element of mutual distrust and suspicion (as evidenced by 
the unwillingness to supply data where available). However, there may be another 
reason. One very senior executive who had in the past, been a representative on the 
Life Offices Committee, believed that the efficacy of the committee had been 
sabotaged because it was becoming "too powerful". According to him this had been 
done by tampering with the composition of the committee so as to reduce their 
effectiveness and 
"Now the companies do not appoint semor level people to the 
committee with the result that the policy recommendations are not 
carried out. How do you expect an assistant superintendent to just walk 
up to his managing director and say 'this is the decision of the 
committee which is binding on the company'? the managing director 
would not even bother to read the memo or listen to him! To make a 
thing like this effective, the managing director or someone who is 
powerful and can take decisions should be represented on such 
committees. I have never had any serious regard for their decisions." 
It appears that public dissatisfaction with the activities of many insurers in the market, 
which has been voiced in strong criticisms of the industry, has influenced the 
Government's regulatory philosophy considerably. This is interesting because there 
are no organised consumer interest groups in the industry. The public perception of 
the activities of insurance companies in Nigeria is very bad,152 especially in the case 
of the life offices. Consequently the regulatory trend has been on the side of stricter 
controls over the industry. A case in point is the reduction of motor rates in 1975, 
after strong pressure from consumers and despite strong resistance from insurers. 
5.3.2.7 The Insurance (Special Provisions) Decree 1988 
Life insurance has been a particular source of grievance for many policyholders. The 
agents selling these policies have been accused of all sorts of sharp practices and 
consumers have complained about the difficulties and delays associated with claims 
settlement. 153 These allegations are sharply refuted by the industry. The Chairman of 
152. Nigerians have never been enamoured of the activities of insurance companies in the country. The Risk 
Bearer. 1988. Vo1.13. No.13 p.5. states that" ... it must be admitted that the Nigerian insurance industry does 
not enjoy ... public goodwill ... " 
153. See for example. Aigbe 1982. for a criticism of the life insurance industry in Nigeria and an overview of 
public attitudes towards life insurance. 
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the Life Offices Committee in an address to the First National Workshop on Life 
Assurance stated that 
" I can confrrm that in all straightforward claims, the insurer settles 
claims with the minimum of delay ... the Director of Insurance seldom 
complains of any malpractice by a life insurance company. In fact I do 
not know of any member of the Life Offices Committee that has 
received a letter of reprimand from the Director ... " 154 
Despite the strong reassurances given by the chairman of the Life Offices Committee 
about the activities of the life offices, in 1988 the government promulgated the 
Insurance (Special Provisions) Decree 1988. The decree was divided into 11 short 
sections dealing with the subjects of disclosure of information on proposal forms, 
warranty and conditions, assignment of life policies, and third party rights against the 
insurer, amongst other things. 
Again, the focus of the legislation was on safeguarding policyholder interests, and 
some portions of it generated some controversy in the industry. The controversial 
provisions of degree however was in respect of disclosure,155 and "Insurable interest 
in life or other Insurance."156 
Section 1 stated that it was the insurers responsibility to ensure that all questions on 
the proposal form were drawn up in such a way as to elicit all the information that the 
insurer considered material 157 to the risk, and that any information not requested 
specifically would be deemed to be immaterial to the risk to be undertaken. This 
understandably was not well received by the insurers in the market, who felt that 
although such a provision was suited to the British market,158 it could not be applied 
to Nigeria since there was a great likelihood of proposers deliberately concealing facts 
154. Odele, M.D., 1986,"The Purpose of Life Assurance Claims and Settlement", Life Insurance, Vo1.2/86,p.25 
155. Section 1(1) to 1(4). 
156. Sections 3,4 and 5. 
157. In insurance a material fact is defined as fact which would influence a prudent underwriter in making a 
decision as to whether or not to accept a risk, or if he decided to accept it, a material fact would influence his 
decision as to the terms on which the risk would be underwritten. The onus of proving whether a risk was 
material or not was originally on the policyholder whose responsibility it was to disclose all facts material to 
the risk whether or not he thought it was relevant at the time, or whether or not he was even aware of the 
existence of the fact considered to be material. As a result many insurers were able to deny liability on the 
grounds of non disclosure of material fact to the detriment of many innocent policyholders. The change in law 
would make this course of action very difficult for insurers in the future. 
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material to the risk, to the detriment of the insurers. Added to this was the fact that 
although life insurers sent their proposers for medical investigations before issuing 
life policies, the investigations, due to the limited sophisticated medical equipment on 
the market, might probably not reveal terminal illnesses in the early stages. 
Although the industry was aware that a decree was to be passed, it is unlikely that the 
industry knew that such a provision was to be included in the decree. Even if it had 
been aware that this legislative provision was to be made, the evidence suggests they 
were unable to influence the policymakers in their favour. The Managing Director of 
the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation who, as the head of a prominent national 
company, would be expected to have been consulted about the provisions of the new 
decree, had this to say; 
"It beats the imagination how the insurer can reasonably be expected to 
know all the material circumstances surrounding each and every risk 
that may be presented for cover .. .it affords the insurance consumer in 
Nigeria today a great deal of room to manoeuvre and hold the insurer 
to ransom ... " 159 
The Nigeria Insurance Association were aware of the proVISIOns In the draft bill 
relating to insurable interest and had made comments and suggestions regarding this 
aspect to the authorities. 160 The insurable interest provisions in effect extended 
insurable interest beyond members of the nuclear family to members of the extended 
family to take into account the socio-economic factors in the society and would, if 
nothing else, probably increase the amount of individual life business underwritten in 
the market. 161 These provisions would satisfy consumer interests because they took 
into account cultural and religious factors in the environment. 
For example, now, unlike the situation before the Decree came into force, a man with 
four wives could name all four as beneficiaries under his life policy. A father could 
also have a life policy issued in respect of his son's life since he could argue that he 
158. This provision is made in the British Statement of Insurance Practice. 
159. The Daily Champion, Wednesday May 22, 1991,p.4. 
160. The Nigeria Insurance Digest 1986,p.25. 
161. It has been suggested that this section of the decree is unacceptable in the sense that it completely rewrites the 
whole definition of insurable interest, which definition is international, and cannot or should not be rewritten to 
suit individual country conditions. 
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was or would in the future be financially dependant upon him. Again in situations 
where persons were not closely related to each other, one party could benefit as 
beneficiary under the others policy once he could prove that he was his dependant. 
These provisions considerably extend the life insurers potential claims liability. 
Once again, the consumer interest appeared to have been the decisive factor behind 
regulatory action, and an industry commentator observed that the decree " .. .is not the 
darling of many insurance executives who argue that it only seeks to protect the 
insured at the expense of the insurer. 162 
5.4 The Structure of the Insurance Department 
Currently, the Federal Government controls the activities of insurance companies in 
Nigeria through the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The 
Insurance Department of this Ministry is charged with the responsibility of 
supervising the market activities and ensuring that the relevant regulations are 
complied with. The Insurance Department is headed by an official known as the 
Director of Insurance who is directly responsible to the Minister for Finance and 
Economic Development. The Director is appointed by interview and appointment in 
accordance with civil service guide-lines. The Insurance Department is supposed to 
be assisted in its functions by NICON and the Nigeria Re. Their stated function is to 
"ensure that government policy in the field of insurance and reinsurance is complied 
with by members in the Nigerian Insurance Market. "163 The Director of Insurance is 
assisted in his functions by the Deputy Director. Two Assistant Directors for 
Insurance and Audit in turn report to the Deputy Director (see figure SA). 
5.4.1 Staffing 
The agency staff are classified along two categories, the professional and 
administrative cadres. Civil service appointment rules govern the recruitment of 
agency personnel. At the time that the interviews were conducted there were about 
150 staff in the Insurance Department. l64 Out of this number, 28 were graduates of 
Universities. Among these were two statisticians, one lawyer and two economists. 
162. The Business Times. Monday August 27. 1990.p.l9. 
163. The Nigerian Insurance Year Book 1989.p.186. 
164. The information in this section has been obtained from the Insurance Department. 
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There was no professionally qualified actuary in the department at this time. In fact in 
the 1960's and early 1970's there were no professionally qualified actuaries in the 
insurance market, and as such insurance companies employed the services of foreign 
actuaries in order to obtain their actuarial support (Adeyemo 1972,p.l01). 
The situation has changed somewhat in recent years with the emergence of a few 
(four) locally based actuarial consultants, although the majority of Insurance 
companies however still employ the services of foreign actuarial firms. 165 
The Principal Actuary in the Insurance Department, although a mathematics graduate 
from the University of Lagos, was not professionally qualified. 166 All the university 
graduates are in the professional, that is, senior cadre. The Department is short-staffed 
at the professional level (Okwor 1982,p.19; Anifalaje 1984,p.92).167 This apparently 
has been the situation since the Departments inception. In the 1960's and early 70's, 
the Office of the Superintendent of Insurance (as it was then called) was "thinly 
staffed", despite concerted efforts to man it with technical experts (Olawoyin 
1976,p.64). Only staff at the professional level are involved in public policy making. 
Staff turnover is very high due to the poor conditions of service in the civil service. 
The staff that leave usually do so to take up jobs in the banking, oil and most 
especially insurance sectors in the economy, where far better pay and conditions of 
service obtain. Very few experienced personnel come in from the private sector to 
work in the Department. 168 The few that cross over usually do so at the higher 
professional' levels after they have made their money in the private sector. Morale 
among agency staff is low especially among the professional cadre whose salaries as 
165. See The Punch July 18 1989,p.1O. 
166. There is an acute shortage of professionally qualified actuaries in the Nigerian Insurance Market. The tenn 
"professionally qualified" presupposes that the individual has taken and passed the relevant examinations of 
approved institutes (usually those of the U.K and U.S.A). Since actuaries are scarce and highly paid, it is very 
unlikely that given the salary structure in the civil service, any qualified actuary would work in the insurance 
department. Even the private sector companies have difficulties in attracting and retaining actuaries. One 
company interviewed, The American International Insurance Co., had sent staff abroad for actuarial training. 
Upon completion of training, the staff did not return to the company or indeed the country presumably because 
of better conditions of service abroad. 
167. For example, Anifalaje (1984,p.92) stated that "Although the state has admirably insisted on the thorough 
supervision of insurance documents in order to ensure that they are reasonable, fair and just and has charged 
the Director of Insurance with the onerous duty to execute supervision, regrettably it has not sufficiently 
provided the Director with the wherewithal for the effective discharge of this function." The Principal Actuary 
in the department confirmed this in an interview in May 1991. 
168. Information obtained from The Insurance Department. 
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compared to the private sector insurance companies and other financial institutions 
are not competitive. 169 
5.4.2 Public Policy Making 
The potential costslbenefits of insurance laws to the industry and/or consumer are not 
assessed in economic terms because the Department does not have people who are 
qualified to assess them. According to a source,170 the bulk of the people in the 
Department are "liberal arts people who just talk and talk" and who do not have the 
competence to evaluate the probable effects of potential legislation. Policing or 
checking for compliance with laid down rules is done (in theory) by carrying out 
random investigations. These random investigations are carried out in cases where (1) 
there are complaints from members of the public (2) there are inadequate subsisting 
insurance treaties and (3) the actuarial valuation reports etc do not come into the 
department by the 31st of May of each year as required by law. The procedure for 
investigation is as follows. The Department writes to the company concerned asking 
for an explanation for the existence of a particular state of affairs. The Department 
having received this letter writes a report and sends it to the Director of Insurance. If 
the offence is grave enough to warrant an investigation, the Director asks the 
Department to investigate or, in some cases, the file may be sent to the legal 
department for immediate legal action in the courts. The Department does not 
particularly want to be involved in litigation because of the expenses involved in such 
actions. Lawyers have to be engaged and sent to the particular state of the federation 
in which the erring insurance company is headquartered since action must be brought 
against the insurance company in its area of jurisdiction. 
5.4.3 Difficulties in Implementation of Regulatory Laws 
The main difficulties said to be experienced by the agency in the implementation of 
regulatory measures are in the following areas: 
169. The significant difference between private sector salaries and emoluments and the public sector salaries in 
Nigeria is common knowledge. See The Business Times. Monday July 23 1990.p.lO. 
170. To preserve confidentiality the source will not be named. The Interview took place during the period May to 
June 1991. 
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(1) non-remittance of outstanding premiums from insurance brokers and agents to 
. . 
msurance compames, 
(2) non compliance with the requirements in the decree regarding the submission of 
actuarial valuation reports. Since there were until very recently no 
professionally qualified actuaries in the country, insurance companies sent out 
their life statistics abroad to actuaries who were paid for their professional 
services in foreign currency. With the advent of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), this process was made increasingly difficult because 
insurance companies found it more difficult to obtain foreign exchange as a 
result of the increased cost of foreign currency. The companies began to 
procrastinate and send in portions, rather than the whole of their returns. Since 
the Insurance Decree of 1976 and other legislation in force are silent about the 
partial submission of returns, the regulatory department in such cases cannot 
penalize a company so long as it submits a part of its returns. Since the life 
offices send their reports abroad, the actuary's report usually comes in a year or 
so later than the official deadline. 
(3) complaints from consumers about the arbitrary repudiation of liability on the 
part of insurers, differences as to the quantum of the sum offered as 
compensation to policyholders, and sharp practices among insurers such as 
charging more than the tariff for excesses, 
(4) the operations of NIeON which have been described by a regulatory official171 
as "a headache and .. .lax and inefficient." 
5.4.4 Record Keeping 
The systems of record keeping and record retrieval at the insurance department at the 
time of the study were found to be poor and rudimentary.172 Statistics of insurance 
company operations, where available, were recorded on ruled, A4 size sheets of paper 
and filed in file jackets. Entries were made with ballpoint pens or pencils and in some 
cases were incomplete. 173 The statistical information did not go back very far: the 
171. This comment was made by a regulatory official at the Insurance Department. 
172. These observations were made during visits to the Insurance Department during the period May to June 1991. 
173. It was not clear whether the omissions were as a result of the submission of incomplete data on the part of 
some insurance companies. or whether they were due to filing errors made by administrative personnel in the 
Deparment. 
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earliest data for the companies was found to relate to 1974. The Department did not 
make use of modem record keeping and retrieval systems such as computers. The 
Government had previously voted a specific amount for the computerisation of the 
Department, but the usual bureaucratic delays for which the civil service in Nigeria is 
characterised had prevented the systems from being set-up. Some of the data 
regarding the returns of insurance companies were unavailable. According to the 
agency, this was mostly due to some companies either not submitting returns or 
submitting incomplete returns. 
Summary 
The stated primary objectives of insurance regulation in Nigeria are: 
(1) the protection of the consumer interest and 
(2) the development of a strong local insurance and reinsurance market in keeping 
with the country's development aspirations. 
Over the years, these objectives have been implemented in two ways: 
(1) the development of industry specific rules and regulations and 
(2) the implementation of general economic policy that affects the insurance sector. 
The regulatory philosophy has shifted over the years from one of relative freedom of 
operation in the market to a system of close supervision of insurance business. 
Restrictions have, over the years, been placed on the insurance market on a services 
and establishment basis. The original emphasis of regulation was on the licensing of 
insurance companies, but gradually the stated intention of regulation moved to that of 
achieving the localisation of insurance business with a view to increasing the 
retention capacity of the local insurance industry as evidenced by the establishment of 
NIeON and the Nigeria Re. 
In the early 1960's the Government did not have specific policy as regards the role 
that life insurance would be expected to play in the economy. In general there was no 
clearly defined policy specific to the insurance sector of the economy. As a result the 
Government's legislative action in respect of the industry was reactive, rather than 
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planned or anticipatory. However, as successive Governments began to plan the pace 
and nature of development of the economy, the insurance sector was seen as a 
potential generator of development capital in the economy. The NIeON and Nigeria 
Re Decrees were promulgated as part of governments general policy of domesticating 
the Nigerian economy and reducing the country's reliance on foreign goods and 
capital. 
Regulation had over the period been the province of government departments in the 
Ministry of Trade and then the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The 
regulatory apparatus has been characterised by the problems of a bureaucratic 
machinery. The Insurance Department is perennially understaffed (in terms of 
professional people) and morale is low due to the poor conditions of service, among 
other factors. Additionally, and perhaps not surprisingly, the Department has 
problems with policing and ensuring compliance with regulatory measures. Apart 
from this the department is not independent, and under military administrations 
especially, it does not appear to have a significant degree of decision making power. 
It is simply a place to which insurance companies are expected to make returns on 
their activities. The actual determination of public policy with respect to insurance is 
done by the political elite who are advised by the civil service. The extent to which 
such advice is taken is debatable, but the general industry feeling is that it is 
insignificant. 
It appears that in the early years, industry views and opinions were solicited and 
incorporated in the formulation of regulatory policy. This resulted in ineffective 
legislation which at the time was in the interests of the foreign dominated insurance 
market. Over the years, with changes in the political landscape in the country, among 
other things, it appears that the interest groups in the insurance industry have not been 
able to significantly influence the nature of regulatory philosophy which has been 
determined in part by the needs and aspirations of the country as perceived by 
national development planners. Regulatory policy affecting the industry can be 
classified along two lines, insurance industry specific legislation and general 
economic policy. It is clear that in the 1970's, the regulatory philosophy of the 
Government in terms of the domestication of insurance business was driven by the 
general economic policies that have been implemented over the years. To the extent 
that recent economic policy is being dictated by external forces, there have been spill 
over effects in the insurance industry. Evidence of this can be is the recent moves to 
deregulate the economy which has resulted in government withdrawing from it's 
participation in some insurance companies. 
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The apparent inability of the insurance industry to influence regulation is also evident 
in the fact that although representations have been made to the government, through 
the Insurance Department, for the amendment of certain provisions in current laws, 
this has not been done.174 The lack of cooperation among the various insurers in the 
market in the past is also a contributory factor. 
It appears that public opinion In the form of dissatisfaction with the conduct of 
insurers has also influenced the nature of industry specific regulatory changes in the 
favour of the consumer interest. How this has been achieved is not clear. The 
activities of fraudulent and inefficient companies has, however, been extensively 
reported in the news media and it is conceivable that there are close interpersonal 
relationships between some consumer groups and the political elite. 
The interest groups do not support regulation that they consider is not beneficial to 
their interests. For example, the requirement for a competent and professionally 
qualified man to run each department in an insurance company was not well received 
because it would among other things, increase the costs of operation. Similarly the 
provisions relating to disclosure in the 1988 decree, although in the policyholders 
interest, was not acceptable to industry groups. 
However, while the intent of regulatory laws may be adduced from the contents of the 
regulatory instruments and statements made by key public officials, the only way in 
which the effectiveness or otherwise of the laws may be ascertained is by examining 
industry structure, conduct and performance over the relevant period. This issue is 
addressed in the next chapter. 
174. For example the tax laws on premium relief and discriminatory taxation between life office pension funds and 
uninsured funds. 
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Chapter 6 
Nigerian Life Insurance Industry Structure, Conduct and Performance 1960-
1988 
Introduction 
Economic theory suggests that the structural features of an industry influences the 
behaviour of finns and the prices, costs, profits and innovative activity resulting in the 
market. 1 The structure-conduct-performance hypothesis emphasises a causal 
relationship between market structure, conduct and performance. This model of 
industrial organisation provides a background against which industrial organisation 
and behaviour may be analysed. 
The traditional model postulates that the fIrms market structure affects its conduct 
which in tum affects firm performance. Market structure refers to the characteristics 
of the organisation of a market that seem to exercise a strategic influence on the 
nature of competition in the market. The salient aspects are: 
(1) The degree of seller concentration which is thought to play an important part in 
determining business behaviour and performance. Economic theory and observation 
suggest that the character, intensity and effectiveness of competition among sellers is 
significantly influenced by this factor. Thus its degree of presence or absence within 
the market could be said to be an indication of the degree of competition or otherwise 
present. A high degree of concentration is an indication of increasing levels of 
monopoly power. 
(2) Barriers to entry which include economies of scale, absolute cost advantages of 
established entrants over new ones and the degree of product differentiation among 
various sellers. The existence of significant levels of economies of scale is thought to 
support increasing levels of industry concentration which results in the considerable 
exertion of market power by larger finns. 
1. See for example, Bain 1968, Koch 1974 and Shepherd 1985. 
156 
Market conduct emphasises the behavioural patterns that firms within an industry 
adopt in response to the nature of the markets in which they sell or buy. It includes 
such features as pricing and advertising policies adopted with respect to other 
competitors within the industry. Performance is reflected in the composite of end 
results which firms in any market arrive at by pursuing whatever lines of conduct they 
have chosen and is reflected in the price-cost and profit patterns, technical efficiency 
and the rate of technological progress of the industry. 
The acceptance of the structure-conduct-performance model is not unanimous and the 
direction of causation may not be one, but two-way because conduct and performance 
may also affect market structure. For example, tactics adopted by firms such as 
predatory pricing and frequent product style changes may drive competing firms out 
of the market which may subsequently alter market structure. 
In this chapter, relevant data from the Nigerian life market are examined in an attempt 
to analyse the changes in market structure, behaviour and performance during the 
1960-1988 period. It has been established earlier that reliable data on insurance 
company operations in general for the pre-independence and indeed some of the post-
independence periods are generally non-existent. Additionally the practice of life 
insurance business did not begin until the 1960's long after the inception of non-life 
business.2 Therefore for the purposes of the analysis in this section, most of the 
company data utilised is from 1968 since it is from this period that some reliable data 
as regards life company operations are available. The data on insurance company 
operations for the years 1968-1974 were not available at the Insurance Department as 
at the time of research.3 As a result official data from sources such as The Central 
Bank of Nigeria, in respect of these years will be used. These data are reliable to the 
extent that they were originally obtained from the Insurance Department when these 
records were available at the Department. In order to obtain a complete picture, it has 
also been necessary to use, to a limited extent, data obtained from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics4 as well as from some secondary sources. Although some of the 
data are inconsistent across the various data sources, the differences are not expected 
to detract from any conclusions made in this section. 
2. See section 5.2.1. 
3. No explanation could be given for this state of affairs. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the files 
containing the relevant data had been "temporarily" misplaced. 
4. This is published by the Federal Ministry of Information. Lagos. 
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The data for the period from 1977-1988 are not subject to such limitations as they 
were available at the Insurance Department. The decision to restrict the range of 
analysis to the year 1988 is due to the non availability of the requisite data beyond 
this year. As a result of the problems with the collection of and compilation of data on 
insurance market operations, there is an unreasonable time lag before the statistics are 
published. The statistics are not published by the Insurance Department, but by the 
Research Department of the Nigeria Re who obtain the data from the Insurance 
Department. Often the data available are incomplete. While the Insurance Department 
blames the insurance companies for not submitting returns within regulatory 
requirements, the companies claim that the returns for the most part are submitted on 
time but that the agency is very slow in compiling the data.5 
Within the limitations stated above, the effects of regulation on the structure, conduct 
and performance of some aspects of life insurance operations will be considered. It 
has been established that the regulatory objectives with respect to the life market are: 
(1) policyholder protection 
(2) the strengthening of the local insurance and reinsurance market 
(3) the contribution to the economic development of the nation. 6 
In order to determine whether (or to what extent) these objectives have been attained 
specified structural and behavioural aspects of the market will be examined. In 
addition to this, some performance indicators which have a direct bearing on the 
attainment of these objectives are examined in the following sections. The analysis 
will be done in two phases. 
The first phase will cover the period from 1960-1976 (1976 being the year when the 
1976 decree, the most comprehensive piece of legislation to date which governs 
insurance market operations, was promulgated) and the second phase will cover the 
period from 1977 to 1988. The rationale for studying these two periods is to compare 
5. Mr. Eugene Okwor. the Director of Insurance has in the past. in an oblique reference to the .Nigerian. situation 
stated that ..... there is a lack of [sic] up-to-date and accurate statistics of the operatIOns of Insurance 
companies", Okwor (1982.p.22). See also Ogunshola (1973.p.59). The situation has not changed much since 
then. 
6. See discussion in chapter 5. 
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the prior market structure of the insurance market (the 1960-1976 period) with the 
existing market structure in the 1977-1988 period. A comparison of structure and 
behaviour in both time periods is expected to reveal shifts or changes in industry 
structure and/or patterns of behaviour. However, the problem lies in determining 
whether such changes have been driven by regulatory or other environmental factors. 
In an attempt to isolate the effects of regulatory change within the data constraints, 
time series and cross sectional analyses have been employed. The results of the 
analyses as well as the methodology employed are discussed in section 6.4. 
The localisation policies of the Government have been motivated by the desire to 
strengthen the local insurance market by increasing it's capacity. The performance of 
the national, foreign and indigenous companies is compared in order to determine 
whether the rationale for establishing national companies, and restricting the 
operation of foreign companies, is justified by their market performance. 
6.1 Regulation and Life Industry Structure and Behaviour 1968-1976 
6.1.1 Number and Location of Firms 
The number of registered companies underwriting insurance between 1968 and 1974 
is shown in table 6.1. These figures are inclusive of life and non-life business. 
Because of the non availability of data in the period from 1960-1968, the exact 
number of companies operating in the market at the time cannot be determined. Since 
the Insurance Act of 1961 and the Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1964 
were not enforced,7 there were many unlicensed and undercapitalised insurance 
companies operating in the market. 8 The number of insurance companies in the 
market in 1960, 1963, 1967 and 1968 have been estimated at 59, 44, 67 and 88 
respectively.9 
According to the Office of the Superintendent, none of the companies operating in the 
market in 1967 and only one of the 88 in 1968 were registered under the Insurance 
7. See sections 6.3.l and 6.3.2. 
8. See "Development of Insurance and Reinsurance in Nigeria" in 10 Years of Professional Reinsurance in Nigeria. 
at p.38, and also Agu (l986,p.3); Ogunlana (1972.p.37) Olawoyin (1976.p.M). 
9. These figures were apparently given to Ajibola Ogunshola who was then the Life Manager of NICON by th.e 
office of the Superintendent of Insurance as it was then called. See Ogunshola 1973.p.57. The 1966 estunate IS 
found in Adeyemo (1972.p.96). 
hIe 6.1 
gistered Insurance Companies in Nigeria 
69-1974 
Bz/Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Life 3 (13.6) 6 (22.3) 7 (16.3) 6 (11.3) 8 (12.3) 9 (12.8) 9 (12.8) 
Non-Life 11 (50.0) 13 (48.1) 26 (60.5) 38 (71.7) 43 (66.2) 44 (62.8) 41 (58.6) 
Composite 8 (36.4) 8 (29.6) 10 (23.2) 9 (17.0) 14 (21.5) 14 (24.4) 20 (28.6) 
Total 22(100.0) 27(100.0) 43(100.0) 53(100.0) 65(100.0) 70(100.0) 70(100.0) 
Life & Composite 11 (50.0) 14 (51.8) 17 (39.5) 15 (28.3) 22 (33.8) 23 (37.2) 29 (41.4) 
Source: (1) 1968 data Ojo & Adewumni 1982 (2) 1969-1974 Omoruyi & Demuren in CBN Economic and Financial Review 1980,p.28. 
159 
160 
Companies Act. Fifty percent of the companies for which returns were available were 
underwriting life insurance business in 1968,10 and although there was an increase in 
the number of these companies in absolute terms (11 in 1968 to 29 in 1974), the 
percentage of life companies did not increase as rapidly as those underwriting non-life 
business. In fact, the percentage decreased over the period to about 41 % in 1974. (See 
table 6.1). 
Almost all the principal offices of the registered companies were located in Lagos as 
at 1971 with a very small fraction having established headquarters outside Lagos 
(table 6.2). Lagos at this time, apart from being the capital city, was the financial and 
social centre of the country. It is expected that the insurance companies would be 
located here for ease of communications and geographical accessibility to overseas 
financial centres, among other things. This concentration in Lagos has continued to be 
the pattern 11 and it is from here that most of the total life funds are generated. 
Table 6.2 
Location of Nigerian Life Insurance Companies 
Principal Offices 1971 
Class of Bz Principal Office 
Life 
Composite 
Total 
Lagos (%) 
7 (39.0) 
9 (50.0) 
16 (89.0) 
Source: Adapted from Adeyemo 1972,p.97 
6.1.2 Ownership of Life Offices 
Other (%) 
1 (5.5) 
1 (5.5) 
2 (11.0) 
Total 
8 (44.5) 
10 (55.5) 
18(100.0) 
In 1965 and 1966, the number of exclusively foreign owned insurance companies in 
the combined life and general market was 78% and about 70% of the total population 
of offices respectively. If the number of companies with joint Nigerian/foreign 
ownership is taken into consideration, the percentages are higher, 92% in 1965 and 
10. The reason behind the inconsistency between the 1968 figure in the table and that given by the office of the 
Superintendent of insurance lies in the fact that not all the companies in the market submitted their returns to 
the Insurance Department In addition. the agency did not enforce compliance with the relevant regulatory 
requirements in this area. Aside from this most if not all of the insurance companies in the market were not 
licensed according to the provisions of the 1961 Act and as such were probably reluctant to submit returns so 
as not to draw attention to themselves. 
11. See section 6.2.1 for more recent figures. 
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90% in 1966 (see tables 6.3(a&b». At this time, most Nigerian insurance 
professionals did not have the requisite expertise to manage life offices on their own, 
and there were no legal restraints under the 1961, 1964 and 1969 (NIeON) Acts as 
regards foreign ownership of business at this time. 
The dominance of the foreign owned offices can be seen from table 6.3(b). At this 
time, about 32% of the life offices under exclusive foreign ownership controlled about 
17% of the capital and 58% of the investment funds of the industry. About 79% of the 
companies were under joint Nigerian and foreign ownership and they controlled and 
owned 85.6% and 99.5% of the capital and investable funds in the life market 
respectively. The few purely indigenous life offices (21 % of the life industry total) 
owned the least percentage of industry capital (14.4%) and investment (0.5%) funds. 
Table 6.3(a) 
Ownership Structure of Nigerian Insurance Companies 
1965 & 1966 
Company Number of Companies 
1965 1966 
Foreign 
Joint 
Indigenous 
Total 
39 
7 
4 
50 
Source: Adeyemo 1972,p.98 
Table 6.3(b) 
34 
10 
5 
49 
%Industry Share 
1965 1966 
78 
14 
8 
100.0 
70 
20 
10 
100.0 
Ownership Structure of Nigerian Life Offices 
December 1971 
Company Number % % Industry Share 
Capital Investment 
Foreign 6 (31.60) 17.4 57.9 
Major 5 (26.30) 50.9 25.2 
Minor 4 (21.05) 17.3 16.4 
Subtotal 15 (78.95) 85.6 99.5 
Indigenous 4 (21.05) 14.4 0.5 
Total 19 (100.0) 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ojo 1976,p.52 
'l'~Dle 6.4 
ership Structure of Nigerian Life Offices 
69-1976 
ass ofBz/Year 
ife 
Foreign 
Joint 
Indigenous 
Subtotal 
Composite 
Foreign 
Joint 
Indigenous 
Subtotal 
Total 
1969(%) 
4(28.6) 
1 (7.1) 
1 (7.1) 
6(42.9) 
6(42.9) 
1 (7.1) 
1 (7.1) 
8(57.1) 
14(100.0) 
1970(%) 
5(31.2) 
1 (6.3) 
1 (6.3) 
7(43.7) 
4(25.0) 
1 (6.3) 
4(25.0) 
9(56.3) 
16(100.0) 
Source: Adapted from CBN Review 1980,p29 
1971(%) 
4(26.6) 
1 (6.7) 
1 (6.7) 
6(40.0) 
4(26.6) 
1(6.7) 
4(26.6) 
9(59.9) 
4(100.0) 
1972(%) 
5(22.7) 
2 (9.1) 
1 (4.6) 
8(36.4) 
7(31.8) 
7(31.8) 
14(63.6) 
22(100.0) 
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1973(%) 
5(19.2) 
3(11.5) 
1 (3.9) 
9(34.6) 
1 (3.9) 
7(26.9) 
9(34.6) 
17(65.4) 
26(100.0) 
1974(%) 
3(10.3) 
4(13.8) 
2 (6.9) 
9(31.0) 
6(20.7) 
14(48.3) 
20(69.0) 
29(100.0) 
1975(%) 
3(11.5) 
4(15.4) 
2 (7.7) 
9(34.6) 
5(19.2) 
12 (46.2) 
17(16.4) 
26(100.0) 
1976(%) 
5(19.2) 
12(46.2) 
17(16.4) 
3(13.6) 
13(59.1) 
16(72.2) 
22(100.0) 
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The ownership structure of both life and composite companies during the period 
1969-1976 (table 6.4) shows that between 1969 and 1976 while the percentage of 
foreign offices went down from 71.5% in 1969 to 4.5% in 1976, the percentage of 
joint Nigerian and foreign offices rose from 14.2% in 1969 to 27.3% in 1976. The 
decrease in the number of foreign offices followed the enactment of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree.12 After November 1973 (when the Government 
decided to participate in the equity holdings of all viable foreign owned insurance 
companies in the country) the foreign companies began divesting themselves of their 
equity capital. By the time the 1977 Enterprises Promotion decree was promulgated, 
most foreign companies already possessed substantial indigenous capital. 
6.1.3 Size of Market 
The size of the market can be viewed from the following closely related perspectives; 
(a) The gross premium income of the life offices for the period under review (table 
6.5). 
The annual growth rate of the life market during the period 1960-1976 was about 
29%. In real terms however, the growth rate was lower (19.4%).13 The market 
appeared to be growing up till 1966, after which negative growth rates were recorded. 
The market did not really pick up again until 1971, after the end of the 1967-1970 
civil war, when an increase of about 54.4% (real terms) over 1970 premiums was 
recorded. The relative shares of the different classes of insurance business during this 
period are recorded in table 6.6. 
(b) The percentage of the total insurance market which is attributable to life 
business. 
122. See chapter four. 
13. The Consumer Price Index has been used to deflate the life premium values since the GDP deflator for the 
years 1961 through 1972 are unavailable. The real premium figures are therefore slightly on the high side. 
Table 6.5 
Gross Premium Income of Nigerian Insurance Companies 
1960-1974 (N'OOO) 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Life 
Premiums 
618 
1054 
1332 
2624 
3828 
5238 
6478 
6030 
5322 
6402 
6852 
12584 
13878 
15468 
23592 
25689 
34490 
Growth Real Life Growth Life Non-Life 
Rates % Premiums Rates % (%Total) Premiums 
(70.6) 
(26.4) 
(97.0) 
(45.5) 
(34.6) 
(26.1) 
(-6.9) 
(-11.7) 
(20.7) 
(7 • 0 ) 
(83.6) 
(10.3) 
(11.5) 
(52.5) 
( 8 . 2 ) 
(34.3) 
142.2 
170.8 
345.7 
499.1 
644.7 
741.2 
717.0 
634.0 
694.4 
653.2 
1009.1 
1140.3 
1228.6 
1578.1 
1283.2 
1386.3 
(20.1) 
(102.4) 
(44.4) 
(29.2) 
(14.9) 
(-3.2) 
(-13.1) 
(9 . 5 ) 
(-5.9) 
(54.5) 
(13.0) 
(7 .7) 
(28.4) 
(-22.9) 
( 0 . 8) 
( 8. 8) 
(12.4) 
(14.7) 
(21.6) 
(23.0) 
(29.0) 
(37.7) 
(36.6) 
(39.3) 
(42.5) 
(35.6) 
(45.5) 
(47.1) 
(33.8) 
(37.2) 
(20.8) 
(18.3) 
6438 
7416 
7738 
9506 
12780 
12598 
10700 
10458 
8212 
8652 
12384 
15060 
15585 
30334 
39749 
96803 
154170 
% 
Total 
(91.2) 
(87.6) 
(85.3) 
(78.4) 
(77.0) 
(1 . 0 ) 
(62.3) 
(63.4) 
(60.7) 
(57.5) 
(64.4) 
(54.5) 
(52.8) 
(66.2) 
(62.8) 
(79.2) 
(81.7) 
Source of premium data: 1960-1968, Annual Abstract of Statistics, Lagos, various issues 
Total 
Premiums 
7056 
8470 
9070 
12130 
16598 
17736 
17178 
16488 
13534 
15054 
19236 
27644 
29463 
45814 
63341 
123292 
188660 
(2) 1969-1974, Omoruyi and Demuren, Central Bank Financial and Economic Review 1980,pp30-31, 
(3) 1969-1971 Total Gross Premium Figures, Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
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Table 6.6 
rcentage Distribution of Various Classes of Insurance Business 
60-1976 
nk/Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
.,l 
1 M (65.6) M (62.5) M (57.9) M (48.8) M (46.1) M (43.7) M (41.3) M (40.9) 
2 F (12.6) F (12.4) L (14.3) L (17.2) L (22.5) L (29.0) L (37.5) L (35.4) 
3 0 (9. 1) L (12.0) F (13.6) o (10.3) F (19.6) F (15.0) F (10.0) F (10.9) 
4 L (8.8) o (10.1) 0 (9.3) F (4.1) 0 (7 . 6 ) 0 (8.4) 0 (7 .3) 0 (8.8) 
5 E (3 .9) E (3 . 1) E (4.9) E (3 .0) E (4.2) E (3 .9) E (3 .9) E (4.0) 
Rank/Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1 L (42 . 0) M (41.7) M (41.9) M (59.2) M (46.3) M (46.3) M (40.2) M (40.2) 
2 M (37.0) L (36.8) L (38.8) L (18.3) L (29.7) L (33.6) L (20.8) L (20.8) 
3 F (9 .4) F (8.9) F (7 .9) F (8. 8) F (9 .3) F (7 . 1 ) F (16.8) G (17.2) 
4 0 (7 .2) 0 (8. 1 ) 0 (8.1) 0 (9 . 1) 0 (9.8) 0 (9 .7) G (13.0) F (14.0) 
5 E (4.4) E (4.5) E (3 .3) E (4. 6 ) E (4. 6 ) E (3 .3) A (19.2) A (10.3) 
tlotes: (1) L, M, F and E denote life, motor, fire and employers liability and workmen's compensation 
insurance respectively, while 0 includes accident and miscellaneous insurance business. (2 ) 1960-1963 
data based on net premium income (3) 1967-1976 data based on gross premiums. 
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During this period motor insurance was the most significant class of business 
underwritten in terms of percentage share of the total insurance market. Motor vehicle 
usage was on the increase and legislative provisions required that motor vehicle 
owners and drivers possess at least third party insurance on these vehicles. 
From 1962 (with the exception of 1969) life business consistently contributed the 
second largest portion of total market premium income, although the size of the 
market appeared to be declining in comparison with the motor market. 
6.1.4 Entry into the Market 
The growth in the number of companies underwriting insurance business (life and 
non-life) during this period was very rapid. Since many unregistered companies were 
able to operate because of the lack of adequate supervision, it is virtually impossible 
to determine the number of companies in the market during this period. The 
registration requirements under the 1961 Act were relatively easy for the companies 
to comply with. There was no legislative provision for the establishment and 
maintenance of adequate free reserves and technical reserves, and no requirement for 
the companies to be managed by personnel with technical expertise. Thus there were 
very few financial and legal barriers to entry into the market. 
Concentration in the life market (calculated on the basis of earning assets of the top 5 
life offices) during the years 1969, 1972 and 1974 has been estimated at 85.5%, 
81.3% and 64.0% (Agu 1986,p.9). The sharp decrease in concentration in 1974 may 
be attributed to the effects of the Indigenisation programme implemented by the 
Government. The foreign companies had monopolised industry premiums, capital and 
assets and the restriction of their operations led to a decrease in monopoly power in 
the market. During the 1969-1976 period, there was a total of eight entrants into the 
life market, with 1971-1972 and 1973-1974 being the most active years. More 
composite offices (13) than pure life offices (4) entered the market, probably because 
the successful operation of a pure life company required the availability of personnel 
with life insurance exposure and expertise which were scarce. This idea is supported 
by the fact that out of the six companies that exited from the market between 1970-
1976, four were life and two composite. It could be said that on average, there were 2 
new entrants each year. Specifically the rate of entry into the market was 2.13 offices 
per year, while the exit rate was comparatively lower at 1.13 per year. (See tables 
6.7(a) & (b). 
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Table 6.7(a) 
Nigerian life Offices 
1969-1977 
Year Total Life Composite 
1969 14 6 8 
1970 17 7 10 
1971 15 6 9 
1972 22 8 14 
1973 23 9 14 
1974 29 9 20 
1975 26 9 17 
1976 22 6 16 
Table 6.7(b) 
Entry into the Nigerian Life Market 
1969-1976 
Year Total Entry Exit 
Entry L C L C 
1969-1970 +3 +1 +2 0 0 
1970-1971 -2 0 0 -1 -1 
1971-1972 +7 +2 +5 0 0 
1972-1973 +1 +1 0 0 0 
1973-1974 +6 0 +6 0 0 
1974-1975 -3 0 0 0 -3 
1975-1976 -4 0 0 -3 -1 
1969-1976 +8 +4 +14 -4 -5 
6.1.5 Intermediaries 
The main distributors of life insurance business (as well as general insurance) were 
agents and brokers. The agents were salaried as well as commission agents. Some 
direct business was underwritten by the companies. The behaviour of insurance 
intermediaries has been discussed earlier on. 14 
The main product sold at this time was whole life insurance although term and 
endowment insurances were gradually introduced. The most popular life assurance 
product was the with profit endowment insurance policy (Ojo 1974,pp.269-272). 
144. See section 5.2.2. 
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The first attempt by the Government to control the activities of insurance 
intermediaries, specifically brokers, was by the establishment of NICON as a broker, 
underwriter and agent. 15 Although the effect of the control measure had a greater 
impact on the non-life market, the effect was also felt in the life sector, since all 
market intermediaries were perceived as inefficient and/or fraudulent. Public 
confidence in insurance business in general and life insurance business in particular 
was at a very low level. 
From the registration pattern of life insurance brokers in Nigeria up till 1974 (the 
period for which data was available) it appears that the growth in the number of 
brokers operating in this market was quite slow, the most active period being between 
1972 and 1974. The location of their principal offices follows a pattern similar to that 
of the life offices, the majority of brokerage offices (about 76%) being located in 
Lagos as at 1974 (tables 6.8(a)&(b). 
Table 6.8(a) 
Location of Nigerian Life Insurance Brokers 
Principal Offices 1974 
Broker Principal Office Total 
Lagos Others 
Life 2(19.5) 2(90.5) 
Life & General 14(66.7) 5(23.8) 19(9.5) 
Total 16(76.2) 5(23.8) 21(100.0) 
6.1.6 Investment Behaviour 
Although data for the period 1960-1968 are generally unavailable due to lapses in the 
legal reporting requirements of the time, the position however, changed somewhat 
with the enforcement of some of the provisions of the Insurance Companies Act 1961, 
and the 1964 Provisions in the Insurance Companies Regulations in 1968. Table 6.9 
shows the pattern of investment of the life offices for the period 1969-1974. Reliable 
figures for 1975-1976 were unavailable. 
Life insurance companies in the course of their activities incur liabilities which are 
essentially long term in nature. In so doing, they generate a sizeable amount of 
premiums. Under the level premium system, the average life office receives it's 
15. See section 5.2.2.2.2. 
Table 6.8(b) 
Rtgistered Life Brokers in Nigeria 
1 55-1974 
C~ass of Bz/Year 1955 1958 
tt fe 'fe & General 1 2 
;:pot a 1 1 2 
Table 6.9 
Nigerian Life Office Assets 
1969-1974 (N'million) 
Assets 
Government Securities 
Stocks, Shares, Bonds 
Mortgages & Loans 
Cash & Bills 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Source: CBN Review 1980,p.3 
1969 (%) 
4.0(20.2) 
2.5(12.4) 
4.7(23.8) 
8.1(40.5) 
0.6 (3.1) 
19(100.0) 
1960 1962 
3 4 
3 4 
1970 (%) 
4.5(18.7) 
4.1(17.2) 
5.7(23.7) 
8.8(36.6) 
0.9 (3.8) 
24(100.0) 
1964 1966 
1 1 
6 8 
7 9 
1971 ( %) 
7.8 (26.5) 
3.0 (10.0) 
5 . 0 (16.8) 
12.4 (42.0) 
1.4 (4.7) 
29.7(100.0) 
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1968 1970 1972 1974 
1 1 1 2 
11 12 14 19 
12 13 15 21 
1972 (%) 1973 (%) 1974 (%) 
8.0 (25.4) 15.3 (26.9) 15.4 (25.1) 
5.1 (16.2) 7.0 (12.3) 8.0 (11.1) 
5.4 (17.2) 9.5 (16.7) 15.6 (21.7) 
9.6 (30.5) 19.4 (43.1) 30.0 (36.0) 
3.4 (10.7) 5.7 (10.7) 6.9 (9.7) 
31.4(100.0) 56.9(100.0) 71.9(100.0) 
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premiums fairly regularly throughout the working year. Premium rates are calculated 
with the assistance of mortality tables,16 the premium payable to the life office by a 
particular life assured remaining at a level amount with the passage of time, despite 
the increasing death risk involved as the life assured matures physically. This ensures 
that only a portion of the premiums received by the office are expended in claims 
costs, a reserve fund being created from the remaining portion of premiums, which 
are available for capital market investment. Since the liabilities of life offices are 
mainly long tenn in nature, life offices are interested in minimizing purchasing power 
risk, and since higher yields on invested funds can be achieved by investing in long 
tenn securities, one would expect that the greater proportion of life office funds to be 
invested in these kinds of assets. 
Nigerian life offices did not, during the 1969-1974 period review keep fully invested 
in long tenn assets. They invested on average, 37% of their funds in cash and other 
liquid assets, 23% in government securities, and 13% in stocks, shares and bonds. 
Comparing this with the situation in the U.K, only 1 % of total life funds were held in 
cash and short term assets in 1963 and 1969, while in the U.S.A, as at the end of 
1970, if a policyholder had held the equivalent of a $1000 share in all life companies' 
assets he would have the following portfolio: $427 in corporate securities consisting 
of corporate bonds and stocks; $359 in mortgages; $78 in policyholders loans, $53 in 
government securities, ... ,$44 in miscellaneous assets, $30 in real estate, and $9 (0.9%) 
in cash. I7 
The behaviour of the Nigerian life offices has been explained to a certain extent by 
the nature of the legislation affecting their investment policies and practices. 18 The 
available data appears to indicate that the life offices did not strictly comply with all 
of these provisions. Although from 1971 to 1973, the companies complied with the 
provisions of the law as to a minimum investment of 25% in government securities, in 
1969, 1970, and 1974, this was not the case (table 6.9) The figures also indicate that 
for the three years 1969 through 1971 the percentage invested in real estate was 
significantly lower than the 10% ceiling stipulated by law. The offices reduced or 
increased their percentage investment in the various assets according to the 
underlying yields and it appeared that they were trying to invest in the most profitable 
assets available to them in the capital market. During this period, the yields on 
16. Life assurance rate calculations also involve estimates of future interest rates, expenses and lapse ratios. 
17. Life Insurance Fact Book 1971. 
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government securities were not high and holding assets in mortgage loans and cash 
appeared to yield higher returns than the other available capital market instruments 
(see appendix A tables AI-A3). The investment income of all the companies in the 
market during the period 1960-1973 is displayed in table 6.10(b). The foreign and 
joint Nigerian/foreign owned offices in life market consistently performed better than 
the indigenous offices. Although the number of wholly owned foreign companies had 
gone down to three in 1974, these three contributed about 20% of total life office 
investments income, while the 16 indigenous companies contributed 24% of the total 
(table 6.10(b)). 
Table 6.10(a) 
Nigerian Insurance Companies Net Investment Income 
1960-1973 (N'Million) 
Year Total Life % Non-Life % 
1960 88 4 (4.6) 84 (94.5) 
1961 128 10 (7 .8) 118 (92.2) 
1962 88 20 (22.7) 68 (77.2) 
1963 256 180 (70.3) 76 (29.7) 
1964 334 276 (82 .6) 58 (17.4) 
1965 676 386 (57.1) 290 (42.9) 
1966 918 532 (57.9) 386 (42.0) 
1967 1022 660 (64.6) 362 (35.4) 
1968 844 720 (85.3) 124 (14.7) 
1969 1030 902 (87.6) 128 (12.4) 
1970 1446 1208 (83 .5) 238 (16.5) 
1971 1692 1404 (83.0) 288 (17.0) 
1972 1914 1492 (77.9) 422 (22.1) 
1973 2786 2389 (85.8) 397 (14.2) 
Source: Life and Non-life investment income data from Nwankwo 
1980,p118. 
6.2 Regulation and Life Industry Structure and Behaviour 1977-1988 
6.2.1 Location of Principal Offices 
During this period there was a redistribution of principal offices, with slightly more 
offices located outside Lagos. This trend was probably a reflection of the increasing 
economic, and infrastructural developments in the country. Compared with 1971 
figures, 29% more principal offices were situated outside Lagos (table 6.11). 
18. Section 5(2). For analyses of the investment pattern of Nigerian insurers see, for example, Ogunshola 1976; 
Akintola-Bello 1983 and Okwor 1986 among others. 
Ie 6.10(b) 
~G6~ tribution of Life Offices Investment Income by Ownership 
~00cc 9-1974 
pany 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%) No (%) 
erlan 2 (14.3) 6 (9 . 6 ) 5 ( 6 . 5 ) 8 (2 .9) 10 (4.2) 16 (24.4) 
nt 2 (14.3) 2 (10.1) 2 (13.0) 9 (57.6) 10 (55.0) 10 (55.2) 
'elgn 10 (71.4) 9 (84.3) 8 (80.5) 5 (39.5) 6 (48.5) 3 (20.3) 
Total 14(100.0) 17(100.0) 15(100.0) 22 (100.0) 26(100.0) 29(100.0) 
Source: As in Table 6.9 
Table 6.11 
Location of Nigerian Life Insurance Companies Principal Offices 
1980-1987 
Class of Bz 1980 1982 1987 
Lagos Other Total Lagos Other Total Lagos Other Total 
Life 3 (13.6) 3 (13. 6) 3 (11.5) 3 (11.5) 2 ( 6. 7 ) 1 (3 . 3 ) 3 (10.0) 
Composite 13 (59.1) 6 (27.3) 19 (86.4) 15 (57.7) 8 (30.8) 23 (88.5) 16 (53.3) 11 (36.7) 27 (90.0) 
Total 16 (72.7) 6 (27.3) 22(100.0) 18 (69.2) 8 (30.8) 26(100.0) 18 (60.0) 12 (40.0) 30(100.0) 
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In 1982 these offices were mainly located in state capitals in the western and eastern 
parts of the country, and in 1985, two companies were headquartered in the north, 
specifically in Kaduna, a city that was becoming a conunercial centre (table 6.12). 
However, up till 1988. only one of the top ten companies (The Universal Insurance 
Co.) was principally located outside Lagos. 
Table 6.12 
Life Company Principal Offices Located Outside Lagos 
1982-1987 
Company Location Ranking by Market Share 
1982 1985 1987 
Trans Nig Ibadan 17 23 
Worldwide Ibadan 26 26 
Palm Beach Enugu 21 23 28 
Universal Enugu 10 10 9 
Bendel Benin 7 12 11 
Rivbank Port-Harcourt 17 11 14 
Gateway Ilorin 16 19 20 
Manilla Calabar 13 16 
Towergate Abeokuta 29 
Foundation Owerri 
Leadway Kaduna 19 
First Nig Kaduna 27 
Confidence Akure 21 
Hallmark Owerri 
6.2.2 Number and Size Distribution of Life Offices 
Following the pattern in the previous period, the number of pure life offices in the 
market decreased between 1977-1987. There was a slight increase in the number of 
composites, from 17 in 1975 to 26 in 1986 (table 6.13). The size distribution of the 
life offices between 1980 and 1987 appears to indicate the increasing dominance of 
larger size life offices (that is, offices with premium incomes in excess of NI0 
million) operating in the market with an increase in the number of smaller firms 
operating on the fringe of the market (table 6.14). 
There was a slight decrease in market share of about 2% between 1985-1987. Small 
size firms have been defined as those offices with life premiums less than NI0 
million. The data indicates a slight increase in the number of "small" life offices 
between 1980 and 1987 (an increase of three offices). 
Table 6.13 
Registered Insurance Companies in Nigeria 
1975-1987 
Class of Bz/Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
fe 9 6 6 6 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 
n-Life 43 37 38 42 55 55 63 63 65 67 69 78 
mposite 17 16 15 15 21 21 23 24 25 25 26 30 
tal 69 59 59 63 80 88 90 94 96 93 96 111 
ife & Composite 26 22 21 21 25 25 26 27 29 29 30 33 
eturns n/a n/a n/a 20 20 21 23 27 26 27 28 31 
Table 6.14 
Size Distribution of Nigerian Life Offices 
1980-1987 (N'Million) 
Size 1980 1982 1985 1987 
No Value MIS No. Value MIS No. Value MIS No. Value MIS 
Below 1 7 1.8 1.9 8 2.2 1.8 12 4.8 2.9 13 7.0 3.5 
1-4.99 6 14.2 14.8 7 15.8 12.9 17 18.8 11.2 8 17.6 7.8 
5-9.99 6 41.4 43.2 3 19.8 16.1 2 13.0 7.7 1 5.2 2.6 
10-14.99 2 21.6 22.5 5 61.7 50.3 1 11.0 6.6 2 24.0 2.0 
15-19.99 1 16.9 17.6 3 48.4 29.0 3 51.8 25.8 
20 & over 1 23.1 18.9 2 71.3 42.6 3 96.9 48.3 
Total 22 95.9 100.0 24 122.7 100.0 27 167.3 100.0 30 202.5 100.0 
Below HI0 19 57.4 59.9 18 37.8 30.8 31 36.6 21.8 22 29.8 13.9 
Above HI0 3 38.5 40.1 6 84.8 69.2 6 130.7 78.2 8 172.7 76.1 
ASF 4.33 3.86 1.8 2.25 
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Their combined market shares did not increase in a corresponding manner, but 
actually fell from about 60% to 14% in the same period. Asset values also fell from 
about N57 million to N38 million, that is by around 33%. Conversely, for the larger 
sized finns, the total number of offices rose from three to eight in the same period, 
while market shares increased considerably by almost 100%, from about 40% (1980) 
to 76% (1987). Total industry assets owned by this category of life offices also 
increased considerably from N38.5 million in 1980 to N172.7 in 1987, an increase of 
over 300%. The trend appears to be towards an increasing degree of market power in 
the life industry, finns with life premiums in excess of N10 million having a 
monopoly of life industry premium income and assets. 
6.2.3 Ownership Structure and Size of Firm 
During this period the number of national (that is companies with government equity) 
increased. The joint Nigerian/foreign venture companies constituted about one third 
of the market. None of the indigenous companies was among the top ten offices in the 
market while on average in 1982, 1985 and 1987, the national companies underwrote 
a third of life premiums. For the three years, joint venture insurers wrote over half the 
total premiums, with the government/foreign companies having the greatest market 
shares (table 6.15). During this period, two large offices with joint foreign and 
government ownership (the British American Ins. Co. and The Crusader Ins. Co.) 
obtained indigenous equity participation in their companies. Further analysis of 
ownership structures among the other offices not included in the top ten list reveals 
that most of them were indigenous companies while a smaller percentage were owned 
by the federal and state governments. The dominance of foreign companies in the 
1960-1976 period had been replaced by the dominance of national and joint venture 
companies. 
The average size of firm (measured by gross premiums) fell from N4.33 million in 
1980 to N2.25 million in 1987. The sharpest drop was in 1985, where the average size 
fell to N1.8million19. A rough estimate of the optimum size of firm (the size of firm 
that contributes increasing amounts of premium income over the years) appears to be 
19. The median has been used as the measure of the average size of firm because of the skewness of the 
distribution. It is given as: 
L+jw/f, where 
L = Lower true limit of the class in which the median is located, 
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N15 million and above. This implies that majority of the life offices operating in the 
market are not doing so at optimum efficiency, with the offices operating "optimally" 
contributing about 17% of the total market premium in 1980, 19% (1982), and over 
70% in 1985 and 1987. 
Table 6.15 
OWnership Structure of Top Ten Life Offices in Nigeria 
1982-1987 
OWnership 1982 
Number MIS 
Ind 
Nat 5 31.0 
Nat/For 3 40.5 
Nat/lnd 
For/lnd 16.8 
For/Nat/lnd 2 
Total 10 88.3 
Table 6.16(a) 
1985 
Number MIS 
4 33.2 
2 24.9 
2 14.9 
2 18.6 
10 91.6 
1987 
Number MIS 
4 34.5 
3 33.9 
2 14.3 
1 7.7 
10 90.4 
Nigerian Life Office Concentration Ratios by GPI 
1978-1988 
CR 1 3 5 10 
1978 17.6 48.9 66.0 90.9 
1980 17.6 40.1 58.2 87.8 
1981 18.2 40.9 61.2 92.7 
1982 18.8 41.2 60.9 88.3 
1983 29.5 52.1 70.8 90.7 
1985 17.9 45.1 67.6 90.2 
1986 30.2 52.9 70.6 93.4 
1987 22.8 47.9 65.8 90.3 
1988 18.1 44.1 64.4 89.9 
j = is the number of values still needed to reach the median after the lower limit of the class containing the median 
has been reached 
f = the frequency of the class interval containing the median and 
w = the width of the class interval. 
177 
6.2.4 Concentration 
Concentration gives an indication of the degree of market power present in an 
industry. Decreasing levels of concentration in the life assurance market could be an 
indication of market growth, that is, an expanding life industry20 and an 
intensification of competition. 
Figure 6A 
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Table 6.16(b) 
] 
1988 
Nigerian Life Office Concentration Ratios by Total Assets 
1982-1987 
CR 1 3 4 5 10 
1982 21.7 44.3 51.4 57.1 79.8 
1985 41.8 57.4 63.7 68.1 83.6 
1987 49.7 58.5 63.8 67.5 80.0 
20. See Cummins et Al 1972. 
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Concentration has been measured as the percentage of total life industry premiums 
which is contributed by the largest fInns. For the period 1980 to 1985, the insurance 
market in general and life market in particular was highly concentrated. It appears 
from 1987 fIgures that there is a decrease in concentration over the previous years, but 
future data will have to be examined to see whether this trend will continue. 
Table 6.16(c) 
Nigerian Insurance Market Concentration Ratios 
1984-1987 
CR 1 3 4 5 10 
1984 20.5 35.6 40.9 45.4 59.7 
1985 22.2 40.3 46.1 50.9 65.3 
1986 24.5 41.0 46.2 51.6 78.6 
1987 37.3 50.7 55.1 59.0 71.0 
Note: CR denotes concentration ratio 
Table 6.17(a) 
Entry into the Nigerian Life Market 
1980-1988 
Year Total Entry Exit 
Entry L C L C 
1980-1982 +1 0 +2 -1 0 
1982-1985 +4 +1 +4 -1 0 
1985-1988 +4 0 +5 -1 0 
1980-1988 +9 +1 +11 -3 0 
6.2.5 Turnover/Entry 
Turnover, that is, a change in the size ranking of the larger firms in a given market 
(Koch 1974,p.166) is said to be an indicator of dynamic competition. The rapidity of 
turnover is indicative of a competitive struggle for position (Scherer 1980,pp.73-74), 
while a decreasing turnover rate would result from the development of more effective 
bars to entry or "Trustified Capitalism" (Schumpeter 1939,p.149). 
Although the concentration ratios indicate the exercise of some monopoly power by 
the largest life offices, there is evidence of a competitive struggle for market shares 
among them. If 1980 is taken as the base year, it can be seen from table 6. 17 (b) that 
the market share ranking of these life offices has, with the exception of 1981, been 
changing. 
*
ble 6.17(b) 
mover Among the Top Ten Nigerian Life Offices 
1 80-1987 
1 
dbmpany/Year 1978 
MIS (R) 
Great Nigeria 16.5 (2) 
Brit/American 17.6 (1) 
Crusader 9.7 (4) 
American Int 14.8 (3) 
African Alliance 7.6 (6) 
NICON 7.4 (5) 
Niger 3.9 (9) 
Nigerian General 2.0(11) 
Royal Exchange 6.8 (7) 
United Nig. Life 4.5 (8) 
Universal 1.1(14) 
Bendel 2.1(10) 
1980 
MIS (R) 
17.6(1) 
12.0(2) 
10.5(3) 
9.6(4) 
8.5(5) 
7.1(6) 
6.7(7) 
5.9(8) 
5.4(9) 
4.5(10) 
3.0(11) 
2.6(12) 
* Life premium figures unavailable 
1981 1982 
MIS (R) MIS (R) 
18.2 ( 1 ) 18.8 (1) 
11.4 (2) 10.6 (4) 
11.3 ( 3 ) 9.1 (5) 
10.5 (4) 11.3 (2 ) 
9.2 ( 6 ) 11.1 (3) 
9.8 (5) 8.2 ( 6 ) 
8.3 (7 ) 4.2 (9) 
0.9(12) 1.3(15) 
6.4 (8) 5.7 (8) 
3.9 (9) 2.9(11) 
3.7(10) 3.1(10) 
1.7(11) 6.2 (7 ) 
1983 
MIS (R) 
12.6 (2) 
9.2 (5) 
9.5 (4) 
29.5 (1) 
10.0 (3) 
6.6 (6) 
2.9 (9) 
0.4(13) 
4.6 (7) 
3.1 (8) 
2.7(10) 
1.3(12) 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 
MIS (R) MIS (R) MIS (R) M/S(R) 
15.1 (2) 13.1 (2) 14.3 (2 ) 14.9 (2) 
11.1 (5) 8.8 (5) 8.7 (5) 9.9 (5) 
11.4 (4) 8.6 (6) 7.7 (6) 8.3 (7 ) 
17.9 (1) 30.2 (1) 22.8 (1) 18.1 (1) 
12.1 (3) 9.6 (3) 9.2 (4) 10.4 (4) 
6.5 (6) 8.9 (4) 10.8 (3) 11.1 (3) 
3.6 (9) 5.1 (8) 6.8 (7) 8.3 ( 6 ) 
1.4(12) 1.3 (11) 1.0(13) 1.1(11) 
5.5 (7) 5.0 (7) 5.0 (8) 4.8 (8) 
3.7 (8) n/a* 2.4(10) 2.5 (9) 
3.3(10) 2.8 (9) 2.6 (9) n/a* 
1.6(11) 1.3 (10) 1.4(11) 1.6(10) 
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Table 6.17(c) 
Entrants into the Nigerian Life Market 
1980-1988 
Life Office 1988 Premium Type Ownership 
Worldwide N377,807 C Nat 
Hallmark n/a C rnd 
First Nigeria N731,969 L rnd 
Towergate N122,650 C Nat/rnd 
Amicable N626,320 C rnd 
Foundation n/a C rnd 
Nigeria French n/a C For/rnd 
Confidence n/a C Nat 
British American* N20,891,694 C For/Nat 
African Prudential* N471,460 C rnd 
Leadway* N2,055,326 C rnd 
Notes: (1) Nat, Ind and For denote National, Indigenous and Foreign 
ownership respectively (2) * denotes cross entrant (3) n/a, premium 
data for 1988 unavailable. 
Monopoly power cannot exist In the long run except where it is supported and 
protected by barriers to entry.21 Between 1980 and 1988, 12 life companies (11 
composite and one specialist) entered into the market while three life companies 
exited from the market. Total entry during the period was one company a year while 
the exit rate was 0.33 (table 6. 17(a)). Three of the new entrants (the British American, 
Leadway and the African Prudential, specialist life companies) were cross entrants22 
into the market. None of the new entrants (excluding one cross entrant, the British 
American) was ranked among the top ten companies in the market, and only one 
specialist company, First Nigeria, commenced business (table 6.17(c)). 
It appears, so far, that different types of entrant will suffer different degrees of 
disadvantage, with entrants from closely related markets being less disadvantaged 
than those from other markets. 23 The rates of entry/exit as well as the low level of 
turnover experienced during the period seem to suggest the existence of significant 
entry barriers. 
21. A barrier to entry may be any advantage held by existing firms over those firms that might potentially produce 
in a given market (Bain 1965). Entry is defined as the production of new output in a given market which may 
emanate from an already existing or new firm. Stigler however argues that the act of entry itself consists only 
of the entry of new finns previously not in the market. 
22. A cross entrant is a firm already involved in underwriting insurance at the date of entry. whether directly 
underwriting classes of business other than life insurance business. or established as a subsidiary of a group of 
companies already established in the insurance market (Franklin and Woodhead 1980). 
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The low entry rates and high concentration levels suggest that (1) entry into the 
market is difficult, probably because of result of the technological barriers in the form 
of the expertise required in this market and (2) the industry is oligopolistic, with the 
largest finns having the monopoly of industry premiums and assets. However, there is 
evidence of some competition among the larger offices. The slight decrease in 1987 
concentration levels may be indicative of a future tendency towards increasing 
competition in the industry, but no definite conclusions can be drawn. 
6.2.6 Growth 
Since 1982, the growth of real life premiums has been declining, although it has 
remained the most significant contributor to total market premiums since 1983 (tables 
6.18, 6.19 & figure 6B). However, the emergence of life insurance as a significant 
contributor to total market premiums is not necessarily because of an increase in life 
assurance consumption, but as a result of decreases in the volume of motor premiums 
in the non-life market. Motor vehicle insurance has traditionally been a very 
important sector of insurance business in Nigeria. In fact, the first legislative 
instruments governing insurance business in the country were the motor vehicle 
ordinances. During the oil boom era the growth of this market was aided by the large 
scale importation of motor vehicles and the generous car loans and allowances paid to 
workers. The subsequent decline in motor premium income has been attributed to 
various factors such as the drastic cutback in the domestic assembly and production of 
motor vehicles, the withdrawal of car loans and allowances to workers in the period 
1978-1979, and the inability of many insureds, who unable to pay high premiums for 
comprehensive cover, have changed to 3rd party cover, thus lowering the total motor 
premiums to the market. 24 Although the average growth rate of the life market during 
this period was 17%, in real terms this amounted to 3.4% in real terms, a considerable 
decline over the previous period. 
23. See Franklin and Woodhead 1980, chapter three for a detailed discussion. 
24. The Nigerian Insurance Yearbook 1987,pp.165-166. 
Table 6.18 
Percentage Distribution of Various Classes of Insurance Business 
1977-1987 
Rank/Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
1 M (35.7) M (30.6) M (28.8) M (24.0) G (25.0) M (24.2) 
2 A (22.1) A (22.1) G (19.4) G (19.4) M (23.6) G (22.0) 
3 G (17.9) G (17.9) L (18.7) L (21.0) L (21.2) L (20.1) 
4 L (17.6) L (17.6) A (18.0) A (18.6) A (17.9) A (19.2) 
5 F (11.8) F (11.8) F (15.1) F (12.9) F (14.5) F (14.5) 
Rank/Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
1 L (24.4) L (25.9) L (27.3) L (26.8) A (28.8) 
2 M (23.5) G (22.4) G (20.8) F (20.3) L (20.6) 
3 G (23.1) M (22.2) M (20.5) A (18.0) F (20.2) 
4 F (16.5) F (17.6) F (17.3) M (17.9) M (15.4) 
5 A (12.5) A (11.9) A (12.1) A (17.0) G (15.0) 
Notes: (1) L, M, F, G and A denote life, motor, fire, general and marine and 
aviation business respectively (2) Figures based on gross premium income. 
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Table 6.19 
Nigerian Life Office Gross Premium Income 
1976-1988(N'OOO) 
Year Life Premium Growth (%) 
Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1985=100 
1976 34490 1386 
1977 50899 1797 47.6 29.6 
1978 65250 1892 28.2 5.3 
1979 69102 1794 5.9 -5.2 
1980 95886 2264 38.8 26.1 
1981 121869 2382 27.1 5.2 
1982 122768 2228 0.7 -6.5 
1983 145023 2136 18.1 -4.1 
1984 157871 1666 8.9 -22.0 
1985 167297 1672 5.9 0.4 
1986 191262 1816 14.3 8.6 
1987 202640 1745 5.9 -3.9 
1988 207877 1295 2.6 -25.8 
\ 
1988 
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6.2.7 Investment Behaviour 
The investment pattern of the life offices remained, on the whole, the same as in the 
post-colonial period. The highest proportion of investment funds remained in 
government securities, and during this period, the minimum investment has been 
about 20% , with an average of about 24%. The life offices, according to the available 
data have not kept fully invested in the government securities as required by law for 
the 1979-1983 and 1985 period. They have however been increasing their total 
investment in corporate securities (and policy and other loans to a lesser extent) while 
decreasing, on average, their investment in real estate, and mortgage loans. As with 
the 1960's, an inordinately high proportion of funds has been kept in cash and other 
short term assets. 
A comparison of the yield rates on the various financial instruments explains the life 
offices investment pattern. The most profitable instruments are corporate securities, 
the yields on government stock and interest rates on bank deposits being 
comparatively lower. The returns on government financial instruments and bank 
deposits in this period did not keep up with the inflation rates in the country (appendix 
A table A4). 
6.2.8 Life Insurance Intermediaries 
During this period, the distribution method for life assurance products remained the 
same as in the earlier period. Life insurance products were marketed by life (full-time 
and part-time) insurance agents, as well as insurance brokers.25 The number of 
registered brokers in the market at this time increased significantly over the 1974 
figure. About 90% were wholly owned by Nigerians, the percentage of joint 
indigenous/foreign business having deceased over the period from 19.6% (1978) to 
11 % (1987) (table 6.20). As far as the public perception of their services was 
concerned, there appeared to be no improvement in this area. The agents and brokers 
were still failing to remit premiums collected from policyholders to the insurance 
companies,26 and it appeared that the Insurance Department was unable to discipline 
erring intermediaries. The insurers alleged that the intermediaries were investing the 
outstanding premiums in short term bonds in order to earn some money on the funds 
25. The Nigerian Insurance Year Book 1979. pp.l87-189. 
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before remitting them to the insurance companies at their convenience. In January 
1987, the Director of Insurance issued a circular which stated measures the 
Department was taking to control the situation. Brokers and agents licenses would not 
be renewed unless they presented evidence of the payment of all outstanding 
premiums to the insurance companies. 27 
Table 6.20 
Registered Life Brokers . Nigeria l.D 
1976-1987 
Type/Year 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 
Life 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 Life&General 30 44 52 67 78 94 99 
Total 32 46 54 70 81 97 101 
Compiled from data in various issues of the Nigeria Insurance 
Yearbook 
However, the companies were being subjected to a subtle form of blackmail. Some 
insurers were reluctant to report erring brokers to the Insurance Department as the 
broker would blacklist the company in future,28 and the company might not recover 
it's outstanding premiums. In addition to this some intermediaries were demanding 
what they referred to as "acquisition costs", which was in effect an inducement given 
to brokers to encourage them to place business with the insurer. 29 Since the life 
market was competitive, companies had no option but to pay up. 
The problem of supervision also extended to the insurers. Despite the strict licensing 
requirements in the 1976 Decree, some unlicensed companies still managed to operate 
in various parts of the country.30 In addition to this insurers were not submitting 
adequate returns to the Insurance Department and the Central Bank as required by 
law.31 The public perception of insurers did not improve in this period. Poor after 
26. The Director of Insurance remarked on this unhealthy practice in an address he gave at a forum arranged by the 
Nigerian Corporation of Insurance Brokers on "The Broker and the Insurance Industry" (WAICA Journal 
1987, Vol.XI p.153). Discussions with industry executives confirmed the Directors comments. 
27. Ibid, p.153 and also The Business Concord, Tuesday September 23 1987,p.16. 
28. One small sized insurer in the market stated that they had to put up with the brokers behaviour because they 
could not afford to be "too choosy" since they needed all the business they could get (The Business Concord. 
Ibid). An executive in one of the large national companies interviewed between May-July 1991 confirmed that 
the company had to put up with a lot of unethical behaviour from the intermediaries for the same reasons. 
29. Ibid,p.153. 
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sales servIce, which in many cases resulted in disputes over insurers liability to 
policyholders contributed to the consumers dissatisfaction with the insurers. 32 
6.2.9 Life Insurance Products/Prices 
During this period, group life insurance dominated the sales portfolios of life 
insurance companies, and the amount of industrial life insurance underwritten was 
insignificant. Endowment insurance policies in ordinary life accounted for 76% of the 
number and 79% of the value of ordinary life insurance in force in 1987. Between 
1979 and 1987 the average proportions of the various kinds of business underwritten 
were as follows: group life: 73.3%, endowment 23.0%, term 3.4% and whole life 
insurance 0.3%. There was a predominance of participating policies and most of the 
without profit policies were mortgage protection and other temporary assurances. 
The level of life insurance consumption was still quite low. Although the number of 
individual life policies increased from 96,082 in 1979 to 222,592 in 1987, in terms of 
the value of policies there was a decrease of almost 200% over 1979 values. The 
value of group life insurances in force however, increased by about 200% between 
1979 and 1987.33 
During this period there was very little innovative activity in the industry. 34 The basic 
products offered in the individual life market were the whole life, endowment and 
term insurances. Research and development activities were practically non-existent in 
the companies.35 Although one of the functions of the Nigeria Reinsurance 
Corporation was to conduct research into the industry, the available evidence 
suggested that it was not initiating any serious projects. The main study it had 
undertaken during the period was an outdated manpower development study of the 
30. The Business Concord. Friday October 23 1987.p.1. 
31. The Deputy Governor of the Central bank of Nigeria commented upon this in The Bullion. Vo\.15 (2) 
April/June 1991, pA. 
32. The Minister of Finance and Economic Development Dr. Chu Okongwu commented on the industry's" ... poor 
image ... " at a symposium organised by the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation in Lagos (The Guardian. Tuesday 
January 26. 1988.p14). See also. The Democrat. Thursday August 11, 1988.plO). 
33. Figures have been obtained from The Nigeria Insurance Digest 1989. pp.59-64. 
34. This lack of innovative activity was also the subject of the Minister of Finance and Economic Development's 
comments (The Guardian. ibid). 
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industry which was basically a headcount of the employees in the insurance sector. 
Very little attention had been paid to the life market despite the fact that the 
consumption of insurance services in this sector was very low. 36 
In the mid 1980's however, in an effort to increase the consumption of individual 
insurances, some of the bigger life companies (for example, the American 
International Ins. Co., Great Nigeria and Crusader) began to offer new37 life insurance 
products such as the Multi-Plan, Tree Payment or Optional Endowment policy. 38 
Additionally, some of these companies also began to market unit or investment linked 
policies. The banking sector appeared to take advantage of the lack of innovative 
activity in the life market to introduce schemes which provided certain types of "free" 
insurance cover for their customers who held certain kinds of bank accounts. 
Although the banks marketed the schemes,39 various insurance companies underwrote 
them. The incursion of the banks into this area was in general not received kindly by 
the insurers.40 
Insurance rates in the life market were believed to be high.41 The insurers defended 
these rates on the basis that they take into consideration the expected mortality 
experience as well as expenses and future interest rates. Thus, increasing inflation in 
the economy, the variability of the company income tax chargeable as well as the 
Government's policy of discriminatory taxation of insurers pension funds42 are factors 
upon which life insurers base their justification for these rates. Additionally, although 
life rates are not directly regulated by the Insurance Department, in accordance with 
regulatory rules, all proposed new policies had to be submitted to the Director of 
35. The Business Times, Monday July 23 1990,p.1O. 
36. This conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of infonnation obtained from the Research and Development 
Department of the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation in June 1991. 
37. These products were new to the Nigerian life market. 
38. The policy offers partial maturity payments based on a percentage of the sum assured to the policyholder at 
agreed intervals during the duration of the policy. The rates of return on such policies are supposed to be high 
and the policyholder has the option of reinvesting the partial maturity proceeds. 
39. The Universal Trust Bank (UTB) and the United Bank of Africa (UBA), two of the largest banks in the 
banking sector market these policies. 
40. See the Business Concord, Tuesday June 5 1990. 
41. This information was obtained from life insurers in the market and not. as would be supposed. life insurance 
consumers. 
42. See section 5.2211. 
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Insurance for approval before they were placed on the market. The approval process 
took months, sometimes years, by which time market conditions in the volatile 
Nigerian economy could have changed to such an extent as to render the original rates 
uneconomical. There were no official guide-lines for the rate approval process and the 
rates proposed by the insurers were simply rubber-stamped by the Director of 
Insurance.43 Some insurers were of the opinion that the unnecessary delay in the 
approval of new policy fonns and rates has contributed to the lack of new product 
development in the industry. 
6.3 The Economic Significance of the Nigerian Life Market 
The governments regulatory objectives have, among other things, been focused on 
increasing the social and economic significance of the Nigerian life insurance market. 
A measure of the social significance of the market is the increased consumption of 
life insurance services. 
Table 6.21 
Nigerian Life Premium Income as a Percentage 
of Personal Disposable Income 1975-1985 
Year Premiums PDI LPI/PDI% PS/PDI% 
1975/76 25689 18284 0.14 26.20 
1976/77 34490 23266 0.15 31.40 
1977/78 50899 26197 0.19 31.05 
1978/79 65250 29404 0.22 17.23 
1979/80 69102 36419 0.19 28.81 
1980 95886 43199 0.22 26.63 
1981 121869 44874 0.27 17.93 
1982 122768 45398 0.27 14.56 
1983 145023 48170 0.30 14.37 
1984 157871 52817 0.29 16.29 
1985 167297 58760 0.29 15.34 
Source: Compiled from the following, (1) Life Premium figures in 
N'OOO from Nigeria Insurance Yearbook 1987, (2) PDI and savings 
figures in N'million, Annual Abstract of Statistics, Lagos various 
issues 
Findings in various studies44 have established that the demand for life insurance 
increases more than proportionately with increases in income. A comparison of the 
growth trends in Personal Disposable Income (PDI) with the growth in life premiums 
43. This state of affairs is not surprising since there are no professionally qualified actuaries in the Insurance 
Department to examine the adequacy or otherwise of the proposed rates. 
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for the 1975-1985 period reveals that there has been a marginal increase of life 
premiums with increases in POI (table 6.21). The highest growth in demand for life 
insurance was recorded in the period between 1980 and 1981, during the oil boom 
era, when the country was experiencing a period of economic prosperity. Correlation 
of the two shows that growth in life premiums and personal disposable income are 
almost perfectly positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.98. Life 
premiums however, represented an insignificant proportion of institutional saving. 
Personal income and savings data beyond 1985 were unavailable at the time of the 
study. The contributions of the life market to GOP measures it's economic 
significance. This has been marginal, and significantly lower than non-life market 
contributions. The figure for the life market rose sharply between 1977-1979, and 
declined just as sharply between 1979 and 1980 (figure 6C). Since 1984, life 
contributions, like non-life figures, have been on the decrease. 
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Although the demand for life insurance services (growth in total life premiums) was 
positively correlated with the growth in the economy (growth in GOP), the 
relationship was weak with a correlation coefficient of 0.33.45 Post 1986 data were 
44. See for example. Carter 1972. Diacon 1980 and Franklin and Woodhead 1988. 
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unavailable at the time of the study. A comparison with the figures for the U.K and 
U.S.A markets reveals that comparatively speaking, the Nigerian figures are quite low 
(table 6.22). The contribution of life premiums to GOP in developing countries is 
generally low. Data for 1984 data indicate that out of 67 countries surveyed, only 
eight had life premiums/GOP figures greater than 1 %.46 
Table 6.22 
A Cross-National Comparison of Life/Non-Life Insurance 
Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP/GNP 1952-1982 
Year 
1952 
1962 
1972 
1977 
1980 
1982 
1986* 
U.K 
(1) 
1.78/2.74 
2.11/3.24 
2.64/3.05 
2.87/2.79 
2.90/2.98 
2.88/3.46 
8.0 
U.S.A Nigeria 
(2) (3) 
2.84/2.40 n/a 
3.60/2.61 0.30/0.05 
4.38/2.58 n/a 
5.05/2.57 0.21/0.04 
4.70/2.47 0.36/0.09 
4.52/2.70 0.40/0.12 
8.2 1.15 
Source: (1) columns (1) and (2) 1952-1982 figures, Diacon 1990,p.19 
(2) 1986 figures from Sigma, No.5/May 1988,p.13 
Notes: (1)*1986 figures represent total insurance market contributions 
to GDP (2) U.K and U.S.A figures expressed as a percentage of GNP, 
Nigerian data as a percentage of GDP 
Table 6.23 
Life Insurance fund and Reserves Contribution to GDP 
1977-1986 
Year Life Funds Life Funds/ 
N' 000 N'million GDP % 
1977 470,285 32,052 1.47 
1978 267,070 33,360 0.80 
1979 896,523 39,939 2.24 
1980 470,460 43,280 1.09 
1981 632,564 43,450 1.46 
1982 654,135 60,483 1.08 
1983 639,351 63,293 1.01 
1984 700,172 69,950 0.89 
1985 837,167 78,776 1.05 
1986 1,017,521 79,740 1.28 
Source: Compiled from premium and life fund data 
from the Insurance Department, Lagos 
45. See appendix B for GDP figures. 
46. UNCT AD TD/B/C.3/220,pp.3-14. This was a statistical survey on insurance and reinsurance operations in 
developing countries carried out in 1984. To date the study has not been updated. 
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Life office funds and reserves are important to the well-being of policyholders, life 
offices and the economy as a whole. These funds are set aside to meet the life offices 
future contractual obligations to policyholders and their adequacy and growth is 
essential for solvency purposes. Additionally, they are a source of the much needed 
investment funds in the economy. Although there is insufficient information to 
estimate individual company solvency, it follows that if the life fund and reserves are 
growing in real terms, policyholders interests are being protected. There has been 
little improvement in the economic significance of life funds and reserves over the 
period from 1977 to 1988. Average real growth rates for the life fund and capital and 
other reserves were about 6% and -6.8% respectively. 
Figure 60 
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The size of the total industry life fund in real terms increased between 1977 and 1982, 
the period of economic prosperity, dropping slightly between 1982 and 1983. 
However the figure more than doubled, rising to over N7,500,000 in 1986, and then 
started to decline progressively from that time (figure 6D). In order to place these 
increases in proper perspective, they were estimated as a percentage of total GDP 
over the period. This showed no significant improvement over the period. In fact the 
1986 ratio (1.28%) was less than the 1977 figure (1.47%) (table 6.23). The size of life 
market capital and contingency reserves actually decreased significantly in real terms 
over the period (figure 6E). 
Figure 6E 
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6.3.1 Reinsurance 
The primary reason for the establishment of the Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation in 
1977 was for the corporation to focus on developing the reinsurance market in 
Nigeria. One of the ways in which this was to be achieved was through the reduction 
of the level of market cessions to overseas reinsurers in order to increase the capacity 
of the domestic market. 
Although the average growth rate for retentions for the 1977-1988 period was 
apparently 15.2%, in real tenns this amounted to only 1.74%. The data on life insurer 
retentions indicates that generally speaking, insurers have been retaining, on average, 
over 90% of life premiums (table 6.27). The growth pattern of real retentions 
followed that of real premiums closely, suggesting that over the period the life offices 
retained more with rises in premium income and vice versa (figure 6F) In 1986, the 
offices were retaining almost all their premiums. 
Figure 6F 
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During the 1977-1988 period the amount of local ceSSIOns exceeded that of 
international cessions considerably. About N65 million worth of life premiums was 
ceded in the market out of which N21 million (about 32%) was accepted locally. The 
amount of direct international cessions to overseas (European) markets was about 6% 
of total cessions. Thus about 62% of the total market cessions were made to the 
Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation (Nigeria Re)47 who are enabled by law to receive 
compulsory cessions48 from the market. Comprehensive figures as to the amount of 
life insurance premiums ceded abroad by Nigeria Re were unavailable. Figures from 
the report of the 1986 Insurance Investigating Panel indicate that in the 1978-1983 
period,49 the Nigeria Re retained on average about 1.08% of life premiums ceded to 
it. For the 1978-1983 period this amounted to a little under N6000. It is not clear how 
much the Corporation received by way of overseas reinsurance acceptances. It is 
47. This deduction has been made in the absence of Nigeria Re data. However since the Insurance Department, and 
NiGerian Insurance Year Book statistics do not include Nigeria Re life premium figures. the assumption 
appears to be reasonable. 
48. The Nigeria Re decree requires compulsory cessions of 20% of premiums on each life policy. In practice, 
however, the Corporation reeived 40% compulsory cessions of aU life assurance treaties and retained the right 
of first refusal on facultative business (Life Insurance Vo1.4/90 June 1990,p.8.). 
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however significant that in 1988 it took a policy decision to the effect that as from 
January 1990, no life insurance risks would be reinsured outside the country. The 
reasons given for this decision to localise life reinsurance business in the country 
were: 
(1) to conserve scarce foreign exchange resources 
(2) to strengthen the local insurance market 
(3) to increase the quantum of life funds for investment in the country and 
(4) to build and develop reassurance expertise in the market.50 
However the real reasons behind this sudden policy shift appeared to be based on the 
fact that international reinsurers were cancelling their reinsurance treaties with the 
market because of non-payment of reinsurance premiums due to these reinsurers. 
Stringent contract terms were being imposed on the Nigerian market by these 
reinsurers as a result of the non-payment of premiums.51 The progressive devaluation 
of the Naira also rendered the business unprofitable for the international reinsurers 
since the premiums due to them had to be converted from local currency to foreign 
currency. It is unlikely that if the business was profitable in terms of the volume of 
reinsurance acceptances from overseas markets that the Nigeria Re would have made 
such a decision. The decision to localise life reassurance was not received 
ethusiastically by insurers in the market. The decision was seen to be impracticable 
because the Nigeria Re lacked the necessary expertise and capacity to implement such 
a policy. 52 The international reinsurers, in addition to accepting cessions from the 
Nigeria Re, provided ancillary services and technical assistance in such areas as 
product design and development, underwriting and rating, training and accounting 
services. Since the Nigeria Re had been dependent upon these reinsurers for these 
services, it is unlikely that they would be able to cope especially in view of the lack of 
skilled personnel in this area. The Nigeria Re would have to resort to negotiating 
technical assistance contracts with the foreign reinsurers. 53 This would involve 
49. This panel has been referred to in chapter one. It was authorised by the Government to examine the insurance 
market Despite repeated efforts it proved impossible to obtain a copy of the report. The figures quoted have 
been obtained from Falegan 1991,p.218. 
50. As stated by the Managing Director NICON. a government spokesman. See Life Insurance ibid,p.7. 
51. See "Ten Years of Professional Reinsurance in Nigeria". 1987. pp.56-59 and also WAICA Vol.XI 1987.p.153. 
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foreign currency disbursements overseas which could lead to increased operational 
costs since the international reinsurers have traditionally had the advantage in 
imposing contract terms. 
Table 6.24 
Nigerian Life Office Cessions 1977-1988 
Year Local 
Cessions(N) 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
4,608,627 
1,652,647 
3,197,871 
926,209 
881,494 
4,646,755 
6,165,934 
6,974,786 
7,434,204 
10,193,727 
9,900,526 
9,316,356 
Total 65,599,136 
International Cessions 
Cessions(N) Accepted(N) 
1,997,554 
2,599,294 
27,592 
360,719 
555,852 
509,332 
6,074,884 
9,406,604 
4,376,004 
5,320 
1,506 
4,596,848 21,317,813 
Source: (1) Nominal retention figures obtained from the Insurance 
Department (2) Retention ratio calculated from data from the 
Insurance Department 
Notes: (1) Retention ratio is given by Gross Premiums less Premiums 
ceded/Total Life Premium Income % (2) Cessions accepted indicates 
cessions accepted locally and is presumed to include retrocessions 
from the Nigeria Re. 
6.4 The Efficiency of the Nigerian Life Insurance Market 
The government's regulatory objectives are aimed at improving life insurance market 
efficiency. The study of life industry market structure in the previous section has 
shown that the market has been characterised by a high degree of concentration, low 
entry rates, and a low degree of innovative activity. The establishment of the national 
companies has been on the basis that they were to operate as lead companies in the 
market and assist in raising the operational efficiency of the market. The existence of 
such market characteristics raises questions about the efficiency of the market The 
52. Life Insurance, ibid,p.ll. 
53. The Managing Director of NICON stated that "I would indeed not be surprised if [the Nigeria Rel obtain 
special assistance in the next few years from overseas reassurers either by means of professional fees or on 
special tenns. It is difficult to see any way out..." Life Insurance, ibid, p.ll. 
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traditional structure-conduct-performance model is a long-run relationship and in the 
long-run, structure is assumed to determine conduct and performance. The 
performance or efficiency of the life market may be measured in terms of cost 
structures, investment performance, labour productivity and the level of retentions, 
among other things. Of particular importance is the concept of scale economies which 
refers to the relationship of average costs per unit of production to the scale or size of 
the firm. Economies of scale represent increased efficiency of operation on the part of 
the firm and a determination of the minimum efficient scale of output per unit of time 
at which the plant or firm can realize the lowest obtainable costs of production has 
significant implications for the direction in which form regulatory policy towards the 
industry should take. 
In this section, time senes and cross-sectional empirical analyses regarding life 
company efficiency have been employed in order to examine the factors which 
account for efficiency among the offices. 
Econometric models have been developed using the regression analysis technique. An 
explanation of this technique can be found in most basic econometric texts,54 and as 
such a detailed analysis of this technique will not be attempted here. The application 
of this technique enables the relative importance of the variables selected in the 
analyses to be estimated. Although the specification and estimation of econometric 
models has been extensively used to examine the relationships among variables for 
life industry data in some of the industrialised countries, this has not been the case 
with Nigerian life industry data. This means that there is no a priori information on 
which to base the selection of variables and their specification. Consequently, the 
decisions as to the variables used and the specification of their relationships in the 
various models were with regard to one or more of the following; (1) the underlying 
economic theory, (2) a review of the related literature in which similar techniques 
have been applied to data in the U.K and U.S.A. (3) the judgement and beliefs of 
experienced managerial personnel in the Nigerian life market and (4) intuition. For 
the cross-sectional average cost models employed in this thesis, heavy reliance has 
been placed on the literature relating to cost studies conducted in western markets. 55 
The other models have been developed mainly with regard to (1), (3) and (4) above. 
54. See, for example, Johnston 1987, Gujarati 1979 and Blalock 1985. 
55. See for example, Houston and Simon 1970, Pritchett 1972 and 1973, Richards and Colenutt 1975. Colenutt 
1977, Geehan 1977 and Pritchett and Brewster 1979 among others. 
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The regressIOn coefficients have been estimated usmg the ordinary least squares 
method which assumes a linear or intrinsically linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. The form of the model used is 
which states that at a particular point in time t, the dependent variable Y is determined 
by a linear combination of k-1 variables and a disturbance term u. The disturbance 
term represents all the variables which have not been included in the regression model 
for various reasons,56 and it also reflects the intrinsic randomness in the dependent 
variable Y which cannot be explained. Under certain assumptions, the ordinary least 
squares method provides the best linear unbiased estimate (BLUE)57 of the regression 
coefficients. These assumptions are as follows; (1) the mean or average value of the 
deviations of the disturbance term u, for any given independent variable X should be 
zero, (2) there is no serial correlation (autocorrelation) in the disturbances, (3) there is 
no correlation between the disturbances and the independent variables, (4) the 
variance of the disturbance term u for each independent variable X is constant, that is, 
they are homoscedastic and (5) each distribution term ui is distributed normally ( the 
normality function). 
Although the independent variables may be linear (or intrinsically linear) in the 
regression paran1eters B, they may not be linear in the variables X. In order to deal 
with this, in some of the models specified in this study, some of the independent 
variables have been transformed into their logarithmic and reciprocal forms. The 
models have been generated using the process of backward elimination. This was 
done by initially developing a model containing all the variables originally selected 
and dropping the variables with t-values of less than 1. 
Two tailed tests of significance (t-statistic) have been conducted at 5% and in some 
cases 10% level of significance. The t test has been applied to the independent 
variables to test the various hypotheses which are discussed in the following sections. 
The statistical significance of the models (with regard to the variables included) have 
56. For example the theory determining the behaviour of Y may be incomplete or quantitative infonnation about 
the variables may be unavailable. 
57. An estimator is said to be BLUE if it is linear. unbiased and has the least minimum variance of all the possible 
linear unbiased estimators. 
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been detennined by an examination of the F values generated. For all the models 
specified the null hypothesis (that the regression equation is not statistically 
significant) has been rejected at 5% level of significance. The goodness of fit of the 
models has been measured by the coefficient of multiple determination R 2, which 
measures the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable accounted for 
by the independent variables. The R 2 values reported are the adjusted R 2 coefficients 
which take into account the effect of the addition of more independent variables to the 
regression model. 
In situations where autocorrelation, multicollinearity or heteroscedacity are present, 
the ordinary least squares estimators of the regression equation may be inefficient. 
This means that the application of the t and F tests will no longer be valid. Detecting 
the presence of auto-correlation has, in the equations generated, been done by the 
application of the Durbin Watson test. 
The Durbin-Watson (OW) statistic has been applied at 1 % significance levels to time 
series data to test for the presence of positive or negative serial autocorrelation in the 
disturbance terms. For all the time series models specified, the null hypothesis of 
nonautocorrelated disturbances has been accepted. 
Detecting the presence of multicollinearity (the existence of a "perfect" or exact linear 
relationship among some or all the explanatory variables) is in practice difficult. 
However, multicollinearity is often suspected when for a particular regression 
equation, the adjusted coefficient of multiple determination R 2 is high, and in 
addition to this, the zero order correlations are high, but very few or none of the 
regression parameters is significant. 58 In all of the regression equations that have been 
employed, these characteristics were not detected, and on this basis, the conclusion 
has been drawn that there were no problems of multicollinearity. 
The Langrange multiplier (LM) test has been used to test the time series models for 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. The test is distributed as a chi-squared variate with 
one degree of freedom. In all the models the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was 
accepted. The test for normality is based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of 
residuals. The assumption of normality assumes normally distributed ui's with zero 
mean, constant variance and covariance of zero among the residuals. the test is 
58. See Gujarati 1979,pp.l81-182. 
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distributed as a chi-square variate with two degrees of freedom. Its importance lies in 
the fact that it simplifies estimation and testing of linear regression models. In all the 
models tested, the null hypothesis (the assumption of normality) was accepted. 
6.4.1 Average Costs and Economies of Scale 
The relationship between the average costs and life premium income of the life 
offices has been examined in order to investigate the existence or otherwise of 
economies of scale. This relationship is of particular importance because of the nature 
of Nigerian life industry structure, that is, an oligopolistic market with low entry rates. 
Some of the questions to be considered is whether the existence of economies of scale 
are responsible for the low entry rates in the market, and whether the larger offices are 
more cost efficient than the smaller ones. Apart from this, the importance of costs lies 
in the fact that life office estimate future expenses in order to actuarially determine 
the premiums to be charged on various policies. The higher the estimate of future 
costs (which are in part dependent upon historical costs and expectations of inflation), 
the higher the premium the policyholder is charged. Thus, cost inefficiencies in the 
market will raise the effective cost of life insurance to prospective policyholders. 
There are various measures that can be used to measure the size of life offices, such as 
premium income, sums assured in force and size of the life fund. These measures 
have been said to be of limited value in estimating costs because they do not consider 
many of the variables that influence operating expenses. 59 It has been however argued 
that premiums are more representative of an insurers importance in the market and as 
such this size measure has been used. 6o Since the linear form of the size variable was 
considered a poor fit, three transformations of the size measure for premiums were 
employed, the logarithmic, reciprocal logarithmic and reciprocal transfonnations. In 
each case the results of the function which estimated the parameters best have been 
reported. 
In the regression model generated, average costs (AC) have been defined as total 
operating costs (OE) which include management expenses, commissions paid and 
other expenses divided by total life premiums, and LP denotes life premiums. Other 
important variables apart from the size variables have also been considered to control 
59. See. for example. Pritchett 1971. Pritchett argued the case for using ActuaVStandard expense ratios wh.ich is 
said to be "reasonably reliable for intercompany comparisons of operating expenses." See also Pritchett, 1973 
and also Geehan 1985. 
61. See, for example, Colenutt 1977. 
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for differences among the life offices. These are, the rate of company growth, 
ownership structure and corporate form. A life office which is growing is likely to 
have higher costs because of commission payment arrangements. Commissions paid 
on new business underwritten usually constitute a high percentage of first year 
premiums. In order to control for this, a variable NPILP, first year premiums divided 
by total premiums has been included. This should be positively correlated with 
average costs. 
One of the main objectives for the restriction of the activities of foreign offices and 
the establishment of national companies was to improve market efficiency. Since the 
differences in ownership are qualitative rather than quantitative, dummy variables are 
used. The general rule is that if a qualitative variable has m categories, only m-l 
dummy variables should be introduced into the model. Since there are three possible 
categories of dummy variables, FOR for foreign life offices, NAT for national life 
offices and INO for indigenous life offices, only two dummy variables, FOR and 
NAT, have been included to investigate economies of scale among the different 
offices. These took the value of 1 for foreign companies and 0 otherwise and 1 for 
national companies and 0 otherwise. NAT has been defined as wholly, that is, 100% 
owned by the government, while FOR denotes companies with some degree of 
foreign equity. From the point of view of regulatory objectives, the national 
companies should show evidence of economies of scale, and as such NAT should be 
negatively correlated with average costs. 
The form of the offices might influence average costs. To determine whether there is 
any significant difference in costs associated with corporate form, a variable, CaMP, 
which takes the value of 1 for composite offices and 0 otherwise, has been included. 
The following regression models were generated for the 1981 and 1988 data: A 
simple regression model; 
[1 ] 
and a multiple regression model; 
[2] 
All the variable definitions are presented in table A 13 in appendix A. 
201 
One of the aims of the analysis is to compare estimates of the regression model in two 
different regulatory periods, in order to determine whether economies of scale existed 
in the different periods defined. In order to do this, it was considered necessary to 
compare cross-sectional data in these periods. The principal legislations relevant for 
this analysis came into operation in 1976 and 197761 and 1976/1977 should therefore 
serve as a benchmark period for comparing the cost structures of life offices in the 
market. However, micro data, that is individual company data, for the period before 
1981 were unavailable. As a result 1981 data have been used. Although this might be 
seen as a limitation in the analysis, this is not expected to detract from the analysis, if 
the effects of regulatory lag are taken into consideration. Thus a regulatory lag period 
of about 4 years (from 1977) has been assumed. This appears to be reasonable, 
especially in the Nigerian situation, where it takes some time for regulation to be 
enforced. 
The data used was obtained from the returns of insurance companies to the Insurance 
Department in Lagos. For the 1981 regression a sample of 18 life offices (out of the 
total of 25 for which returns were available) have been used. Seven companies were 
left 0 ut of the analysis because their cost data were unavailable or insufficient. The 
1988 sample contained 26 out of the 33 companies in the market. The offices 
excluded from the analysis were 
(1) companies that had been operating in the market for less than 10 years since the 
start up expenses of newly established companies are expected to be high in the 
first years of business, 
(2) companies transacting remsurance business exclusively smce they do not 
operate in the same market with the direct offices, 
(3) Companies for which the data were unavailable or insufficient. All the 
companies in both samples utilised both the agency method and direct selling 
method in the distribution of life insurance products. 
The results of the 1981 and 1988 regressions analysis are presented in table 6.25. Two 
regressions were run for each year. The first regression is a simple regression model 
which estimated the function using the size variable as the independent variable. 
62. The Insurance Decree 1976, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees 1977 and the Nigerian Reinsurance 
Corporation Decree 1977. 
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These models are denoted by OE11 and OE81 for 1981 and 1988 data respectively. 
The variable l/LogLP, denoting the reciprocal logarithmic transformation of the life 
premium, was used in the 1981 regressions. If economies of size were present it is 
expected that the coefficients on the reciprocal logarithmic premium transformations 
would be positive. 
OE11 and OE12 indicate the presence of economies of size in 1981. Introducing the 
variables NP/LP for new business underwritten and FOR for foreign life offices into 
the simple regression increased the explanatory power of the model by over 100%. 
Since the constants in both functions were positive, this indicates that the average 
costs decreased with size in a non-linear form. As expected the coefficient for new 
business underwritten which has been used as a proxy for growth was positive, 
suggesting that the offices growing rapidly have higher costs. The coefficient for 
foreign life offices was positive and statistically significant, indicating that for this 
category of life offices, expenses increased with size. The results suggest that the 
foreign companies were operating at higher cost levels than the other companies. 
Although the variables for national and composite life offices were initially included 
in the model, they were dropped due to lack of significance. 
Figure 60 displays the relationship between average cost and firm size. It illustrates 
the variation in cost structures among the various companies in the 1981 sample. The 
presence of economies of scale would suggest that the larger companies (in this case 
those nearer the 0 coordinates on the Y axis since the reciprocal values of the log 
transformation of life premiums has been used) should experience lower average cost 
levels compared with the relatively smaller ones. However, only 3 of the largest 5 
firms had average cost values lower than 20%, while the lowest average cost (10.9%) 
was obtained by a company that would be classified as relatively small. In fact the 
average cost figures for the largest 7 companies ranged from between 12-60 (%). The 
explanation for this probably lies in other factors such as the growth and ownership 
factors which are associated with higher average costs. 
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Table 6.25 
Cross-Sectional Average Cost Regression Analysis 
1981 &: 1988 
1981 
VARIABLES OE11 OE12 
Constant -43.01 
-86.67 
(-1.45) (-3.17)* 
LogLP 
1/LogLp 473.70 666.70 
(2.57)* (4.17)* 
liP 
NP/LP 0.17 
(2.02)** 
FOR 22.54 
(3.11)* 
NAT 
COMP 
S 15 98 12.86 
R2 24.70 51.20 
F 6.58- 6.96-
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
**t-statistic significant at 10% 
-F value significant at 5% 
1988 
OE81 OE82 
38.51 37.38 
(9.77)* (2.96)* 
6693008.00 6196698.00 
(3.15)* (2.55)* 
-0.03 
(-0.22) 
-2.39 
(-0.25) 
3.53 
(0.38) 
1.95 
(0.16) 
17.18 18.58 
26.40 13.80 
9.95- 1.80 
For the 1988 data, the reciprocal transfonnation of the life premiums were used in 
estimating the regression function. The simple regression model OE81 suggested the 
existence of economies of scale, with average costs decreasing with increases in size 
in a non-linear manner. The expanded model OE82 also indicates economies of scale, 
however, the addition of the ownership variables FOR and NAT, the structure 
variable COMP and the proxy for growth NP/LP decreased, rather than increased the 
explanatory power of the model since none of them was statistically significant. In 
fact the multiple regression model was statistically insignificant at 5% level of 
significance. Thus size accounted for a little over one quarter of the variation in 
average costs, while ownership was not a significant factor. This means that there 
could be some other variables which have not been included in the model which may 
account for the existence of economies of scale. An example is the quality of 
management, since good managers could be successful in controlling costs. However, 
since there was no way of estimating this effect, it could not be included in the model. 
Another factor could be the proportions of the various categories of life insurance 
policies underwritten by the various life offices, since different kind of policies have 
different associated costs. 
70 
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Since the relevant infonnation was not available, this also could not be included in the 
model. In addition to this, buyer preference could be an explanatory factor in the 
sense that potential policyholders are attracted to the bigger life offices because of the 
perceived quality of their products as compared with the other fringe life offices. This 
could stimulate economies of cumulative volume so that costs decline over time as a 
result of the learning or experience-curve effect. An estimate of the optimum size of 
company for this sample using the survivorship technique (see section 6.2.3) suggests 
that optimum size is achieved at premium incomes of N15 million and above. Only 
the largest 7 companies achieved this level of premium income. Although 8 of the 
largest 10 companies experienced average cost levels of less than 45%, quite a 
number (8) of the relatively smaller ones had average cost values of less than 35% 
(see figure 6H). This has implications for cost efficiency and suggests that although 
there is evidence for the existence of economies of scale, companies are not operating 
at minimum efficient scale. 
Although comprehensive reliable infonnation on prices, that is, premiums charged by 
the various offices is not available, market sources suggest that these are high. 62 This 
presents implications for the efficiency of the market. If the relatively bigger life 
offices, especially the top ten offices are charging high premiums despite the evidence 
for economies of scale, it would appear that policyholders are not getting a good deal. 
If the cost inefficient firms are also charging high rates, this would also contribute to 
market inefficiency because of the umbrella effect, where the inefficient frrms are 
shielded because of the high costs being charged by all firms in the market. The 
positive correlation between market share and profitability has been investigated and 
established in a number of studies.63 Therefore the large market shares of the bigger 
life offices (the top four life offices control over 50% of total life market premiums 
while the top ten offices control about 95% of the market), coupled with high 
premium rates in addition to scale economies lead to the conclusion that the relatively 
bigger life offices are more profitable than the others. The non availability of reliable 
operating profits data made it impossible for the hypothesis to be tested in this 
specific case but in the light of the available data it appears reasonable to make this 
conclusion. 
63. Infonnation obtained during discussions with industry senior managerial personnel during May-July 1991. 
64. See for example. Buzzell et Al1975; Bradley and Branch 1982 and Buzzell and Gale 1987. The ~ta for ~ese 
studies were obtained from the PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) database of the Markehng SCience 
Institute. The hypothesis that market leadership is the primary detenninant of profitability has however hccn 
challenged. See Woo and Cooper 1982 and Woo 1984. 
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Two time series models were tested to examine the movements in average costs over 
the years. The first model (AC1) examined the trend from 1977-1988, while the 
second model (AC2) examined the trend from 1979-1988. The operalisation of the 
models is as follows: 
[3] 
[4] 
For the time series data average costs were defined as all the expenses of management 
less commission payments divided by total life premiums. In both models the 
independent variables have been lagged by one period to take into account the lapses 
of time before the industry responded to the exogenous variables, that is, the shocks in 
the environment. MIL and OIB and are dummy variables. MIL takes the value of 1 
when the country was under military rule and 0 otherwise, OIB takes the value of 1 
during the era of economic prosperity (the oil boom years), and 0 otherwise. A 
dummy variable DEC59+4 was initially introduced into the model to account for the 
four year period after implementation of the 1976 Insurance Decree, the 1977 Nigeria 
Re Decree and the 1977 Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. The purpose was to 
determine whether economies of scale existed during this period of regulatory lag. 
The t-statistic on this variable was considerably less than one in all the 
transformations of the model, and as such it was dropped. The qualitative values of all 
the dummies used for both time series analysis are their midyear values. 
If economies of scale existed during this period, it is expected that the signs of the 
regression coefficients for the size variable Log LPt-l to be negative. The sign of MIL 
is expected to be positive because the greater part of this period coincided with 
increasing inflationary trends in the country, with rising consumer prices. During the 
oil boom era, consumer prices were still relatively lower and as such om is expected 
to take on a negative sign. 
AC2 takes into consideration the lagged variable NBt_l (the proxy for new business 
underwritten or growth). It is expected to take on a positive sign indicating the high 
costs associated with increased new business. Life offices sell various products which 
have different associated costs. Industrial insurance is high cost business while group 
life business is low cost. In order to control for this effect, a variable GPt-l, (which 
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has been lagged by a year) for group life insurance, has been introduced into the 
regression. It should be negatively correlated with average costs. 
Lapse ratios, the amount of life insurance lapsed divided by total life premiums, are 
an important determinant of average costs. If policies are lapsed during the early years 
of the contract, this could increase the costs of the company since acquisition costs 
might not have been recovered. This variable LRt_l (also lagged) is thus expected to 
be positively correlated with costs. It would have been ideal to introduce the 
preceding variables into the 1977-1988 regression, but the data were unavailable and 
as such this was not possible. 
Table 6.26 
Time Series Average Cost Regression Analysis 
1977-1988 
VARIABLES MEl ME2 ME3 
Constant 103.76 
(2.05) 
LogLPt-1 -10.57 
(-1.66) 
1/1ogLPt_1 13.20 
(0.41) 
20.21 
(8.04)* 
1/pt-1 -75255160.00 
(-0.35) 
MIL 8.06 6.14 5.59 
(4.13)* (2.88)* (2.94)* 
OIL -12.51 -7.90 -7.19 
(-3.53)* (-2.39)* (-3.23)* 
S 2.16 
R2 71.00 
Dw 2.12+ 
F 9.14~ 
LM [1] 1.40331' 
N [2] 0.4901'1' 
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
-F value significant at 5% 
2.55 
59.70 
2.12+ 
5.94~ 
0.740591' 
+Durbin Watson test applied at 1% significance level 
ALM test at 1 degree of freedom, 5% significance level 
AA Normality test at 2 degrees of freedom 
2.53 
60.20 
2.13+ 
6.02~ 
1.55461' 
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Table 6.27 
Time Series Average Cost 
Regression Analysis 1979-1988 
VARIABLES ME 
Constant 50.87 
(4.16)* 
NBt -l 7.12E-04 (7.88)* 
GPt-l -0.38 (-3.18)* 
LogLPt -l 0.06 (0.06) 
LRt -l -1.54 (-6.58)* 
MIL 4.82 
(5.98)* 
S 0.68 
R2 97.20 
Dw 2.57+ 
F 49.46-
LM [1] 1.14881'\ 
N [2] 1'\ 1'\ 
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
-F value significant at 5% 
+Durbin Watson test applied at 1% significance level 
ALM test at 1 degree of freedom, 5% significance level 
AAToo few observations to compute test statistic 
The results are presented in tables 6.26 and 6.27. In both models there was no 
evidence of the existence of economies of scale over the relevant time periods. For 
model ACl the regression containing the logarithmic function of size, LogLp, has a 
greater explanatory power than the other transformations, although in terms of 
significant t-statistics, the results are basically the same. Although the regression 
coefficient for size was negative, it was not significant. As expected, costs were high 
during military rule and low during economic prosperity. Model AC2 has greater 
explanatory power than ACl. In Model AC2, new business was found to be positively 
correlated with average costs, which confirms the hypothesis that new business 
growth is associated with increased costs, and as expected a high proportion of group 
life business results in lower costs. The coefficient for lapse ratio is however 
unexpectedly negative. This could be for a number of reasons. First, lapses could have 
occurred after the policies had been in force for a period long enough for all the 
associated acquisition costs to have been recovered. Second, since the management 
expenses do not include commission expenses, this could have had the effect of 
reducing the impact of lapses on average costs. As expected, costs were high during 
the military period. 
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Figure 61 shows the differences in expense ratios for a sample of six foreign,64 five 
indigenous65 and six national66 life offices over the 1980-1988 period. This sample 
will be referred to as the control sample. The life offices were selected on the basis of 
availability of the relevant data over the period and the sample contained the same 
offices over the period with the purpose of seeing the pattern of changes in expense 
ratios over the period. Foreign office expense ratios were on average higher than both 
the average total market ratios and those of the other categories of life offices. 67 
However, Figure 61 indicates that although the foreign life offices average ratios were 
higher, since 1985, they were on average lower than the national and indigenous life 
offices whose expense ratios rose to a peak of over 50% of premium receipts in 1985 
and 1986 respectively, at a time when the foreign life offices were keeping their 
expenses down. Although expenses appeared to drop around 1985, since 1987, they 
have been on the increase. Expenses figures from the Insurance Department show that 
the drop in expenses was mainly attributable to a decrease in commissions payments 
65. The African Alliance. American International. British American. Crusader. Lion of Africa. and Royal 
Exchange. 
66. The African Prudential. Marine and General. Rivbank, United Nigeria Life and Unity Life and Fire. 
67. Bendel Insurance. Gateway. Great Nigeria. NICON. Niger and Nigerian General. 
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to agents and other costs associated with the payment of agents on a non-commission 
basis (table 6.28). 
Table 6.28 
Distribution of Life Office Expenses 
1977-1988 (N'OOO) 
Year Agents Management Agents 
Commissions Expenses Compensation* 
1977 6572 10077 
1978 7578 12771 
1979 8035 11080 
1980 11563 18492 54 
1981 14393 22046 64 
1982 12459 19678 1386 
1983 14543 25845 2026 
1984 13254 28182 1691 
1985 14069 32908 2213 
1986 22448 45462 54 
1987 17571 41240 2695 
1988 22598 50345 2199 
*compensation to agents other than commissions payments 
Table 6.29 
Labour Productivity and Wage per Employee 
in the Nigerian Life Market 1987-1988 
Year 1987 1988 1987-1988 
LP/SL ME/SL LP/SL ME/SL LP/SL 
FOR 42093.6 7875.6 39662.2 9041.1 40877.9 
IND 7523.8 4334.3 6784.9 3711.8 7154.4 
NAT 22738.8 4959.3 38240.9 5595.5 30489.9 
ME/SL 
8058.4 
4023.1 
5277.4 
Since management expenses formed the greater part of the operating expenses of the 
life offices, the nature of the expenses of the various categories of life offices was 
analysed to determine whether the variation in expense ratios was due to variations in 
salary structure among the different categories of life offices. It was expected that 
salaries per employee would be higher in the foreign and indigenous life offices, since 
salaries in the national companies were paid in line with the civil service salary 
structure which is lower than private sector salaries. The life office returns at the 
Insurance Department did not differentiate between salaries and other categories of 
management expenses, and as such management expenses has been used as a proxy 
68. The expense, claims, investment and retentions data of the companies by class of ownership are reproduced in 
appendices A 7 to A 11. 
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for salaries. The estimate of average salary, or salary per employee has been defined 
as the ratio of management expenses to size of labour force. Since size of labour force 
data was unavailable for the years 1980-1986, estimates for the two years 1987-1988 
were made and the figures averaged. The average estimate figures show that as 
expected, salaries per employee were higher in the foreign life offices compared with 
the national and indigenous offices (table 6.29). In order to determine whether the 
higher salaries paid in the foreign offices was justified, labour productivity LP/SL (the 
total life premium income divided by the size of the labour force) was calculated for 
all categories of the life offices. The data indicated that labour productivity was 
higher in the foreign life offices. The two values were correlated and found to be 
positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.851. The implication is that the higher 
foreign life office management expenses is justified. The direction of the relationship 
is however unclear, that is, whether higher salaries result in greater productivity or 
vice versa. 
6.4.2 Claims Payments 
Claims costs are a significant proportion of life office expenses. Life offices 
endeavour to keep their claims ratios low so as to improve efficiency and profitability. 
Policyholders interests are served when, all things being equal,68 a high proportion of 
their premiums is returned to them in the form of claims payments. This is especially 
true in the Nigerian situation where policyholders complain about the offices inability 
or reluctance to compensate their policyholders. 
A regression model was initially developed with the independent variables of size and 
type of ownership of life office in order to investigate the direction of the relationship 
between claims and these variables. This however did not yield any significant 
results, and finally a simple regression model of the form 
Claims = 61 + 62 LP [5] 
was developed. In order to determine the form of the relationship between size and 
claims, three transformations of the independent variable LP (life premiums) have 
been undertaken. The independent variables LogLp, l/LogLp and l/Lp were used in 
69. This assumes the principles of insurance pricing (adequate. non-excessive and non-discriminatory rates) are 
being adhered to. 
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the regression and the dependent variable claims is the amount of claim payments 
divided by total life premium income. If economies of scale in claims exist, then the 
coefficient of LogLp would be expected to have a negative sign, and the coefficients 
l/LogLp and I/LP positive signs. The results indicate that there are no economies of 
size with respect to claims payments (table 6.30). 
Table 6.30 
Cross-Sectional Claims Payment 
1988 
VARIABLES Claims1 
Constant -35.58 
(-1.87) 
LogLP 7.35 
(2.50)* 
1/LogLP 
liP 
S 9.88 
R2 17.40 
F 6.26~ 
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
**t-statistic significant at 10% 
-F value significant at 5% 
Regression Analysis 
Claims2 Claims3 
59.36 14.04 
(3.02)* (5.88)* 
-303.20 
(-2.43)* 
-2339804.00 
(-1.82)** 
9.90 10.00 
16.40 8.50 
5.91~ 3.31~ 
The explanatory powers of the functions are however low, with the loglinear 
transformation LogLP exhibiting the greatest explanatory power (17.4%). This result 
suggests that there are other factors which account for the level of claims payments 
among the life offices. These could be such factors as mortality experience and the 
relative proportions of the various types of policies sold. This information was 
however unavailable. The results suggest that claims payments increase with size of 
company. The size of the regression coefficient is however small and as such it is 
doubtful whether this really implies increased return of premiums paid to 
policyholders. 
A time series model shown below was developed 
Claims = 8 1 + 82 LogLp + 83 MIL + 84 OIL 
[6] 
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The model was initially specified with the variable DEC59+4 in order to determine 
the direction of the relationship between claims ratios and the period of the regulatory 
lag. The t value for this variable was however less than 0.1 and it was dropped from 
the final model. 
Table 6.31 
Time Series Claims Cost 
Regression Analysis 1977-1988 
VARIABLES Claims 
Constant -47.25 
(-0.83) 
LogLp 7.43 
(1.05) 
Mil 6.43 
(3.51)* 
Oil 
-8.95 
(-2.38)* 
S 2.06 
R2 87.00 
Dw 2.39+ 
F 25.51-
LM [1] 2.8714" 
N [2] 0.495"" 
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
-F value significant at 5% 
+Durbin Watson test applied at 1% significance level 
ALM test at 1 degree of freedom, 5% significance level 
AA Normality test at 2 degrees of freedom 
The results show that claims ratios increased in the military period and decreased 
during the era of prosperity. The claims figures appear to indicate that the decrease in 
the OIL era might simply be as a result of increasing premium income in this period 
and not necessarily as a result of decreasing claims payments. The decreasing 
economic activity during the latter part of the military period specified in the study 
possibly resulted in more policies being lapsed/surrendered as a result of decreasing 
amounts of personal disposable income. 
A comparison of claims ratios for the control sample shows that over the period the 
national life offices had the highest claims ratios in the life market, an average of 
27.9% higher than the market average of 16.8%. The foreign offices average claims 
results (12.9%), although much lower than the national offices were more stable. This 
could mean either of two things. (1) The national offices are more policyholder 
interest oriented since they have higher claims ratios, or (2) The foreign offices by 
prudent underwriting procedures have been able to obtain better results on their 
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portfolio of business and as such keep claims expenses down. The claims figures of 
the various categories of life offices were analysed in order to determine which of the 
above applied. This was done by estimating the percentage of surrenders/lapses in the 
claims portfolios of the life offices. IT the percentage of surrenders in the portfolios of 
the national offices is high, this means that their high claims ratios are not in the 
policyholders interest because (1) this would be indicative of their inability to retain 
their life accounts (2) high surrender/lapse ratios are expensive and generally lead to 
increased costs which are eventually passed on to policyholders. 
Table 6.32 
Nigerian Life Offices Claims Analysis 
by Ownership 1980-1988 
Year FOR IND NAT 
1981 47.2 66.3 35.9 
1982 42.7 47.4 28.6 
1983 44.9 67.0 8.3 
1984 43.8 50.7 8.5 
1985 47.9 37.4 23.6 
1986 47.1 55.3 8.8 
1987 51.5 55.6 23.3 
AVG 39.6 54.2 19.6 
STD 16.4 9.7 10.3 
Note: AVG and STD denote mean and standard deviation respectively. 
The results are reported in table 6.32. The 1981 and 1988 values are not included 
because in these two years, surrenders were not differentiated from the total values of 
the claims paid and as such their values as a percentage of claims paid could not be 
estimated. On average, the national offices had the least percentage of surrenders as a 
percentage of their claims portfolio (19.6%), while the indigenous life offices had the 
highest (54.2%). The fact that the national life offices had the least percentage of 
surrenders suggests that although their claims ratios were high, their claims 
experience has been in the policyholders interests since most of these payments were 
actually made to policyholders as maturity or death payments. 
Figure 6J 
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6.4.3 Investment Performance 
The investment perlonnance of life offices is of utmost importance because of the 
nature of their liabilities, which are mainly long-tenn. In order to build up a fund from 
which future claims payments will be made, life offices must generate sufficient 
return on their invested assets, as well as make an underwriting profit. An attempt was 
made to generate cross-sectional models for the 1981 and 1988 data to examine, 
among other things, the variation in investment perlonnance according to the 
ownership of the life offices, and the effects of government regulation and control of 
life office investments. One of the objectives was to test the effects of size or market 
share influence on profits. These however did not yield any significant results with 
respect to the size and ownership variables and variables GS{f A BS{f A, RE{f A and 
Lff A which represent the amounts invested in government stocks, private stocks and 
bonds, real estate and loans to policyholders. 
However a times series model was developed which yielded some significant results. 
The fonn of the model was 
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ROA = 81 + 82 GS{fA + 83 BS{fA + 84 MIL + 85 OIB [7] 
Investment performance ROA has been measured as the pre-tax investment income of 
the life offices divided by total life market investment assets. 
It has been suggested in the literature on Nigerian insurance market investment 
behaviour that the Government's regulation of the investment behaviour of insurance 
companies affects their investment performance because portfolio managers do not 
have the advantage of flexibility in designing their investment portfolios. The two 
variables GS{f A and BS{f A were included in the model and since the return on 
government stocks is relatively much lower than the return on bonds and shares, the 
expectation was that GS{f A should be negatively correlated with, and BSrr A 
positively correlated with the return on investment. During the period of economic 
prosperity the variable OIB was expected to be positively correlated with the return 
on assets. During military rule the rate of return on invested assets was expected to be 
negatively correlated with investment performance, as a result of the effects of the 
structural adjustment programmes in the economy for most of this period. 
The model was initially regressed with the dummy variable DEC59+4, but since its t 
statistic was less than one, it was dropped from the final regression. The results of the 
regression (shown in table 6.33) show that surprisingly, the sign of the regression 
coefficient for government stock was positive, indicating that higher amounts 
invested in government stocks had a positive effect on the return on investment. In 
retrospect however, this could be attributed to the fact that by law the life offices were 
required to invest at least 25% of their portfolio in this category of investments. Since 
the financial markets were narrow, many life offices invested more than the 
prescribed minimum in these assets. Thus the higher amounts of funds invested in 
government stock relative to the other financial instruments, would compensate for 
the low return on the assets. 
Unexpectedly, ROA was found to be negatively correlated with OIB and positively 
correlated with MIL at 90% level of confidence. This raises some questions, since it 
suggests that the performance of the investment portfolio decreased during a period of 
economic prosperity when the return on investments was expected to be high. It could 
be argued that this has been caused by the low yields on government stock in the life 
offices investment portfolios. However the analysis has established a positive 
relationship between the variable GS{f A and ROA. This raises questions as to the 
efficiency of the life offices with respect to their investment practices. Cross-sectional 
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analyses could have presented a clearer picture, but as mentioned previously, no 
meaningful models could be generated from the available data. 69 
Table 6.33 
Time Series Investment Income 
Regression Analysis 1977-1988 
VARIABLES ROA 
Constant 1.67 
(0.56) 
GS/TA 0.14 
(2.22)* 
BS/TA 0.07 
(1.18) 
MIL 0.91 
(1.74)** 
OIB 
-1.87 
(-2.34)* 
S 0.55 
R2 83.60 
Dw 2.33+ 
F 14.99-
LM [1] 2.8714"'-
N [2] 0.495 
* t-statistic significant at 5% 
** t-statistic significant at 10% 
-F value significant at 5% 
+Durbin Watson test applied at 1% significance level 
ALM test at 1 degree of freedom, 5% significance level 
AA Normality test at 2 degrees of freedom 
The coefficient for the variable MIL was unexpectedly, positive. This when examined 
in retrospect may not be surprising. 
There are two possible explanations for this. First, the life offices could have 
perfonned so well during the initial period of military rule in the country which ended 
in 1979, and this could have offset low investment returns in the succeeding military 
period (1984-1988). Second, the measures taken by the Military Government in 
70. A pattern has been observed with respect to the micro data on profitability obtained from the returns of 
insurance companies; operating profits were either incomplete or looked suspiciously inaccurate and thus 
unreliable. Information from some market sources indicate that for reasons of taxation and confidentiality, 
some companies do not declare accurate returns in this area. As one source put it. "there are three separate sets 
of accounts, one for the tax office, one for the Insurance Department and the 'real' one for the company's 
records." This has made meaningful analysis in this area very difficult. if not impossible. The suspicion is that 
some of the life offices declare lower returns than what is actually obtained. On the other hand it could be 
argued that the data, although supplied to the Insurance Department has not been compiled accurately. 
Examination of the data does indeed indicate that this is sometimes the case. If this view is taken however, the 
assumption is that the regulatory agency personnel responsible for the compilation of returns somehow have an 
"aversion" to profitability data! 
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respect of the deregulation of the economy could have raised interest rates on the 
various financial instruments to the extent that the investment performance of the life 
offices considerably improved at this time. 
The data 70 for the control sample for this period shows that indeed the average life 
market investment performance did improve at this time. In addition to this, in real 
terms the quantity of foreign life office assets exceeded that of the national and 
indigenous life offices, with the indigenous offices having the least assets. On 
average, the foreign life offices contributed almost half of the invested funds in the 
life market. Total life market investments rose in real terms between 1977 and 1982, 
but they have been declining since 1985. In terms of investment performance, again, 
on average the national offices achieved a slightly higher rate of return on their assets, 
8.7% as compared to the life offices 8.5%. However, as in the case of the expenses 
and claims results, the foreign life office investment performance figures displayed 
less volatility than that of the national offices. The data shows that since 1985, the 
foreign life offices performance was improving, while the results for the national 
companies showed a decline. 
71. The 1983 individual company assets figures were missing from the returns files and these have been estimated 
by extrapolating the data. 
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6.4.4 Bonus Declarations 
Life offices declare bonuses on their with-profits participating policies. These bonus 
payments are made to with-profits policyholders, much in the same way that 
dividends are distributed to shareholders, and are made from the surplus of the offices 
which is drawn from the income from invested assets. It is therefore expected that the 
bonus rate will be positively correlated with the rate of return on assets. When this 
occurs, the participating policyholders interests are being protected since they are 
participating in the profits of the life offices. A time series model was fitted to 
determine the nature of the relationship between the dependent variable BR (bonus 
rate) and ROA (return on invested assets). The form of the model was 
[8] 
The dummy variables MIL, om, and DEC59+4 were initially included in the model 
but dropped for lack of significance. It was expected that bonus declarations would be 
positively correlated with the return on invested assets. + 
Table 6.34 
Time Series Bonus Declaration 
Regression Analysis 1977-1988 
VARIABLES 
Constant 
INV 
S 
R2 
Dw 
F 
LM [1] 
BR 
10.67 
(3.64)* 
-0.89 
(-2.18)* 
1.88 
25.50 
2.03+ 
4.77-
0.50645" 
* t-statistic significant at 5% 
- F value significant at 5% 
+ Durbin Watson test applied at 1% level of significance 
ALM test at 1 degree of freedom , 5% significance level 
The results show that the rate of bonus declared by the life offices actually decreased 
with increases in return on invested assets (table 6.34). Since the rate of bonus 
declared does not appear to be dependent on the economic conditions specified, the 
implication is that there are other factors which determined the life offices policy on 
bonus declarations, such as, the level of operating profits, and expected future 
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expenses. Since precise information on these variables was unavailable, they could 
not be included in the model. Cross-sectional regression analyses of the relationship 
between these variables for the years 1981 and 1988 did not yield any significant 
results. 
6.4.5 Labour Productivity 
A measure of the relative efficiency of the life offices would be their efficiency with 
respect to the amounts of premium generated by an individual employee. Life 
premiums serve as a proxy for the output of the firm. Since the products of the offices 
are not homogenous, it would be expected that output (and as such productivity) 
would vary with the product mix of individual offices, as well as the proportion of the 
various policies in the company's portfolio. This information was however 
unavailable. The unavailablity of comprehensive labour force data precluded a cross-
sectional study for 1981. An attempt was made to generate a regression model from 
1988 data to investigate the nature of the relationship between labour productivity, the 
various types of company, the offices asset base and size of labour force. The results 
did not however yield meaningful results. Insufficient data precluded a time series 
analysis of the data. 
In figure 6M the relationship between labour productivity (defined as LP/SL, the 
amount of total life premiums divided by the size of the labour force) and the 
logarithmic transformation of the size of total company assets (LogA) is displayed. 
Asset size has been employed as a measure of size of life office, as this variable is a 
better estimator of size of life office. The expectation was for labour productivity to 
increase with size of company if the labour force was efficient. The resultant graph 
yielded a curious result. It shows that as expected, there appears to be a direct 
relationship between labour productivity and asset size,71 with the smaller companies 
72. For the 1988 data asset size (Log A) and premium size (Log LP) were found to be highly correlated with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.88. 
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being less labour efficient in comparison with the larger ones. From asset size 5.8 to 
7.3 there was little variation in the labour efficiency indicator. However from asset 
size 7.6, there is a sharp change in the trend of the data. The labour efficiency 
indicator rises sharply and then falls again, though not to the level of the relatively 
smaller companies. There is a considerable variation in the values for 8 out of the 
biggest 10 life offices, so much so that it appears that the graph is displaying two 
different sets of data. The explanation for this may lie in the differences in the way in 
which the different categories of company report their data. It is also possible that the 
bigger companies are able to generate very large amounts of premium income with a 
relatively smaller work force. The obvious discontinuity however remains 
unexplained. 
6.4.6 Retentions 
One of the objectives of government regulation has been to increase the capacity of 
the life market by increasing the level of life office retentions, and keeping life 
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retentions however, has to be made with regard to the size and financial strength of 
individual offices. Thus, the level of capitalisation of the offices, as well as the 
amounts of reserves and size of life fund should be generally taken into consideration 
in making the retention decision. 
The retention pattern of the Nigerian life offices was modelled in order to determine 
the variables that explain the level of retentions in the market. An attempt was made 
to model two different functions for the years 1981 and 1988 were modelled. 
However only one, the 1981 model yielded a meaningful result. The 1981 model was 
generated as follows: 
[9] 
Since the view is taken in some industry circles that the level of capitalisation should 
be increased to raise market capacity by raising retention levels, a variable K, 
representing the level of paid up capital was initially specified in the model, but was 
dropped for lack of significance. A qualitative variable B2 which took the value 1 
when the level of capital exceeded Nl,OOO,OOO and a otherwise also was not 
statistically significant. The variable CRt-l defined as the level of capital and reserves 
in the previous year was included to take into account the effects of capitalisation and 
reserving. The lagged values of this variable was used in the model. The quantitative 
value for the size of the life fund was not included in the final regression as this was 
not a significant explanatory variable. However, a dummy variable B 1 takes on the 
value 1 where the size of the life fund is greater than N20 million and a otherwise. 
The expectation is that the level of retentions RR, which is the amount of life 
premium income retained within the company (less reinsurance ceded plus 
reinsurances accepted) divided by total life premiums, should increase with the level 
of capital and reserves, magnitude of life fund, and with the size of the company. In 
other words, it is expected that the decisions on retention levels in a particular year 
should be made with regard to the level of capital and reserves of the life office in the 
previous years. It was expected that the positive relationship should be stronger in the 
case of life offices with big life funds (B 1). A simple regression function was 
developed. The sample size was 16 rather than 18 firms, because the relevant data 
was unavailable for 2 firms. Table 6.35 shows that the model indicates that the level 
of capital and reserves was a significant factor determining life office retentions. 
When the variables for size of life fund, and type of ownership were introduced in a 
multiple regression, the results show in addition to the level of capital and reserves, a 
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multiple regression, the results show in addition to the level of capital and reserves, a 
big life fund was a detennining factor in retention decisions. The sign of the 
coefficients for the variables FOR and NAT were negative as well as significant 
indicating that retention ratios were low, especially in the case of the foreign life 
offices. 
Table 6.35 
Cross-Sectional Retentions Regression 
1981 
YEAR 1981S 1981M 
VARIABLES RR81 RR82 
Constant 85.94 90.05 
(27.32)* (28.26)* 
CRt -1 1.05E-05 1.03E-05 (3.03)* (3.13)* 
B1 7.07 
(2.04)** 
LogLPt_1 
FOR -11.12 
(-2.63)* 
NAT -7.09 
(-2.14)* 
S 5.74 4.99 
R2 33.80 49.90 
F 9.17- 4.99-
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
-F value significant at 5% 
**t-statistic significant at 10% 
Analysis 
Graphical representation (figure 6N) indicates some skewness (negative skewness). 
The implication is that there is some degree of bias in the estimators. However, the 
general trend appears to be that retention increases as the size of the capital and 
reserves increases. 
A time series model in the form 
[ 10] 
was estimated to examine the trend in retentions over time. The time series model 
contained one dummy variable DEC59+4. The variables for level of capitalisation, 
economic prosperity and military period were initially included in the model but were 
later dropped due to lack of significance. The results indicate a negative time series 
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was the premiums in the previous year lagged by two periods to take into account the 
trend effects. This suggests that the life offices in times when a trend towards 
decreasing premium income was observed, increased their percentage of retentions 
probably in order to generate some working capital. Retentions were positively 
correlated with DEC56+4, the period just following the implementation of the various 
regulatory rules (table 6.36 and figure 60). 
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Table 6.36 
Time Series Retention Ratios Regression Analysis 
1977-1988 
VARIABLES 
Constant 
LogLPt-2 
DEC59+4 
S 
R2 
Dw+ 
F 
LM [1] 
N [2] 
RR 
123.15 
(254.85)* 
-57.18 
(-46.59)* 
0.86 
(75.19)* 
0.04 
99.90 
2.11 
4289.99~ 
4.9775/'\ 
2.180/'\/'\ 
*t-statistic significant at 5% 
-F value significant at 5% 
+Durbin Watson test applied at 1% significance level 
ALM test at 1 degree of freedom, 10% significance level 
AA Normality test at 2 degrees of freedom 
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For the control sample, figure 60 shows that the total market retention ratios 
increased between 1977 and 1981 and have been declining slightly since then, 
although there was a slight increase between 1987 and 1988. Again on average the 
national offices retained more of their premiums (95.6%) than the foreign offices 
(94.6%), and their retention rates were more stable than that of the foreign offices. 
Table 6.37 
Nigerian Life Office Performance Ratios by Class of 
ownership 1980-1988 
Performance FOR IND NAT TOTAL CONTROL 
Indicator SAMPLE 
Expenses(%) 
AVG 37.2 36.5 33.5 35.9 35.7 
STD 4.7 8.8 10.4 4.4 7.1 
Claims(%) 
AVG 12.9 11.5 27.9 16.8 17.4 
STD 2.0 5.3 9.6 4.2 5.7 
ROA(%) 
AVG 8.2 8.0 8.7 7.6 8.1 
STD 2.2 1.9 3.5 1.1 2.2 
Retentions(%) 
AVG 94.6 93.9 95.6 95.6 94.7 
STD 2.1 3.0 1.2 1.1 1.8 
Assets (N'rnillion) 
AVG 2275.9 344.7 1435.8 5114.7 4056.4 
STD 351.4 64.7 379.5 
Note: (1) AVG denotes mean value and STD denoted the standard 
deviation (2) ROA denotes return on invested assets. 
SUMMARY 
The objectives of Government regulation of the Nigerian life insurance market have 
been aimed at protecting the policyholders interest, strengthening the domestic 
insurance and reinsurance markets, and enabling the market to make significant 
contributions to the nation's economic development A comparison of prior market 
structure and behavioural patterns in the Nigerian life market in two different periods 
(1960-1976; 1977-1988) leads to the following observations. 
Market structure has not changed appreciably and the market remams highly 
concentrated. Although the implementation of domestication policies resulted in 
changes in ownership of some life offices, the effect has been merely to transfer 
market power from the foreign life offices to some of the national and joint venture 
companies. Entry into and exit from the industry declined over the period, although 
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there is some evidence of competition among the largest life offices. The evidence of 
the existence economies of scale in the time period following the implementation of 
regulatory rules and in recent times suggests that entry barriers have been supported 
by the existence of economies of scale. 
The average results of life office performance indicators appear to suggest that the 
national life offices are leading the foreign life offices in terms of expenses, claims 
ratios and investment performance. However a close examination of the time series 
trends indicates that since 1985 foreign life offices expense ratios have been lower 
than those of the national companies. In addition to this, although the average expense 
ratios of the foreign offices were higher than those of the national life offices, this can 
be attributed to the higher salaries per employees paid in the foreign offices which 
appear to be justified by their higher labour productivity. Time series analysis 
indicates that in general, during the 1977-1988 period, there was no evidence for the 
existence of size economies in the market, with respect to management expenses, and 
the 1988 data show that labour productivity varies inversely with size of labour force. 
The 1988 cross-sectional data also indicate that most of the life offices (all the 
composites) were labour inefficient. 
Since 1986 the foreign life offices return on assets ratios has been higher than that of 
the national and indigenous life offices. Total life office investments rose in real terms 
over the period with the foreign life offices investing more funds in various financial 
instruments than the national and indigenous offices. However, the life offices still 
kept a significant proportion of their funds in liquid assets and their bonus payments 
decreased with increasing investment performance. 
Although the life market was the greatest contributor to total insurance industry 
premium income during the period from 1977-1988, the average growth rate in life 
premium income in real terms declined from 19.4% in the pre 1976 period to just 
3.4% in the period from 1976-1988. Expenses and claims ratios were high during the 
period of military rule reflecting the structural adjustments to the economy at the 
time. The total life industry expense ratios were stable during the early 1980's, rose in 
the mid '80's, fell, and since 1987, appeared to be on the increase again. Although the 
total life market claims ratio rose steadily over the period, there is evidence that an 
appreciable proportion of the claims payments were in the form of payments for 
lapses and surrenders. A measure of total market asset growth was achieved but this 
also appears to be on the decline. Similarly there was, in general, a steady increase in 
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the level of total market return on invested assets with the suggestion of a slight 
decline since 1987. The level of real capital and reserves fell consistently over the 
period. Although the size of the life fund rose between 1977 and 1986, it's total 
contribution to economic development did not improve. The products sold and 
services offered do not appear to have changed significantly, and the credibility of 
insurance intennediaries has not improved over the years. In addition, the patterns of 
distribution of life insurance products remained basically the same. The demand for 
life insurance was positively correlated with the level of personal disposable income 
in the economy, however, its contribution to economic development remained 
marginal and has been on the decline since 1983. 
Despite the fact that retention ratios in the life market have remained high, in real 
terms there has been a decline in retentions and by implication retention capacity. Life 
office retentions in real tenns rose slightly over the period, with the highest increases 
in the period just after the implementation of regulatory rules, but by 1988 they were 
almost at 1977 levels. Size of company and a big life fund appeared to be the 
significant factors determining retention levels. 
Thus the environment within which the life offices have been operating appears to 
have encouraged a market structure in which there is high concentration, significant 
barriers to entry and cost inefficiencies. This has serious implications for the 
performance of the life offices since high concentration invariably results in the 
misallocation of resources, increasing costs and poor economic perfonnance. The 
results appear to suggest that the Governments policy goals vis a vis the insurance 
market have achieved mixed results. A comparison of the experience of the national 
and foreign life offices does not indicate that the national offices are superior in terms 
of their perfonnance. There is imperfect competition in the market and the decline in 
capital and reserves and more recently the size of the life fund, is not in the 
policyholders interest. Despite policy efforts to stimulate and strengthen the market, 
growth in real tenns has been marginal. 
230 
Chapter 7 
Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The economic and political developments in Nigeria indicate that the country has 
been economically and politically unstable. Economic conditions are difficult, the 
communication systems are inadequate and there is a lack of adequate infrastructure, 
features that are characteristic of developing country economies. In an attempt to 
stabilise the economy, various governments have formulated and attempted to 
implement various fiscal and monetary policy measures. The frequent changes in 
political leadership has led to inconsistencies in government policy over the years and 
this has contributed to inadequacies in financial policy and by implication the 
problems of the economic system. The regulation of the Nigerian insurance market 
has been in response to the presence of market inefficiency. However, because there 
was in general, in the past, no clearly defined policy specific to the insurance sector, 
legislative action has been reactive, rather than planned or anticipatory. 
In recent times however, the Government has taken the view that the industry should 
be stimulated so as to be a potential generator of funds which are to be mobilised for 
the nation's economic development. In addition to this, a concern with the public 
interest has resulted in the Government's increasingly restrictive regulation of the 
insurance industry in general and the life insurance industry in particular. 
Consequently, the stated primary objectives of insurance regulation in the country 
have been focused on the protection of the public (consumer) interest and the 
development of a strong domestic insurance and reinsurance market, within the 
nation's developmental framework. This has led to two categories of insurance 
legislation: the industry specific rules which are primarily focused on the insurance 
industry, and the general economic policy which affect all sectors of the economy. 
As a result of the implementation of various regulatory rules, regulatory philosophy 
has shifted over the years from one of relative freedom of operation in the market to a 
system of close supervision of insurance business. Restrictions have been placed on 
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the insurance market on a services and establishments basis, so that the nature of 
legislation has been protectionist. The Government has actively participated in the life 
insurance industry not only through regulatory activity, but through the establishment 
and operation of national insurance companies. The activities of foreign insurers has 
been restricted by the acquisition of equity in these companies by private and public 
parties. 
However, the effectiveness of the industry specific rules has been hampered by, 
among other things, the inability of the Insurance Department to enforce the rules, 
and non-compliance with various aspects of the regulatory provisions. The 
Department is professionally understaffed and lacks the financial resources to carry 
out its responsibilities. Apart from this the Insurance Department is not an 
independent agency, and under military administrations especially, it does not appear 
to have a significant degree of decision making power. The actual determination of 
public policy with respect to the insurance industry appears to have been done by the 
political elite with relatively little influence from the civil service. 
In the 1960's, powerful (foreign) interest groups in the industry were able to influence 
legislative activity to the extent that the regulations in force were largely ineffective 
and mainly in the producer interest. In more recent times, the evidence suggests that 
the insurance industry has been unable to influence the nature and scope of regulatory 
policy and there is no evidence, at the present time, of regulatory capture. 
However, the intent of regulation and regulatory rules is one thing and the reality of 
the effect of the rules is another. Although the focus of regulatory effort is supposed 
to be a concern with the public and national economic interest, the changes in life 
industry structure, conduct and performance indicate that this has not been achieved. 
The growth of the life market in real terms has declined and the level of life industry 
capital and real reserves has, in real terms, been declining raising questions of life 
insurer solvency. Although the size of the total life industry life fund increased during 
the late 70's and early 80's, since the mid eighties, this has in real terms, been on the 
decline. The contribution of the life insurance market to GDP has not increased over 
the years. In addition to this, there is insufficient evidence to establish the success of 
the policy measures taken by the Government to improve the balance of payments 
position by reducing the amount of foreign currency reinsurance outflows to the 
western reinsurance markets. In comparative terms, the national life offices, which 
were established to improve market efficiency, have not established a clear-cut 
superiority over the foreign offices, although in terms of claims they appear to have 
~_ __ ,_,=~:.:~rationa1 efficiency. However, in terms of the 
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generation of funds invested in the economy and labour efficiency, the foreign offices 
have been performing better than the national life offices. The average perfonnance 
of the indigenous (domestic) life offices has been disappointing. Thus, in the 
Nigerian case, the implementation of restrictive protectionist policies in the life 
insurance market has not achieved the stated policy objectives. The problem however, 
is not with the principle of protectionism per se. The experience of some developing 
economies l has shown that such measures can be beneficial to the development of 
such markets. In the Nigerian situation, the failure of this policy to achieve stated 
goals has been as a result of, among other things, the inherent problems in economic 
structure and management and ineffective implementation and supervision. In 
addition to this, protectionism has been seen as the panacea for the nation's economic 
troubles and protectionist rules have been implemented without regard to the 
prevailing and long-term economic situation. The rules have to be fonnulated and 
applied in line with the economic framework and in some areas limited protectionist 
policies may have to be put in place to achieve the long-run desired results. There are 
some lessons to be learnt. In the past, the blanket application of a restrictive regime 
has resulted in the situation where the Government has, in recent times, been 
compelled to back-track on protectionist policies in some other sectors of the 
economy.2 
7.2 Recommendations 
In an attempt to improve insurance market efficiency, the Government is believed to 
be taking steps to promulgate and implement a new insurance decree. Although the 
provisions of the new decree were not known at the time of writing, there was 
speculation that the capital licensing requirement for the establishment of new life 
insurance companies was to be raised to N5 million to discourage the entry of 
inefficient insurers into the market. It was reported that industry sources wanted the 
capital base raised to NIO million.3 
However, although an increase in the capital base could possibly discourage the entry 
of the so called inefficient insurers into the market, this would not resolve the 
1. For example. Brazil. Korea and Tanzania (See section 3.4). 
2. See chapter four. section 4.2.3. pp.96-97. 
3. See for example. The Daily Champion. Wednesday May 22 1991,p.9; The Daily Times, Wednesday May 22. 
1991.p.27 and The Guardian on Sunday. May 12 1991,p.A3. 
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problems of market inefficiency and the slow growth of the life market. Indeed the 
modelling of life market retentions in this study revealed that the level of 
capitalisation is not a significant determinant of life office retentions, and as such an 
increase in the level of capitalisation is unlikely to increase the retention capacity of 
the market. The evidence from this study of the Nigerian life insurance market 
indicates that effective policy implementation has been hampered by, among other 
things, the general economic situation and lax supervision. Various problems need to 
be addressed, at the life industry level and on a general economic level, and this leads 
to the following recommendations. 
(1) The Government should, if it is committed to ensunng the growth and 
efficiency of the life insurance industry, review and amend some of the 
regulatory rules affecting the industry. Of particular significance are: 
(a) The provisions in the 1976 decree relating to the valuation of the assets and 
liabilities of the life offices.4 The way the rules stand, the life offices make 
valuations based on any valuation method which is to their liking. Although an 
actuarial valuation would be needed to assess the full impact of this, the fact 
that over the years the value of reserves (and more recently the life fund) have 
declined is evidence of the increasingly precarious position of the life offices in 
terms of future solvency. Apart from this, the instability of the financial market 
makes the estimation of future interest rates difficult and there is a danger that 
in the future a number of life offices could eventually collapse. Indeed, given 
the inadequacies of the supervisory system, there is a possibility that a number 
of companies could be operating at near insolvency levels. This should be a 
cause for concern and the recent experience of some big life insurers in some 
western markets has shown that this is a real danger. 5 
(b) In addition to this, the restrictions on life office investment activity6 need to be 
reviewed within the framework of the economy. The imposition of a maximum 
ceiling on investment in private shares and land, and a minimum level of 
investments in government assets may not be achieving the national interest. 
The life offices have, within the restrictive measures, been achieving a measure 
of success in tenns of investments returns. The life market (and indeed the 
4. See see chapter five, section 5.3.2.4, pp.l30 & 132. 
5. See for example. Kopcke and Randall (1991), Wright (1991). 
6. See for example, chapter five, section 5.3.2.4, p.130. 
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whole insurance sector) cannot continue to subsidise the Government by this 
indirect form of taxation. It is in the policyholders interest (and by implication 
the larger economic interest) if the life offices are allowed greater freedom in 
designing investment strategies which will result in higher returns on invested 
assets. If the improved performance of life offices leads to a better service to 
policyholders in terms of product quality, and this increases consumer 
confidence and investment in the life market, then ultimately this will be in the 
national economic interest since increased savings will ultimately be employed 
in economic development. 
(c) Under the provisions of the 1988 Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree7 
the Government took the steps to divest itself of all of its equity in insurance 
companies in which it had joint foreign and/or indigenous participation. The 
national companies however, were not subject to privatisation. The Government 
simply "commercialised" these companies. This meant that these companies 
would still continue to be fully owned by the Government, but would be 
expected to operate without any financial support from the Government. The 
companies would be left to raise capital from non-government sources. The 
Government, in order to make the measures it has been taking to deregulate the 
economy meaningful in the context of the life industry should divest itself of 
some of its equity in all the national companies. The experience over the years 
indicates that the national life offices have not achieved the status of "market 
leaders" for which they were primarily established, and this could be due to 
their having to operate within the generally inefficient bureaucratic framework 
of the Government. The Government's continued regulation of the industry in 
the form of extensive participation by the national companies has been costly in 
terms of resource allocation. Although it would be difficult to measure the full 
extent of the financial resources committed to the establishment and 
maintenance of these companies, the fact that they are not fulfilling their 
established purpose indicates that the costs outweigh any associated benefits. 
The Government has admitted the fact that it has failed to cover the costs of 
operation in it's public sector companies.8 In order to stimulate competition 
within the entire market, the partial privatisation provisions of the Privatisation 
decree should be extended to the national insurance companies and foreign and 
indigenous equity investment in these companies should be encouraged. The 
Government should withdraw from its present intensive participation in the 
7. Section chapter four, section 4.2.3, p.96. 
8. See section 4.23, p.96. 
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market and channel it's resources towards maintaining an effective regulatory 
mechanism. 
(d) Size, and not ownership appears to be one of the principle determinants of life 
insurer efficiency. This is the case with respect to economies of size, labour 
efficiency and to some extent, retentions. This leads to the suggestion that the 
Government, in developing and establishing regulatory rules should aim to 
encourage life insurance market consolidation. There is no need for the 
Government to continue it's extensive participation because the experience of 
the national companies (on the basis of the objectives for which they were 
established) does not justify their continued participation. 
(2) The Insurance Department cannot be expected to fulfil it's supervisory functions 
if it is continuously subject to financial and human resources handicaps. The 
Department cannot effectively perform it's functions (especially with respect to 
monitoring solvency and the approval of life policy forms and rates) without the 
requisite professional staff. Unless the Department is adequately funded and 
modern systems of record keeping installed, it will continue to be ineffective. 
The present civil service salary structure is insufficient to attract and keep the 
specialised personnel needed to monitor insurance company solvency among 
other things, and a review is overdue. 
(3) The Government's decision to localise the reinsurance activities of the life 
market was supposedly taken in the national interest. However, there appears to 
be a conflict with the national and policyholder interest. Although this decision, 
it is said, will result in the retention of more life funds within the market, which 
would possibly be in the national interest (if these funds are not expended on 
technical agreements with western reinsurers) it is not clear whether and how 
this will ultimately improve the quality of service to the policyholder. The fact 
that there is insufficient expertise in the area of life reinsurance is not disputed, 
and inefficiencies in this area will simply, among other things, raise the cost of 
life insurance to policyholders. Thus the Government's decision to was 
apparently based primarily on political considerations, and was precipitate 
given the present state of the insurance market. 
(4) The relationship between a viral economy and a viral life insurance industry has 
been established. In the case of the Nigerian life market, empirical analysis has 
established that about 80% of life office retention behaviour can be explained 
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by the total premium income of the life offices. The implication is clear-the life 
market has to generate more output in order to increase market capacity. 
However, the life market operates within the broader macro-environment and as 
long as the economic situation in the economy remains at the currently 
depressed levels, it will be difficult to stimulate and sustain effective growth in 
the industry. It is difficult to foresee, in the long-term, any significant 
improvement in life industry growth. The fact that over 70% of the life 
insurance sold is in the form of group life insurance is an indication of the 
seriousness of the situation. Unless people are "compelled" to purchase life 
policies through group plans at work, they will in general not utilise this form of 
saving and investment. 
It has to be recognised that the vanous economIC measures taken by the 
Government will impact on the industry, and a concerted effort has to be made 
to coordinate and integrate these with general economic measures to sustain a 
viable life market. It is not sufficient for the Government to state that its 
regulatory objectives are premised on a concern with the consumer and public 
interest. The reality of the situation is otherwise. If the Government does not 
demonstrate a real commitment to these goals then regulation of the industry 
will continue to be mere ritual. 
(5) In order to ensure the industry'S continuing survival, the life offices have to 
develop ways to obtain an increasing part of potential policyholder income. 
This means an emphasis on innovative activity and a willingness to fund 
research into the industry. 
The above recommendations as regards the (de)regulation of the life industry have 
been made with a view to stimulating allocative efficiency and enhancing the 
innovative and technological progressiveness of the market. The level of total market 
life premium income needs to be increased so that this sector of the economy could 
serve as a source through which funds could be effectively channelled into the capital 
market. It has to be recognised however that the recommendations made might have 
some possibly perverse effects on the life insurance and capital markets. For example, 
deregulation of investment activity may result in a reduction in the amount of funds 
that are invested in government assets, which could reduce the amount of capital 
funds available to the government. 
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In addition to this, life insurance market consolidation, while increasing general 
market efficiency might tend towards increasing monopoly power. However, it is 
expected that the welfare effects to be achieved from implementing these measures 
will outweigh any potentially negative effects. As an illustration, in the case of 
investment activity, although investment in the public sector might be considerably 
reduced, the expected increase in private sector investments is expected to be more 
than compensatory and to be beneficial to the life market as a whole. 
7.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
The conclusions made in this study are based on the results of the theoretical and 
empirical analysis of available data. However, it has to be recognised that these are 
subject to certain limitations in the data. It cannot be assumed that the variables 
employed in the empirical analysis have been measured without any errors. Error free 
measurement of variables is an ideal which is unfortunately not met in practice. in the 
case of the Nigerian life market data, there are limitations with respect to : 
(1) The non-availability of requisite data 
(2) Incomplete data across the spectrum of companies, that is, non-response errors 
(3) Inconsistencies across the various data sources, that is, reporting errors. 
These are mainly due to the problems with the collection and compilation of data on 
insurance market operations. The assumption has been made that the problems of 
measurement detailed above are of sufficiently small magnitude to enable the 
estimations based on the data to be acceptable. The tests for normality, auto-
correlation, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity that have been applied to the data 
suggest that these deficiencies are not a major problem. 
This study has attempted to throw some light on the interrelationships between 
regulation, structure, behaviour and performance in the Nigerian life market. The life 
insurance market is however, strictly speaking, not homogenous across product lines 
and separate individual studies of the individual life and group life markets would 
probably increase the understanding of the market. 
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Although regulatory effects in the non-life market have been studied, most, if not all, 
of this has been theoretical; and empirical analysis in this area will be needed to 
obtain a wider picture of the dynamics of the insurance industry as a whole. 
The impact of strategy upon operational profitability is also of utmost importance in 
any industry, and more especially in the life market where market share leadership 
predominates. A detailed study of the effects of market share and concentration on 
profitability is therefore essential to determining the efficiency or inefficiency of the 
insurance market. In addition to this there remains much work to be done concerning 
the nature of the oligopolistic bargain in the life market, how this is influenced by 
market structure and how this has affected industry performance. 
The effects of the localisation policies in respect of the reinsurance transaction is 
another area for future study. Since the Government has repeatedly placed emphasis 
on it's belief that this course of action is in the economic and policyholder interest, it 
is necessary to evaluate these effects, to arrive at a definite conclusion. 
In addition to this, an empirical analysis of the determinants of insurance company 
investment behaviour in the life and non-life markets is needed. 
The above presupposes the existence of a reliable and accessible database from which 
relevant data can be extracted in order to examine these issues. This at the time of 
writing is unfortunately, lacking. Although the Nigerian Insurance Association should 
be commended for independently attempting to do this, the information source is still 
seriously lacking in the necessary and requisite micro-company data which are so 
important in these types of analyses. There is obviously still a lot of work to be done 
in this area. 
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Table A1 
Nigerian Stock Exchange Transactions 1960-1989 
(N'million) 
Year Government Industrial Total 
Securities Securities 
Value % Value % Value 
1961 1.4 (94.0) 0.09 ( 6 . 0 ) 1.49 
1962 4.2 (92.7) 0.33 (7 .3) 4.52 
1963 9.7 (93.8) 0.64 ( 6 .2) 10.34 
1964 11.8 (84.3) 2.20 (15.7) 14.0 
1965 14.4 (90.6) 1.50 ( 9 .4) 15.99 
1966 15.2 (92.7) 1.20 (7 .3) 16.40 
1967 12.1 (97 .6) 0.30 (2 .4) 12.40 
1968 12.6 (98.5) 0.21 (1 .6) 12.81 
1969 16.2 (98.9) 0.18 (1 .1) 16.38 
1970 16.4 (98.6) 0.24 (1 .4) 16.64 
1971 16.3 (90.1) 1.80 ( 9 . 9 ) 18.10 
1972 26.2 (96.4) 0.98 (3 .6) 27.18 
1973 91.9 (99.4) 0.53 ( 0 . 6) 92.43 
1974 49.4 (97.4) 1.30 (2 .6) 50.70 
1975 62.8 (98.6) 0.90 (1 .4) 663.70 
1976 111.3 (99.5) 0.56 ( 0 .5) 111.86 
1977 178.8 (99.3) 1.22 ( 0 .7) 180.02 
1978 187.1 (98.8) 2.40 (1 .2) 189.50 
1979 257.5 (98.3) 4.40 (1 .7) 261.90 
1980 503.4 (98.3) 8.60 (1 .7) 512.00 
1981 324.0 (98.2) 6.10 (1 . 8) 332.10 
1982 206.5 (96.1) 8.30 (3 .9) 214.80 
1983 384.7 (96.7) 13.00 (3 .3) 397.70 
1984 402.8 (96.3) 15.40 (3 .7) 418.20 
1985 296.0 (92.7) 23.60 (7 .3) 319.60 
1986 470.3 (95.5) 23.70 (4 .5) 492.70 
1987 307.7 (88.4) 40.10 (11.6) 348.00 
1988 104.9 (76.3) 32.70 (23.7) 137.60 
1989 462.0 (88.5) 59.60 (11.5) 521.60 
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Nigerian Securities 
Exchange, Lagos 
242 
Table A2 
Nigerian Stock Exchange Transactions 1960-1989 
Year Government Industrial Total 
Securities Securities 
Number % Number % Number 
1961 92 (27.5) 242 (72.5) 334 
1962 175 (25.2) 520 (74.8) 695 
1963 296 (41.6) 415 (58.4) 711 
1964 404 (41.0) 581 (59.0) 985 
1965 391 (38.40 627 (61.6) 1018 
1966 501 (45.7) 595 (54.3) 1096 
1967 336 (44.0) 427 (56.0) 768 
1968 286 (44.3) 360 (55.7) 646 
1969 307 (55.5) 246 (52.2) 553 
1970 303 (47.8) 331 (52.2) 634 
1971 204 (21.4) 748 (78.6) 952 
1972 258 (28.7) 640 (71.3) 898 
1973 232 (34.4) 537 (65.6) 819 
1974 256 (8.4) 2807 (91.6) 3063 
1975 193 (27.8) 501 (72.2) 694 
1976 321 (31.6) 696 (68.4) 1017 
1977 337 (20.4) 1314 (79.6) 1651 
1978 243 ( 9 .8) 2230 (90.2) 2473 
1979 124 (3 .8) 3099 (96.1) 3223 
1980 211 (3 .0) 6843 (97 .0) 7054 
1981 117 (1 .1) 10101 (98.9) 10218 
1982 185 (2 .0) 9218 (98.0) 9403 
1983 291 (2 .4) 11625 (97.6) 11916 
1984 195 (1 .1) 17170 (98.9) 17365 
1985 320 ( 1 .4) 23060 (98.6) 23380 
1986 271 ( 0 .7) 26404 (99.3) 26583 
1987 230 (1 .2) 19353 (8 .8) 19583 
1988 88 ( 0 .5) 17928 (99.5) 18016 
1989 150 ( 0 .7) 22346 (99.3) 22496 
Source: As in Table AI 
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Table A3 
Interest Rate Structure and Inflation in Nigeria 
1960-1987 
Year Discount Deposit Lending Inflation Real 
Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Deposit 
Rate 
(1 ) (2 ) ( 3 ) (4 ) (2)-(4) 
1961 5.50 3.00 8.00 6.40 -3.40 
1962 4.50 3.00 7.00 5.30 -2.30 
1963 4.00 3.00 7.00 -2.70 5.70 
1964 5.00 3.00 7.50 0.80 2.20 
1965 5.00 3.50 7.50 4.10 -0.60 
1966 5.00 3.50 7.50 9.70 -6.20 
1967 5.00 3.50 7.50 -3.70 7.20 
1968 4.50 3.00 7.00 -0.50 3.50 
1969 4.50 3.00 7.00 0.20 2.80 
1970 4.50 3.00 7.00 13.70 -10.70 
1971 4.50 3.00 7.00 16.10 -13.10 
1972 4.50 3.00 7.00 2.70 0.34 
1973 4.50 3.00 7.00 5.70 -2.70 
1974 4.50 3.00 7.00 12.50 -9.50 
1975 3.50 3.50 6.25 33.60 -30.10 
1976 3.50 2.67 6.50 22.00 -19.33 
1977 4.00 2.83 6.00 21.40 -18.57 
1978 5.00 4.15 6.75 21.70 -17.55 
1979 5.00 4.47 7.79 11.70 -7.23 
1980 6.00 5.27 8.43 10.00 -4.73 
1981 6.00 5.72 8.92 20.80 -15.08 
1982 8.00 7.60 9.54 7.70 -0.10 
1983 8.00 7.41 9.98 23.20 -15.79 
1984 10.00 8.25 10.24 39.60 -31.35 
1985 10.00 9.12 9.43 5.50 3.62 
1986 10.00 9.24 9.50 5.40 4.10 
1987 10.00 13.09 13.96 10.20 3.76 
Source: Compiled from data from the IMF International Statistics 
Yearbook 1991, and the IMF Financial Statistics. 1961-1969 Deposit 
and Lending rate figures obtained from Ikhide 1990 in the Nigerian 
Financial Review 1990,p.44 
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Table A4 
yields on Government Stock 
9.75 FRN 22nd DS 1992 
9.75 FRN 22nd DS 1995 
6.00 FRN 15th DS 2001 
6.00 FRN 8th DS 1996 
6.00 FRN 12th DS 1999 
6.00 FRN 9th DS 1997 
6.00 FRN 3rd DS 1990 
6.00 FRN 5th DS 1993 
6.00 FRN 2nd DS 1989 
5.00 FRN 6th DS 1985 
5.75 FRN 1st DS 1988 
5.75 FRN 4th DS 1987 
6.00 FRN 4th DS 1992 
6.00 FRN 16th DS 2002 
Source: The Business Times, January 23, 1984 
Note: FRN denotes Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Stock 
Table A5 
yields on Selected Industrial Stock 
Ordinary Shares 
Financial 
Union Bank 
Manufacturing 
Cadbury 
Commercial 
UTC 
Pharmaceutical 
Glaxo Nig.Ltd 
Petroleum 
Total 
Construction 
Julius Berger 
1980 
% 
12.5 
40.0 
20.0 
30.9 
33.3 
19.6 
1985 
% 
15 
24.2 
11.0 
13.0 
45.7 
14.2 
DS, Development 
1991 
% 
24.8 
50.0 
20.0 
74.0 
50.0 
Source: Returns compiled from (1) 1980 figures, Business Times, 
June 24 1980, (2) 1985, Business Times, January 4 1985 (3) 1991, 
The Nigerian Stock Exchange Daily Official List, 4th October 1991 
Notes: Yields on shares calculated as follows: Total 
Dividend/Nominal Value of share % 
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Table A6 
Insurance Contribution to GDP 
1973-1986 
Year GDP Insurance Non-Life/Life % 
(1) (3) (3) 
1973/74 11224 0.16 0.11/0.05 
1974/75 18652 0.13 0.10/0.03 
1975/76 21475 0.19 0.16/0.03 
1976/77 27318 0.22 0.18/0.04 
1977/78 32052 0.25 0.21/0.04 
1978/79 33360 0.35 0.29/0.26 
1979/80 39939 0.41 0.33/0.08 
1980 43280 0.45 0.36/0.09 
1981 43450 0.52 0.40/0.12 
1982 60483 0.42 0.31/0.12 
1983 63293 0.31 0.20/0.12 
1984 69950 0.25 0.15/0.10 
1985 78776 0.18 0.11/0.07 
1986 79740 0.15 0.09/0.06 
Source: (1) GDP figures in N'OOO, 1973-1981, insurance contribution 
to GDP, obtained from Nigerian Gross Domestic Product and Allied 
Macro Aggregates: 1973/74-81, Vol.l No.1, April 1992, Federal 
Office of Statistics, Lagos (2) GDP figures 1982-1987 Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, Lagos, 1986 
Notes: (1) GDP figures at 1984 constant factor cost (2) Percentage 
contribution of life/non-life markets to total GDP estimated as 
follows: Direct Premiums (Life)/Direct Premiums (non-life) x Total 
percentage insurance contribution to GDP 
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Table A7 
Growth in Retentions of Nigerian Life Offices 
1977-1988 (N'OOO) 
Year Retentions Growth RR 
Nominal Real Nominal Real % 
1985=100 
1977 45,209 1,113 90.8 
1978 54,335 1,124 20.2 1.0 97.5 
1979 63,305 1,159 20.2 3.1 91.6 
1980 87,374 1,386 33.8 19.6 96.8 
1981 113,050 1,645 29.4 18.6 97.8 
1982 112,634 1,604 -0.4 -2.5 96.1 
1983 134,631 1,641 19.5 2.3 95.6 
1984 127,348 1,323 -5.4 -19.4 94.9 
1985 132,552 1,325 4.1 0.13 94.7 
1986 174,889 1,786 31.2 34.8 94.5 
1987 168,164 1,147 -3.8 -35.8 94.4 
1988 198,560 1,116 18.1 -2.7 95.5 
Note: (1) Retention figures obtained from Insurance Department, 
Lagos (2) Nominal figures have been deflated (3) RR denotes 
retention ratio. 
Table A8 
Expense Ratios By Ownership 
1980-1988 
Year FOR IND 
1980 40.1 35.3 
1981 34.5 23.7 
1982 47.7 30.4 
1983 30.8 35.1 
1984 39.5 30.8 
1985 34.9 53.1 
1986 33.9 41.8 
1987 34.3 30.7 
1988 39.1 47.4 
AVG 37.2 36.5 
STD 4.7 8.8 
AVGS 7 1 
STDS 35.8 
NAT MARKET 
28.5 34.5 
18.9 32.9 
27.9 35.3 
25.7 34.5 
27.5 31.8 
38.0 46.1 
54.0 38.7 
34.5 29.7 
46.1 39.8 
33.5 35.9 
10.4 4.4 
Note: AVG denotes average, STD standard deviation, STDS standard 
deviation of the control sample, and AVGS average of the control 
sample. 
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Table A9 
Nigerian Life Office 
Ownership 1980-1988 
Claims Ratios by 
Year FOR IND NAT MARKET 
1980 9.8 5.4 17.3 11.3 
1981 9 . 9 5.9 15.4 10.8 
1982 13.8 6.9 19.7 12.9 
1983 12.5 8.5 23.1 15.2 
1984 14.7 8.1 29.7 18.0 
1985 14.2 19.8 45.9 22.1 
1986 13.9 18.6 38.1 20.8 
1987 15.9 15.4 33.6 21.6 
1988 11.1 14.5 28.2 18.7 
AVG 12.9 11.5 27.9 16.8 
STD 2.0 5.3 9.6 4.2 
AVGS 17.4 
STDS 5.6 
Table A10 
Nigerian Life Office Investment Performance by 
Ownership 1980-1988 
Year FOR IND NAT MARKET 
1980 7.0 8.8 5.2 6.8 
1981 7.9 7.8 5.8 6.9 
1982 7.6 6.5 6.9 5.9 
1983 3.5 3.8 4.6 6.9 
1984 8.2 8.6 8.7 7.1 
1985 7.6 7.3 15.6 7.9 
1986 9.4 9.1 12.9 9.3 
1987 10.6 10.4 8.4 8.5 
1988 11.9 9 . 9 10.0 8.9 
AVG 8.2 8.0 8.7 7.6 
STD 2.2 1.9 3.5 1.2 
AVGS 8.1 
STDS 2.2 
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Table All 
Nigerian Life Office Investments by Ownership 
1980-1988 (N'OOO) 
Year FOR IND NAT MARKET 
1980 1758 246 1340 3739 
1981 2109 415 1646 4403 
1982 2444 317 1828 6273 
1983* 2304 316.6 1491 5214 
1984 2164 316 1154 4928 
1985 2720 371 1263 5608 
1986 2940 433 1569 6410 
1987 1966 266 1998 4841 
1988 2078 422 634 4617 
AVG 2275.9 344.7 1435.9 
STD 351.4 64.7 379.5 
Note: 1983 figures estimated by extrapolation 
Table A12 
Nigerian Life Office Retention Ratios 
by Ownership 1980-1988 
Year FOR IND NAT MARKET 
1980 95.3 92.2 95.7 96.8 
1981 93.9 97.0 92.9 97.8 
1982 97.2 96.5 96.9 96.1 
1983 91.6 98.8 95.7 95.6 
1984 96.2 96.1 95.1 94.9 
1985 91.7 92.5 94.5 94.7 
1986 97.1 90.9 96.5 94.5 
1987 92.7 89.3 96.5 94.4 
1988 96.1 92.4 96.5 95.5 
AVG 94.6 93.9 95.6 95.6 
STD 2.1 3.0 1.2 1.1 
AVGS 94.7 
STDS 1.8 
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Table A13 
Definitions of Variables Employed in Regression Analyses 
VARIABLES 
Ownership 
**FOR 
**NAT 
Structure 
**COMP 
Size 
LP 
LogLP 
l/LogLP 
l/P 
SL 
A/SL 
*LP/SL 
LogA 
CRt -1 
**B1 
Financial 
NP/LP 
GPt - 1 
NBt - 1 
LRt - 1 GS/TA 
BS/TA 
*ROA 
*AC 
*OE 
*ME 
*Claims 
*RR 
DEFINITIONS 
Foreign Life Offices 
National Life Offices 
Composite Life Offices 
Life Premium Income 
Log of Life Premium Income 
Reciprocal Log Life Premium Income 
Reciprocal Life Premium Income 
Size of Labour Force 
Total Assets per Size of Labour Force 
Labour Efficiency 
Log of Assets 
Capital & Reserves in year t-1 
Life Fund in excess of N20million 
New Life Business (% of Life Premiums) 
Goup Life Insurance in Force in year t-1 
New Businesss Underwritten in year t-1 
Lapse Ratio in year t-1 
Poportion of Total Assets ln Govt Stock 
Poportion of Total Assets ln Private stock 
Return on Invested Assets 
Average Cost Ratio 
Operating Costs Ratio 
Management Expense Ratio 
Claims Ratio 
Retention Ratio 
Regulatory Periods 
**MIL 
**OIB 
**DEC59+ 4 
Military Administration 
Oil Economy 
Regulatory Lag Period 
*Denotes independent variables 
**Denotes dummy variables 
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Interview Guide: Life Managers 
Section A: Introductory 
(Ql) Do you think that the insurance industry in Nigeria is 
heavily regulated or not? 
(Q2) What about the life insurance industry? 
(Q3) What is the basis for your opinion (why is that?) 
(Q4) Would you like to see more or less regulation of life 
insurance in this country? 
Section B: Market Structure 
(Ql) Could you give me an idea of the structure of the life 
insurance industry in this country? 
(Q2) Has this structure had any effect on the market? 
(Q3) In what way? 
(Q4) What in your opinion are the main barriers to entry into the 
life insurance industry? The general industry? 
Section C: Market Behaviour 
Product 
(Ql) What kinds of life insurance policies does your company 
sell? 
(Q2) What is the most popular policy underwritten? Least 
popular? Why is that? 
** Ask for supporting data, that is, proportion of annuities, 
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single premium policies, endowments, whole of life assurance 
e.t.c 
(Q3) In what way would you say regulation has had an impact if 
any, on your rating/pricing of life policies? 
In termediaries 
(Ql) What kinds of intermediaries do you utilise in the 
distribution of life insurance? 
(Q2) Which category would you say have been the most effective? 
(Q3) Could you give an estimate of the number of intermediaries 
your company employs? 
(Q4) What sort of problems do they encounter? 
(Q5) Would you like to see more or less regulation of the 
activities of insurance intermediaries in the market? 
Investments 
(Ql) What is your opinion of the regulatory provisions regarding 
investments? 
(Q2) Why is that? 
Section D: Public Policy 
(Ql) Do you feel that the Government consults with the industry 
before regulatory rules are introduced? 
(Q2) If this is the case, to what extent do you feel that the 
government takes the advice of the industry? 
(Q3) Do you find it relatively easy to comply with regulatory 
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rules such as solvency requirements 
filing business returns 
actuarial valuation of assets and liabilities 
contribution to the special provision fund? e.t.c 
(Q4) Which aspect(s) of regulatory policy are you most satisfied 
with? Dissatisfied with? 
Section E: Claims 
(Ql) What particular aspects of claims settlement is the most 
problematic? 
(Q2) Could you give me figures for your loss ratios over the last 
few years? 
Section F: Statistics 
(Ql) If interview has proceeded well, ask for raw data: 
Finn Size (GPI), reinsurance activities, expense ratios, loss 
ratios, underwriting profits, investment income, capital fund, 
from when company started operations to date. 
(Q2) Request for copies of annual reports and accounts. 
Section G: General 
Additional relevant information 
Check-list 
(A) Introduction ( ) 
(B) Market Structure ( ) 
(C) Market Behaviour ( ) 
Product ( ) 
Intermediaries ( ) 
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Investments ( ) 
(D) Public Policy ( ) 
(E) Claims ( ) 
(F) Statistics ( ) 
(G) General ( ) 
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Interview Guide: The Insurance Department 
Section A: Insurance Department Structure 
(Ql) What is the present structure of the Insurance department? 
How has this changed over the time period under 
consideration? 
(Define structure in terms of levels of hierarchy from the 
top to the bottom). 
Personnel 
Ql(a» How many staff are there in the Insurance Department? 
(b) What is the composition of the personnel, that is, Lawyers, 
Economists, Statisticians e.t.c. 
(c) What is the position of these personnel in terms of the 
organisational hierarchy? 
(d) Are all levels of staff involved in public policy making? 
How? 
(e) What is the level of staff turnover? High? Low? 
(t) Reasons for the above? 
(g) Do Insurance Department staff leave to take up appointments 
in the insurance industry? 
(h) Vice versa?, that is, do experienced people from industry 
come in to work at the agency? 
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Q(2) Who appoints the Director of Insurance? Other senior 
officials? 
Q(3) Does the Director of insurance appoint his own staff? 
Q(4) Who appoints the Managing Directors of NIeON, Nigerian Re 
and African Re ? 
Section B: Insurance Department Behaviour 
Q(l) How does the Department make regulatory decisions? 
(Q2) Who initiates the making of insurance laws? The agency? The 
industry? Others? 
Q(3) To what extent does the industry participate in public policy 
making directly relevant to the industry? 
(a) Formally?, that is, representation on the various committees. 
(b) Informally? How? 
Q(4) How are the potential costs/benefits of potential insurance 
laws to the industry assessed? 
(b) How are the benefits to the consumer assessed? 
Q(5) How is policing/compliance with the rules and regulations 
carried out? 
Q(6) How is the effectiveness of the work of the agency 
measured? 
Q(8) What are the difficulties encountered by the agency in the 
implementation of regulatory measures? 
Q(9) In what particular areas of insurance supervision does the 
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agency experience difficulties with non-compliance with 
rules? 
Q(10) How is this dealt with? 
Q(11a) Does the insurance industry cooperate closely with the 
agency? 
(b) If yes, in what ways? 
Q(12a) How many insurance firms have had their licenses cancelled 
since 1976? 
(b) Life firms, Brokers, Agents? 
specific figures needed 
Q(13a) How many insolvencies have occurred in the general and life 
market since 1976? 
(b) What are the causes of these insolvencies? 
Q(14) Are members of the regulatory agency allowed to have 
interests in the industry, for example, membership of boards 
of insurance companies, shareholdings? 
Section C: General 
(Generated from the discussions) 
Check List 
A Department Structure 
B Personnel 
C Department Behaviour 
Regulatory decisions 
Costs/benefits 
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Policing/compliance 
Difficulties in supervision 
Industry compliance 
Revocation of licenses 
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Table A13 
Definitions of Variables Employed in Regression Analyses 
VARIABLES 
Ownership 
**FOR 
**NAT 
Structure 
**COMP 
Size 
LP 
LogLP 
l/LogLP 
l/P 
SL 
A/SL 
*LP/SL 
LogA 
CRt - 1 
**B1 
Financial 
NP/LP 
GPt - 1 
NBt - 1 
LRt - 1 GS/TA 
BS/TA 
*ROA 
*AC 
*OE 
*ME 
*Claims 
*RR 
DEFINITIONS 
Foreign Life Offices 
National Life Offices 
Composite Life Offices 
Life Premium Income 
Log of Life Premium Income 
Reciprocal Log Life Premium Income 
Reciprocal Life Premium Income 
Size of Labour Force 
Total Assets per Size of Labour Force 
Labour Efficiency 
Log of Assets 
Capital & Reserves in year t-1 
Life Fund in excess of N20million 
New Life Business (% of Life Premiums) 
Goup Life Insurance in Force in year t-1 
New Businesss Underwritten in year t-1 
Lapse Ratio in year t-1 
poportion of Total Assets ln Govt Stock 
Poportion of Total Assets ln Private stock 
Return on Invested Assets 
Average Cost Ratio 
Operating Costs Ratio 
Management Expense Ratio 
Claims Ratio 
Retention Ratio 
Regulatory Periods 
**MIL 
**OIB 
**DEC59+ 4 
Military Administration 
Oil Economy 
Regulatory Lag Period 
*Denotes independent variables 
**Denotes dummy variables 
